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Abstract
Distributed protocols, typically expressed as stateful agents communicating asynchronously over buffered
communication channels, are difficult to design correctly. This difficulty has spurred decades of research in the
area of automated model-checking algorithms. In turn, practical implementations of model-checking
algorithms have enabled protocol developers to prove the correctness of such distributed protocols. However,
model-checking techniques are only marginally useful during the actual development of such protocols;
typically as a debugging aid once a reasonably complete version of the protocol has already been developed.
The actual development process itself is often tedious and requires the designer to reason about complex
interactions arising out of concurrency and asynchrony inherent to such protocols. In this dissertation we
describe program synthesis techniques which can be applied as an enabling technology to ease the task of
developing such protocols. Specifically, the programmer provides a natural, but incomplete description of the
protocol in an intuitive representation — such as scenarios or an incomplete protocol. This description
specifies the behavior of the protocol in the common cases. The programmer also specifies a set of high-level
formal requirements that a correct protocol is expected to satisfy. These requirements can include safety
requirements as well as liveness requirements in the
form of Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) formulas. We describe techniques to synthesize a correct protocol
which is consistent with the common-case behavior specified by the programmer and also satisfies the high-
level safety and liveness requirements set forth by the programmer. We also describe techniques for program
synthesis in general, which serve to enable the solutions to distributed protocol synthesis that this dissertation
explores.
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Abstract
Distributed protocols, typically expressed as stateful agents communicating asynchronously
over buffered communication channels, are difficult to design correctly. This difficulty has
spurred decades of research in the area of automated model-checking algorithms. In turn,
practical implementations of model-checking algorithms have enabled protocol developers
to prove the correctness of such distributed protocols. However, model-checking techniques
are only marginally useful during the actual development of such protocols; typically as
a debugging aid once a reasonably complete version of the protocol has already been
developed. The actual development process itself is often tedious and requires the designer
to reason about complex interactions arising out of concurrency and asynchrony inherent to
such protocols. In this dissertation we describe program synthesis techniques which can be
applied as an enabling technology to ease the task of developing such protocols. Specifically,
the programmer provides a natural, but incomplete description of the protocol in an intuitive
representation — such as scenarios or an incomplete protocol. This description specifies
the behavior of the protocol in the common cases. The programmer also specifies a set
of high-level formal requirements that a correct protocol is expected to satisfy. These
requirements can include safety requirements as well as liveness requirements in the
form of Linear Temporal Logic (ltl) formulas. We describe techniques to synthesize
a correct protocol which is consistent with the common-case behavior specified by the
programmer and also satisfies the high-level safety and liveness requirements set forth by
the programmer. We also describe techniques for program synthesis in general, which serve
to enable the solutions to distributed protocol synthesis that this dissertation explores.
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1
Introduction
Protocols for coordination among concurrent processes are an essential component of modern
multiprocessor and distributed systems. The multitude of behaviors arising due to asynchrony
and concurrency makes the design of such protocols difficult. Consequently, analyzing such
protocols has been a central theme of research in formal verification for decades. Now that
verification tools have matured to a point where they can be applied to find bugs in real-
world protocols, a promising research direction is to develop and leverage program synthesis
techniques as an enabling technology to simplify the design process of such protocols via more
intuitive programming abstractions for specifying the desired behavior.
Traditionally, a distributed protocol has been modeled as a set of communicating processes,
where each process is described as an extended state machine which has a finite number of
control states or locations, along with a finite number of typed state variables. The correctness
of a protocol is specified by both safety and liveness requirements. Model-checking techniques
are then used to check that the protocol satisfies the safety and liveness requirements. In
many cases, the model-checking algorithms are completely automatic. It is thus natural to
ask if we can derive a correct protocol implementation starting from a set of safety and
liveness requirements. And indeed, in reactive synthesis [RW89, PR89, BJP+12], the goal is to
automatically derive a non-distributed protocol, or a single reactive module, from its correctness
requirements specified in temporal logic. However, if we require the implementation to be
distributed, then reactive synthesis is undecidable [PR90, LT00, Tri04, FS05]. Furthermore, it
is not clear that precisely codifying the behavior of the entire protocol using an intricate and
complex formula in some temporal logic of choice is necessarily an easier or simpler task than
specifying an operational description or an executable model of the protocol.
1
This dissertation proposes an alternative, and potentially more feasible approach inspired by
program sketching [SLRBE05]. Our approach asks the programmer to specify the common case
behavior of the protocol as a set of incomplete communicating processes, which may include
some unknown functions. These unknown functions could be used in the guards for transitions
— which describe the condition under which the transition in question can be executed —
and the update functions to state variables on transitions — which describe how the state
variables of the state machine evolve upon execution of the transition. The programmer could
also provide some information on the missing behavior. This information might be in the
form of input-output examples describing the behavior of the unknown functions, or could be
information about exactly what behavior is left unspecified, for example, information about
what kinds of messages need to be handled at a given point. The programmer would also have
to state the high-level correctness requirements for the protocol in a temporal logic of choice.1
The role of the synthesizer is to complete the incomplete protocol provided by the programmer,
such that the completed protocol (a) satisfies the high-level correctness requirements set forth
by the programmer, and (b) is consistent with the information provided by the programmer
about the unspecified behavior. This methodology for protocol specification can be viewed as
a fruitful collaboration between the designer and the synthesis tool: the programmer has to
describe the structure of the desired protocol, but some details that the programmer is unsure
about, for instance, regarding corner cases and handling of unexpected messages, are filled in
automatically by the tool.
In our formalization of the synthesis problem, processes communicate using input/output
channels that carry typed messages. Each process is described by a state machine with a set of
typed state variables. Transitions consist of guards — that test some condition over the state
variables — and updates to state variables and fields of messages to be sent. Such guards and
updates can involve unknown (typed) functions to be filled in by the synthesizer. In many
distributed protocols, such as cache coherence protocols, processes are expected to behave in a
symmetric manner. Thus, we allow variables to have symmetric types that restrict the read/write
accesses to obey symmetry constraints. To specify safety and liveness requirements, we allow
the use of safety and liveness (or Büchi) monitors respectively. Finally, fairness assumptions
are utilized to restrict incorrect executions to those that are fair. It is worth noting that in
1Note that these correctness requirements are typically much less detailed and simpler than the temporal logic
formulae expected as input to typical reactive synthesis algorithms which attempt to synthesize a protocol purely
from a specification in temporal logic.
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Figure 1.1: The traditional methodology for designing distributed protocols
verification one can get useful analysis results by focusing solely on safety requirements. In
synthesis, however, ignoring liveness requirements and fairness assumptions, typically results
in trivial solutions. The protocol completion problem, then, is, given a set of extended state
machines with unknown guards and update functions, to find expressions for the unknown
functions so that the composition of the resulting machines does not have an accepting fair
execution.
In the rest of this chapter, we describe the design methodology we propose as part of this
dissertation, as well as compare and contrast it with the traditional design methodology, by
means of illustrative examples.
1.1 The Traditional Design Methodology
Figure 1.1 describes how distributed protocols are typically constructed. The programmer
starts off with a variety of artifacts which describe the desired protocol. These can be in the
form of scenarios, which describe the behavior of the protocol under specific use-cases, or
as incomplete state machines which describe the common-case behavior of the protocol. In
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addition, the programmer usually also has in mind some high-level correctness requirements
that the protocol is expected to satisfy. These requirements could include safety requirements —
which ensure that the protocol never does something “bad” — as well as liveness requirements
— which ensure that the protocol eventually does something “good”. The programmer then
manually constructs an executable model (or implementation) of the protocol. This executable
model can be described in various languages and formalisms, such as the Promela modeling
language [Hol97], or the Murϕ modeling language [ID96, Dil96], for example.
The resulting implementation is then checked for correctness using some combination of
verification and testing techniques. For example, testing techniques could be used to check
for correct behavior with respect to different scenarios specified by the programmer, whereas
verification techniques could check that the candidate protocol satisfies the high-level safety and
liveness specifications set forth by the programmer. In the event that an error is found during
this check for correctness, the verification or testing framework provides the programmer with a
concrete execution of the candidate protocol that demonstrates the error. The programmer then
uses this information to refine or correct the behavior of the candidate protocol in the context
of the specific counterexample currently under consideration. This process often requires the
programmer to reason globally about the protocol to avoid introducing new errors as in the
corrected version of the protocol. This tedious process of discovering bugs and correcting the
protocol is iterated until a correct protocol is constructed. We now illustrate this process with
a concrete example of how a simple cache coherence protocol might be constructed using this
methodology.
1.1.1 The VI Cache Coherence Protocol
A cache coherence protocol ensures that all the processors in a multiprocessor system see a
consistent view of data, despite the possibility that data values might be cached— and modified
— by other processors in their local caches. Any coherence protocol essentially needs to ensure
that the coherence property holds: The value read by any processor from a memory location
must be the most recent value written to that memory location by any other processor in the
system. Directory-based coherence protocols ensure that this property is maintained by using
a centralized directory which is responsible for granting permissions to processors to read and
write to memory locations. The processors and the directory then coordinate by exchanging
messages with each other to acquire read and write permissions for memory locations in a
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Figure 1.2: Communication Architecture of the VI Cache Coherence Protocol
manner that does not violate the coherence property. For the purpose of illustrating how
the traditional design methodology might be applied, we consider a simple cache coherence
protocol called the Valid-Invalid (VI) protocol.
Figure 1.2 depicts the communication architecture of a variant of the VI cache coherence
protocol, shown here with two cache state machines for clarity. The same architecture general-
izes to an arbitrary number of cache state machines. The protocol consists of a state machine
called the “Directory”, which maintains the knowledge of which cache currently holds a cached
copy of each data address. The caches communicate requests for access to a data block through
the reliable, but unordered buffer named “DirBuffer”. All communication in the protocol is
buffered and asynchronous. The only exception is that communication between the caches and
their respective environments occurs synchronously. The buffers have a finite size, but are sized
to be large enough to ensure that no state machine ever blocks on a full buffer. The directory
processes requests in the “DirBuffer” in an arbitrary order, and communicates commands to
the caches by the buffers “C1Buffer” and “C2Buffer”. The caches on their part, again process
commands in an arbitrary order. Finally, we note that a state machine need not necessarily
respond to all commands and requests at all points in time. In other words, a state machine is
allowed to defer the processing of some command or request, which is in a buffer, until some
condition has been enabled.
The working of the VI coherence protocol is perhaps best explained using the scenarios
shown in Figure 1.3. The protocol consists of two classes of state machines: The cache controller
state machines, whose behaviors are symmetric, denoted by C1, C2, . . . , Cn in Figure 1.3, and
a singular directory state machine, denoted by D in Figure 1.3. Each cache machine has a
state variable named cdata which contains the cached value of data at any point, and can be
undefined if the cache does not have an up-do-date cached copy of the data. The directory
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Figure 1.3: The scenarios for the VI protocol
machine has two state variables: one named ddata which represents the most up-to-date value
of the data when no cache in the system has a valid cached copy of the data; the other variable
named owner denotes which cache (if any) currently contains the most up-to-date value of the
data. The description of the VI coherence protocol is presented here in a slightly abstracted
fashion for ease of understanding. In an actual implementation, the directory state machine
would need a few more state variables to track the cache whose request is currently being
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serviced. Note that the inputs from the environments for the caches are denoted by red arrows
in Figure 1.3.
The first scenario shown in Figure 1.3(a) describes the how the protocol behaves when a
cache requests ownership, i.e., read and write permissions, and no other cache currently has
ownership of the data block in question. In this situation, all the caches as well as the directory
are in the Invalid state, denoted by I. In this situation, the directory itself is assumed to possess
the most up-to-date copy of the data value. The cache requests the directory for access by
sending the directory a GET message and the directory responds immediately, with a response
message RSP, which contains the most up-to-date value of the data block, granting ownership
to the cache. Following this the cache unblocks the directory by sending an acknowledgment
message ACK. Upon receipt of the ACK message, the directory notes that the cache C1 is now
the owner of the block and transitions to the Valid state, denoted by V.
The second scenario shown in Figure 1.3(b) describes how a cache can relinquish ownership
on a given data block. In this situation, the cache under question must own the data block,
and thus it, along with the directory, must be in the Valid state denoted by V. The cache sends
a WBREQ message containing the most up-to-date value of the data block to the directory. The
directory updates its data block with the value received from the cache, and also notes that
no cache currently owns the data block in question, by setting its owner state variable to be
undefined. Following this, it responds with a WBACK message to the cache and transitions to
the Invalid state, denoted by I. The cache, upon receipt of the WBACK message invalidates its
local copy of the data, and also transitions to the Invalid state, denoted by I.
The third scenario, shown in Figure 1.3(c) describes how the protocol works when a cache
requests ownership of a data block, but another cache already has ownership of the block. This
situation is represented by the cache C1 being in the Invalid state, and the directory as well as
the cache C2 being in the Valid state. From the perspective of cache C1, this scenario is the same
as the one shown in Figure 1.3(a). However, the directory, upon receipt of the GET message
sends an invalidation message INV to the cache C2 which currently owns the data block. Upon
receipt of the INV message, cache C2 responds by sending an acknowledgment of invalidation,
INVACK, which also contains the most up-to-date value of the data block, to the directory and
transitions to the Invalid state. Its permissions have now been stripped by the directory. Upon
receipt of the INVACK message from C2, the directory updates its local copy of the data. From
this point on, the scenario proceeds in a manner similar to the scenario shown in Figure 1.3(a).
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Figure 1.5: The incomplete state machine for the directory in the VI protocol
In addition to the coherence property—which all cache coherence protocols ought to satisfy
— it is desirable that each cache coherence protocol satisfies a set of liveness requirements,
to ensure progress. In the case of the VI cache coherence protocol, the intuitive liveness
requirement is that a GET request from every cache eventually results in the receipt of an RSP
message with the most up-to-date value of the data by the cache that has issued a GET request.
Additionally, a similar liveness requirement is also desirable with respect to the WBREQ request,
which must eventually result in the receipt of a message that results in the cache transitioning
to the Invalid or I state.
1.1.2 Designing Distributed Protocols: The Easy Parts
Based on the three common-case scenarios shown in Figure 1.3, the programmer constructs the
state machines for the caches and the directory as shown in Figures 1.4 and 1.5 respectively.
8
C1
I
D
V
owner = C2
C2
V
REQ
WB
GET
INV
??? B
WBR
EQ
{dat
a :=
cdat
a}
A ???
Figure 1.6: A scenario implied by the scenarios shown in Figure 1.3 in the VI protocol
This translation is rather straight-forward and can even be automated in some cases, as we
shall discuss in Chapter 7. Upon attempting to verify the correctness of the protocol described
by the state machines in Figures 1.4 and 1.5, a verification tool presents the execution shown
in Figure 1.6 as a counterexample which results in a deadlock.
The execution shown in Figure 1.6 occurs as a result of the interleaving of the scenarios
shown in Figure 1.3(b) and Figure 1.3(c). Specifically, the state machines C1 and the directory
are proceeding according to the scenario shown in Figure 1.3(c). The cache C2 does not have
any knowledge about the state of other state machines in the system and proceeds according
to the scenario shown in Figure 1.3(b) upon receiving a WB command from its environment.
This results in a deadlock. the directory state machine is expecting an INVACK message, but
instead receives a WBREQ message. The state machine for the cache C2 is expecting a WBACK
message, but instead receives an INV message. Neither the cache nor the directory state
machines have a transition which describes what needs to happen in this circumstance, thus
resulting in a deadlocked protocol. Note that it is impossible to avoid this situation, owing to
the distributed nature of the protocol. This naturally leads us to a discussion about the difficult
parts of designing a protocol using the traditional methodology.
1.1.3 Designing Distributed Protocols: The Difficult Parts
To specify the correct behavior in the specific scenario shown in Figure 1.6, the programmer
needs to handle the behaviors in the state machines shown using dashed transitions to an
unknown target state in Figures 1.7 and 1.8. Note that the locations labeled A and B in
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Figure 1.8: Unhandled behavior in the directory state machine for the VI protocol
Figure 1.6 correspond to the state q4 in the directory state machine and the state labeled q5 in
the cache state machine respectively. The transitions represented by the dashed arrows thus
represent the new transitions that must be added to eliminate the deadlock in the execution
shown in Figure 1.6.
To eliminate the deadlocking execution, the programmer now needs to answer the following
correlated questions:
1. Which state must the cache state machine transition to upon receipt of an INV message in
the state q5?
10
2. How must the cdata state variable of the cache state machine be updated along this
transition?
3. Which state must the directory state machine transition to upon receipt of a WBREQ
message in the state q4, given the choice made earlier for the transition of the cache
machine upon receipt of the INV message in state q5?
4. How must the ddata and owner state variables of the directory state machine be updated
along this transition, again taking into consideration all the choices made so far in the
process of correcting the protocol.
Clearly, the right answers to these questions are correlated. Thus the programmer is forced
to perform some form of global reasoning about the protocol to describe the correct behavior.
Further, the programmermay need to perform this kind of reasoningmultiple times as additional
erroneous executions are discovered. We argue that this process is rather tedious and contributes
significantly to the difficulty of designing correct implementations of distributed protocols. We
now present an alternative methodology which makes use of program synthesis techniques to
make the process of designing distributed protocols easier.
1.2 An Alternative Approach to Protocol Design
Given the undecidability of the problem of synthesizing distributed protocols purely from
temporal logic specifications, we view the synthesis problem as one of completion in this
dissertation. This section provides an intuitive description of how this view can help in making
the difficult parts of protocol design easier.
1.2.1 Automating the Difficult Parts of Protocol Design
Figure 1.9 provides a high-level overview of the approach we propose in this dissertation.
The programmer specifies the behavior of the protocol using a combination of common-case
scenarios (which can be easily translated to incomplete state machines, either automatically, or
manually) and incomplete state machines constructed from the well-understood common-case
behavior of the protocol in question. Our approach also requires that the programmer formally
specifies the high-level safety and liveness requirements that the protocol is expected to satisfy.
We then leverage synthesis techniques to complete this incomplete protocol, or add behaviors
to this incomplete protocol provided by the programmer to obtain an implementation which is
correct by construction, i.e., the completed protocol admits at least all the behaviors admitted
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Figure 1.9: The methodology proposed in this dissertation for designing distributed protocols
by the incomplete protocol specified by the programmer, and satisfies all the high-level safety
and liveness requirements.
This view of synthesis as a completion problem yields two advantages. First, the programmer
is freed from the tedium and complexity of the iterative debugging process, and has only to
specify an incomplete protocol, which is relatively easy. Second, we side-step the undecidability
of distributed protocol synthesis. The completion problem is itself decidable, provided that
the domains of all the state variables are finite. The decidability results from the fact that the
completion process does not attempt to add new control states or variables. Obviously, this
decidability comes at a cost: to be useful, the programmer needs to provide a “reasonably
complete” version of the protocol, i.e., it must be possible to obtain a correct protocol from
the incomplete protocol provided by the programmer, without the addition of new control
locations or state variables to the state machines in the protocol.
The upshot is that viewing the problem as one of completion, rather than synthesis, allows
us to leverage the fact that the easy bits of distributed protocol design can be done by the
programmer, to develop effective and useful algorithms that alleviate the difficulty of designing
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Figure 1.10: A possible completion of the implied scenario in the VI protocol
distributed protocols. This trade-off between programmer involvement and effectiveness of
automated algorithms for completion is a theme that we will explore throughout the subsequent
chapters in this dissertation.
Turning our attention back to the example of the VI cache coherence protocol, Figure 1.10
shows one possible way in which the implied scenario shown in Figure 1.6 can be extended,
such that all the correctness properties are satisfied. Essentially, the directory, treats the WBREQ
message in the same manner as it would treat an INVACK message from the cache, and updates
its local copy of the data with the value contained in the WBREQ message. The rest of the
scenario plays out between the directory and cache C1 as shown in Figure 1.3(c). The cache
C2, on its part, treats the INV message in the same manner as a WBACK message, invalidating
its local copy of the data and transitioning to the Invalid or I state.
Figures 1.11 and 1.12 show the cache and directory state machines, respectively, com-
pleted according Figure 1.10. Viewed as a completion problem, the algorithms described in
subsequent chapters of this dissertation are able to synthesize the state machines shown in Fig-
ures 1.11 and 1.12, starting from the incomplete state machines shown in Figures 1.4 and 1.5,
along with a set of high-level safety and liveness requirements.
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Note that although the state machines for the VI protocol did not have any guards in their
transitions, this may not be the case in general. Some protocols might consist of state machines
which require transitions to be executed conditionally, based on some predicate on the state
variables of the machine in question. In the case of the VI protocol, these predicates can be
viewed as being universally true. In general, a completion algorithm would need to determine
these predicates, in addition to determining the target state and the updates to state variables
along a transition.
1.2.2 Feasibility and Effectiveness of Protocol Completion
The utility of the design methodology for distributed protocols that we have just introduced,
depends heavily on whether it is feasible to build tools that support the methodology and on
the effectiveness of such tools. Objectively, the proposed design methodology for distributed
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protocols can be considered useful, provided that the answers to the following two questions
can be proven to be in the affirmative:
• Is it possible to develop effective algorithms to solve the distributed protocol completion
problem? A related question is whether these algorithms can be useful in assisting a
protocol designer in developing correct versions of real world protocols which are beyond
the capabilities of traditional approaches to reactive synthesis.
• Is it easier for a protocol designer to specify the behavior of the protocol using a combi-
nation of scenarios and incomplete state machines, along with a set of high-level formal
requirements in temporal logic?
Detailed experimental evaluations in the subsequent chapters of dissertation demonstrate that
the answer to the first question is indeed in the affirmative. The second question, on the other
hand, is rather subjective. While a large scale user study is beyond the scope of this dissertation,
we hope that the examples provided in this chapter, as well as in subsequent chapters, serve to
convince the reader that it is indeed easier to specify distributed protocols using the approach
that we propose.
To demonstrate affirmative answers to the questions just raised, we built and evaluated
several prototype tools. We now present a brief summary of the capabilities of each tool. A
more thorough exposition will be provided in subsequent chapters.
The first tool we built, dubbed transit, required the protocol designer or programmer to
be a part of the synthesis loop. The programmer was expected to provide local remedies to
specific, concrete erroneous executions uncovered during the verification process. Our case
studies demonstrate that this was useful in reducing the tedium of the debugging phase of
protocol design. In each case, the programmer was able to obtain a correct protocol, with
only a few rounds of interaction with the completion tool. The approach was found to be
very scalable, and was successfully used to specify the industrial SGI Origin cache coherence
protocol [LL97]. This is a large, scalable, real life protocol, with millions of reachable states,
and has been deployed in high-end systems from SGI.
Encouraged by the success of transit, we now sought to automate the process, and free
the programmer from being part of the synthesis loop. The second tool which we developed
only handles protocols where the state machines do not have any state variables. In this specific
setting, the completion problem can be viewed as a minimal Boolean satisfiability problem,
which in turn can be solved effectively by Integer Linear Program (ILP) solvers. Another feature
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of this tool was it accepted inputs in the form of scenarios, which are as shown in Figure 1.3,
rather than as incomplete state machines. This tool was able to automatically complete several
text-book protocols, such as the alternating-bit protocol, protocols for consensus and even a
simple cache coherence protocol.
The limitation of this scenario based completion tool was not scalability: it synthesized
everything we threw at it with ease. However, it was rather difficult to specify larger protocols
with the restriction that state machines not have any variables. The third tool which we built
addresses this limitation, and also allows the programmer to specify symmetry constraints that
a completed protocol ought to satisfy. Using this tool, we were able to automatically synthesize
protocols for mutual exclusion, a moderately sized self-stabilization protocol, as well as the
modestly complex German/MSI cache coherence protocol.
While the automated algorithms are not as scalable as the algorithms which require the
programmer to be a part of the synthesis loop, they can still be useful in developing protocols of
moderate complexity. The experimental evaluations in subsequent chapters of this dissertation
will explore this trade-off between programmer involvement and scalability in greater depth.
1.2.3 Protocol Completion as Synthesis of Interpretations
Throughout this dissertation, we will take the view that the protocol completion is tantamount
to the problem of synthesizing interpretations for multiple, possibly correlated, unknown
functions. To make this view apparent, observe that the guard for each new transition to be
added can be viewed as a Boolean valued function over the state variables of the state machine
in question. Similarly, the updates to each state variable along a transition to be added can be
viewed as a function of the appropriate type over the state variables. Lastly, the target control
state to transition to can also be viewed as an update to a distinguished state variable — say a
variable named “location” — of a suitable enumerated type.
To illustrate this view, as well as to describe the subtleties of symmetry and fairness in some
detail, we consider another example: the Peterson’s mutual exclusion protocol. Figure 1.13(a),
describes this protocol, which manages two symmetric processes contending for access to a
critical section, labeled as the state L4 in Figure 1.13. Each process is parameterized by two
parameter variables Pm and Po (for “my” process id and “other” process id respectively), such
that Pm 6= Po. Both the parameters Pm and Po are of type processid, which is a symmetric type,
and they are allowed to take on values P0 and P1. We therefore have two instances of the
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Figure 1.13: Peterson’s Mutual Exclusion Protocol
symmetric process shown in Figure 1.13(a): P0, where (Pm = P0, Po = P1), and P1, where
(Pm = P1, Po = P0). P0 and P1 communicate through the shared variables turn and flag. The
variable turn has type processid. The flag variable is an array of Boolean values, indexed by
values of the type processid. The main objective of the protocol is to control access to the
critical section, represented by location L4, and ensure that both of the processes P0 and P1
are never simultaneously in the critical section, i.e., it is a safety violation for both P0 and P1
to be in state L4 at the same time. For clarity, the assignments to flag and turn are shown as
simple assignments in Figure 1.13, but in a faithful model of the Peterson’s algorithm, these
would be involve exchange of messages, with the shared variables flag and turn represented as
state machines for atomic registers.
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The liveness monitor shown in Figure 1.13(c) captures the requirement that a process not
wait indefinitely to enter the critical section. The liveness monitor is itself parameterized by
the parameters Pm and Po in a manner similar to the processes, with each instance encoding
the liveness requirement for the appropriate process. The monitor accepts all undesirable runs
where a process has requested access to the critical section (i.e., the process in question is in
state L3), but never reaches state L4 — which corresponds to entering the critical section —
after reaching state L3. In other words, the monitor accepts an infinite execution where one
of the processes P0 or P1 is stuck in state L3 forever. Note that a run accepted by the monitor
may be unfair with respect to some processes. For instance, if process P0 is in state L3 and
could possibly transition to state L4, but the scheduler never schedules process P0, and process
P0 therefore never enters state L4, then this execution is unfair with respect to process P0.
Enforcing weak process fairness on P0 and P1, — i.e., if a process is enabled at every point in an
infinite execution, then it must be executed at some point in that execution — is sufficient to
rule out unfair executions, but not necessary. Enforcing weak fairness on the single transition
between (L3,L4) suffices to rule out all unfair executions which could possibly be accepted by
the monitor shown in Figure 1.13(c).
Now, to view the protocol completion problem as one of synthesizing interpretations, con-
sider the incomplete version of Peterson’s mutual exclusion protocol as shown in Figure 1.13(b).
Here, the condition under which a process is allowed to enter the critical section, the condition
under which a process must wait in location L3, and the update to the turn variable along the
edge from L2 to L3 have been replaced by the unknown functions gwait, gcrit and f respectively.
The target control locations along these transitions could also be unknown, but are retained
here for clarity.2
The functions gwait and gcrit represent unknown Boolean valued functions over the state
variables and the parameters of the process under consideration. The function f represents the
unknown update to the turn variable. Including the parameter variables Pm and Po as part of the
domain of gwait, gcrit and f is necessary to ensure that the completions synthesized by a tool for
processes P0 and P1 are symmetric. We defer a formal definition of what it means for protocols
and interpretations to be symmetric until Chapter 2. Now, given a set of fairness assumptions,
the protocol completion problem reduces to automatically discovering interpretations for these
unknown functions, such that the completed protocol satisfies the necessary mutual exclusion
2It would be rather confusing to see transition arrows all shooting up into nowhere.
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property, and that every fair execution of the completed protocol is not an accepting run of the
liveness monitor shown in Figure 1.13(c).
Thus the protocol completion problem can indeed be viewed as a problem of synthesizing
interpretations for a set of correlated unknown functions. This provides an excellent segue for
the next section in this chapter, which motivates the development of a general framework for
describing such problems, independent of distributed protocols.
1.3 A Framework for Function Synthesis
Although synthesis of distributed protocols is the primary focus of this dissertation, during
course of research on this topic, we also had to develop scalable program synthesis techniques
to enable the synthesis of distributed protocols. As we have just explained, synthesizing guard
and update functions that constitute the descriptions of state machines in a distributed protocol
is tantamount to the synthesis of multiple unknown functions, the constraints on the behavior of
which can possibly be correlated. We observed that a lot of recent work on program synthesis for
different domains were essentially solving this very same problem— i.e., that of synthesizing an
unknown function (or a set of unknown functions) such that the synthesized function satisfies
some constraints — with a variety of independently developed (and possibly domain-specific)
algorithms. Unfortunately, there was no uniform way to compare the strengths and weaknesses
of each of these algorithms due to subtle differences in the way each of them required the
constraints over the unknown functions to be expressed, as well as the search space for the
interpretations or bodies of these unknown functions.
This led us to formulate the Syntax-Guided Synthesis (SyGuS) problem, which is intended
to be a general framework — along with a specification language — for expressing program
synthesis problems. The motivation for this was two-fold:
• Provide a common input language for specifying the constraints on, and the search space
for candidate interpretations or bodies of unknown functions to be synthesized. This format,
called SyGuS-IF, can then serve as a common input language for describing benchmarks to
evaluate tools implementing different program synthesis techniques.
• Spur research in program synthesis by organizing annual SyGuS competitions, in the same
manner that the SMTLIB and SMTCOMP initiatives have helped encourage research in
satisfiability modulo theory (SMT) solvers and theorem provers.
The intention is for SyGuS to be to program synthesis, what SMTLIB is to program verification.
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This dissertation includes a description of the SyGuS problem as well as a description and
evaluation of two SyGuS solvers which implement algorithms based on enumerative strategies
— i.e., algorithms which systematically, and intelligently, enumerate function interpretations
or bodies from the search space until a solution is found — to solve instances of the SyGuS
problem. The SyGuS solvers may be considered as technologies which enable the construction
of higher-level and domain specific synthesis algorithms — such as algorithms for distributed
protocol completion and synthesis.
1.4 Contributions of this Dissertation
Having introduced the specific problems that the research to be described in this dissertation was
intended to tackle, we now provide a short summary of contributions made by this dissertation:
• We demonstrate that although the problem of full distributed reactive synthesis from
temporal logic specifications is hard, useful assistance can still be provided to the de-
signer/developer of such protocols by viewing the synthesis problem as one of completion. In
this world-view, the developer assists the synthesis algorithm by providing the information
which is natural and easy for a developer to provide. The tool in turn provides as much
automation as possible to the developer in automatically discovering the parts of the protocol
which the developer finds difficult to reason about.
• We describe and evaluate three tools which we have developed, which aim to make the
process of developing distributed protocols easier. Each of these tools differ in the level
of automation provided — and thus in their performance and scalability — and in the
restrictions they impose on the kinds of protocols they can handle.
• In evaluating and comparing the abilities of these tools, we explore the three-way trade-off
between the level of automation provided by the tools versus the amount of developer
involvement in the process of developing these protocols versus the scalability of the tools.
• We describe the SyGuS framework for specifying program synthesis problems in a general
manner, which is intended to be an enabling technology for higher-level synthesis techniques
to build upon. We also describe and evaluate algorithmic strategies based on systematic and
intelligent enumerative search to solve instances of the SyGuS problem.
The subsequent chapters of this dissertation are organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces
some notation and definitions and provides a formal definition of the protocol completion
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problem. Chapter 3 describes an elegant symbolic solution strategy for the protocol completion
problem, and explains why the strategy is not effective in a practical setting. Chapter 3
also describes the insights gained from implementing and experimenting with the symbolic
algorithm, which motivated the choices made with respect to the rest of the work described
in this dissertation. Chapters 4, 7 and 8 describe the solution approaches to the protocol
completion problem that we have implemented and evaluated. Chapter 5 describes a general-
purpose framework for program synthesis, called SyGuS, that arose from the work described
in Chapter 4, and Chapter 6 discusses some enumerative strategies for solving instances of the
SyGuS problem. Chapter 9 provides an overview of related work in the area and discusses
how the work described in this manuscript differs from earlier work. Chapter 10 summarizes
the contributions of this dissertation and discusses the avenues along which the work may be
extended in the future, and concludes with some reflections on the problems addressed in this
dissertation.
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2
The Protocol Completion Problem
Having informally described and motivated the protocol completion problem in the previous
chapter, we now present a rigorous definition of the problem and set up the prerequisite
definitions and notation which will be used in the rest of this dissertation.
2.1 Objective
Our primary objective is to ease the task of developing correct distributed protocols. To
accomplish this, we leverage the fact that it is often easy to specify the behavior of a distributed
protocol in the common cases. We allow the developer to specify a skeleton or sketch of the
protocol that defines (i) the set of communicating processes that make up the protocol (ii) the
state variables of each communicating process that is part of the protocol, (iii) the communication
architecture of the protocol, which defines which processes can communicate, and along which
direction, as well as describes the properties of communication links between processes, (iv)
the behavior of the protocol in the common case scenarios, (v) the correctness properties, in the
form of invariants and liveness monitors, and (vi) a set of fairness requirements under which the
liveness properties ought to hold. Collectively, these artifacts describe an incomplete protocol.
We will assume that the incomplete protocol, by itself, does not satisfy the desired correctness
properties. The goal then, is to complete this incomplete protocol, by adding transitions where
required, such that the completion satisfies the desired correctness properties.
2.2 Formalization and Notation
We now formally define our notion of a state machine, executions of state machines, composition
of state machines and other related notions in this section. Our formalism draws on the notion of
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input-output automata (I/O automata) described in the text-book by Lynch [Lyn96]. However,
we do not assume that the state machines (or I/O automata) are input-complete, i.e., are
required to handle any input at any point in their execution.
2.2.1 Types
Let B be a set of base types, where each type T ∈ B has finite cardinality, and is either (1) the
Boolean type, (2) an enumerated type, (3) a fixed range integer type, or (4) a symmetric type.
Symmetric types are similar to enumerated types, but the behavior of the system is considered
to be invariant under permutations of the symmetric type. The notion of a symmetric type
will be described in more detail in Section 2.2.7. Given a type T1 ∈ B, and a type T2, the
composite type array(T1, T2) contains all mappings from values of type T1 to values of type
T2. Given types T1, T2, . . . , Tn, the composite type record(T1, T2, . . . , Tn) denotes a type whose
values range over T1 × T2 × · · · × Tn. Given a fixed set of base types B, we define TB to be
the smallest set of types such that (1) TB ⊇ B and, (2) TB is closed under composition using
the array and record operators, i.e., if T1 ∈ B, and T2 ∈ TB, then array(T1, T2) ∈ TB, and if
T1, T2, . . . , Tn ∈ TB, then record(T1, T2, . . . , Tn) ∈ TB. We drop the subscript and use T to
refer to TB whenever the context is clear. Note that every type T ∈ TB has finite cardinality.
2.2.2 Function Symbols
Given a set of types T, we fix a set of function symbols F. Each function symbol f ∈ F has a
signature denoted d1×d2×· · ·dn → r, where d1,d2, . . . ,dn ∈ T represent the domain of the
function and r ∈ T represents the range of the function. A function symbol may have a fixed
interpretation, e.g., the symbol ‘+’ might denote integer addition, or the interpretation may be
unknown. We denote by U ⊆ F, the subset of the function symbols in F whose interpretations
are unknown. We define an expression to be a well-typed composition of function symbols
applied to values or variables of the appropriate types. Further, we assume that exactly one
state machine uses any given unknown function in its description. Thus for each unknown
function fu ∈ U, we can speak about the state machine that uses fu in its description.
2.2.3 Messages
We define Σ to be a message alphabet and mtype : Σ → T to be a function that maps each
message m ∈ Σ to the type of its payload. Further, we define ΣP to be a set of parame-
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terized messages. A parameterized message has the form m 〈p1 : T1,p2 : T2, . . . ,pn : Tn〉,
where T1, T2, . . . , Tn ∈ T are symmetric types, and p1,p2, . . . ,pn are parameter vari-
ables whose values can range over T1, T2, . . . Tn respectively. For every parameterized
message m of the form m 〈p1 : T1,p2 : T2, . . . ,pn : Tn〉 ∈ ΣP, the corresponding instances
of the message m are in Σ. i.e., m 〈p1 7→ v1,p2 7→ v2, . . . ,pn 7→ vn〉 ∈ Σ, for all values
v1, v2, . . . , vn, where v1 ∈ T1, v2 ∈ T2, . . . , vn ∈ Tn. Further, any two instances of a para-
metric message have the same payload type. Specifically, if m is a parameterized message
as described above, then, we have that mtype(m 〈p1 7→ u1,p2 7→ u2, . . . ,pn 7→ un〉) ≡
mtype(m 〈p1 7→ v1,p2 7→ v2, . . . ,pn 7→ vn〉) for all {ui} and {vi}. Parameterized messages
themselves cannot be used as inputs to, or outputs of state machines, but instances of parame-
terized messages can. Instances of parameterized messages have restrictions on being inputs
and outputs of state machines as we will describe shortly.
2.2.4 Extended State Machines
An extended state machine (esm) A is a tuple A , 〈L, l0, I,O,V ,σ0,R,Fs,Fw〉, where:
• L is a finite set of locations.
• l0 is the initial location at which every execution of the esm begins.
• I ⊆ Σ is a set of input messages.
• O ⊆ Σ is a set of output messages, such that I ∩O = ∅.
• V is a finite set of typed state variables. For notational convenience, we define the typing
function typeof : V → T which maps each variable to its type.
• σ0 is an initialization function that maps each variable v ∈ V to an initial value s ∈ typeof(v).
• R , Ri ∪ Ro ∪ R is a set of transitions, partitioned into a set of input transitions Ri, a set
of output transitions Ro and a set of internal transitions R. Each transition r ∈ R is of the
form r , 〈l,m, guard, updates, l ′〉, where l, l ′ ∈ L are the initial and final locations for the
transition;m ∈ I for input transitions,m ∈ O for output transitions, andm =  for internal
transitions; guard is a Boolean valued expression over the state variables V, and updates
maps each lvalue under consideration to an update expression of the appropriate type. If
r ∈ Ri, then updates maps each lvalue v ∈ V to an update expression which may only refer
to the variables in V ∪ {mp}, wheremp /∈ V refers to the payload of the incoming message
m. If r ∈ Ro, then updates maps each lvalue v ∈ V ∪ {mp} to an update expression, where
mp /∈ V is the payload of the outgoing message, and the update expressions may refer only
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to variables in V. Finally, if r ∈ R, then updates maps each lvalue v ∈ V, to an update
expression which may only refer to variables in V .
• Fs,Fw ⊆ 2Ro∪R are sets of subsets of the transitions which characterize strongly and
weakly fair executions of the state machine A respectively.
Note that the guard and update expressions in the description of an esm might involve
functions whose interpretations are unknown. If the description of an esm contains at least one
occurrence of a function symbol fu ∈ U in any of its guards or in any of its update functions,
then we call such a description an esm sketch (esm-sk).
2.2.5 Executions
We define executions of an esm or esm-sk A by first choosing an interpretation I. An inter-
pretation I must satisfy the following: (1) I maps each function f ∈ F \ U to its predefined
or nominal interpretation, and (2) I maps each function fu ∈ U to some valid interpretation.
Given the set of state variables V of A, a valuation σ maps each each variable v ∈ V to a
value of the appropriate type, σ(v). Let SV be the set of all such valuations, given a set of
variables V . Given a valuation σ ∈ SV , a variable x /∈ V and a value vx ∈ typeof(x), we write
σ[x 7→ vx] ∈ SV∪{x} to denote the valuation that maps all variables y 6= x to σ(y) and maps x
to vx.
A state of an esm or esm-sk A is defined as a pair (l,σ), where l ∈ L and σ ∈ SV . Given
a transition r ∈ R, of A, of the form r , 〈l,m, guard, updates, l ′〉, and an interpretation I,
we say that r is enabled with respect to I at a state (p,σ), if and only if (1) substituting each
variable v ∈ V with σ(v) in the expression for guard results in the guard being equivalent to
true, and (2) p = l. Note that given an interpretation I, the expression guard defines a set of
valuations where the transition r is enabled. We write [[ guard, I ]] to denote this set. Similarly,
given the interpretation I, updates defines a function:
• [[ updates, I ]] : SV → SV∪{mp}, if r is an output transition; heremp /∈ V is a variable that
represents the payload of the outgoing messagem and has type mtype(m).
• [[ updates, I ]] : SV∪{mp} → SV , if r is an input transition; here mp /∈ V is a variable that
represents the payload of the incoming messagem and has type mtype(m).
• [[ updates, I ]] : SV → SV , if r is an internal transition.
We define an execution of A, under an interpretation I by describing the sequence of states
of A which result from the execution of successive transitions defined on A. We write:
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• (l,σ) m?vm−−−−→ (l ′,σ ′) if and only if A has an input transition r ∈ Ri, which has the form
r , 〈l,m, guard, updates, l ′〉, σ ∈ [[ guard, I ]] , and [[ updates, I ]] (σ[mp 7→ vm]) ≡ σ ′.
• (l,σ) m!vm−−−−→ (l ′,σ ′) if and only if A has an output transition r ∈ Ro, which has the form
r , 〈l,m, guard, updates, l ′〉, σ ∈ [[ guard, I ]] , and [[ updates, I ]] (σ) ≡ σ ′[mp 7→ vm].
• (l,σ) −→ (l ′,σ ′) if and only if A has an internal transition r ∈ R, which has the form
r , 〈l,m, guard, updates, l ′〉, σ ∈ [[ guard, I ]] , and [[ updates, I ]] (σ) ≡ σ ′.
For notational convenience we write (l,σ) → (l ′,σ ′) if (1) there exist m and vm such that
(l,σ ′) m?vm−−−−→ (l ′,σ ′), or (2) there exist m and vm such that (l,σ) m!vm−−−−→ (l ′,σ ′), or (3)
(l,σ) −→ (l ′,σ ′). Further, given a named transition t , 〈l,m, guard, updates, l ′〉, we also write
(l,σ) t−→ (l ′,σ ′), to denote (l,σ) m?vm−−−−→ (l ′,σ ′), or (l,σ) m!vm−−−−→ (l ′,σ ′), or (l,σ) −→ (l ′,σ ′) if
t ∈ Ri, t ∈ Ro, or t ∈ R respectively.
An execution e of an esm or esm-sk A under an interpretation I is thus a sequence of
the following form: e , (l0,σ0) → (l1,σ1) → · · · → (ln,σn) → · · · , where for every j > 0,
(lj,σj) is a state ofA, (l0,σ0) is an initial state ofA, and for every j > 0, (lj,σj)→ (lj+1,σj+1).
An execution may be finite or infinite.
A state (l,σ) of an esm or esm-sk A is reachable under an interpretation I if and only if A
has a finite execution of the form (l0,σ0)→ (l1,σ1)→ · · · → (l,σ), under I. A state (l,σ) of A
is called deadlocked under an interpretation I if and only if there does not exist a state (l ′,σ ′)
such that (l,σ) → (l ′,σ ′). In other words, no transitions of A are enabled in a deadlocked
state. An esm or esm-sk A is called deterministic under an interpretation I if for every state
s = (l,σ) of A, if it is the case that there are multiple transitions enabled in state s, then each
of them is an input transition and each of them corresponds to the receipt of a distinct message.
Lastly, an infinite execution e , (l0,σ0)→ (l1,σ1)→ · · · of an esm or esm-sk A, under an
interpretation I is called a fair execution if and only if both of the following hold:
1. For each F ∈ Fw, if there exists a k such that for all i > k, some transition t ′ ∈ F is enabled
at state (li,σi) in e under I then there exists j > k, such that (lk,σk) t−→ (lk+1,σk+1) is a
step in e, where t ∈ F. Informally, if some transition in F ∈ Fw is enabled at every point in
an execution e under an interpretation I after a finite prefix of e, then some transition in F
must be taken in the infinite suffix of the execution e.
2. For each F ∈ Fs, if there exist infinitely many i in such that some transition t ′ ∈ F is
enabled at state (li,σi) in e, under I, then there must also exist infinitely many j such
that (lj,σj) t−→ (lj+1,σj+1) is a step in e, where t ∈ F. Informally, if some transition in
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F ∈ Fw is enabled infinitely often in an execution e, under an interpretation I, then some
transition in F must also be executed infinitely often in the execution e.
2.2.6 Composition of esms and esm-sks
Let A1 , 〈L1, l01, I1,O1,V1,σ01,R1,Fs1,Fw1〉 be an esm or esm-sk. Given another esm or
esm-sk A2 , 〈L2, l02, I2,O2,V2,σ02,R2,Fs2,Fw2〉, the composition of A1 and A2, denoted
by A1 | A2, is defined only if (1) O1 ∩O2 ≡ ∅, and (2) V1 ∩V2 ≡ ∅. We define the composition
A = A1 | A2 as an esm A , 〈L, l0, I,O,V ,σ0,R,Fs,Fw〉, where:
• L = L1 × L2
• l0 = (l01, l02)
• I = (I1 ∪ I2) \ (O1 ∪O2)
• O = O1 ∪O2
• V = V1 ∪ V2
• σ0 is a function that maps each variable v ∈ V1 ∪ V2 to an initial value σ0(v) ∈ typeof(v)
and is defined as:
σ0(v) ,

σ01(v) if v ∈ V1
σ02(v) otherwise
• For every set Fi ∈ Fs1, we include a set Fi1 in Fs. Similarly, for every set Fi ∈ Fs2, we
include a set Fi2 ∈ Fs. For every set Fi ∈ Fw1, we include a set Fi1 ∈ Fw, and for every set
Fi ∈ Fw2, we include a set Fi2 ∈ Fw. The construction of these sets is described when we
describe how the transitions R are constructed.
• The set of transitions R = Ri ∪ Ro ∪ R, where R is partitioned into Ri, Ro and R, is
constructed according to the following rules. Note that the following rules also describe
how the fairness sets Fs and Fw are constructed:
– For every message m ∈ I, if m /∈ I2, then for every transition of t1 ∈ R1, which has the
form t1 , 〈l1,m, guard, updates, l ′1〉, and for every l2 ∈ L2, we include the transitions,
each of which has the form t , 〈(l1, l2),m, guard, updates, (l ′1, l2)〉 in Ri, and thus in R.
– For every message m ∈ I, if m /∈ I1, then for every transition of t2 ∈ R2, which has the
form t2 , 〈l2,m, guard, updates, l ′2〉, and for every l1 ∈ L1, we include the transitions,
each of which has the form t , 〈(l1, l2),m, guard, updates, (l1, l ′2)〉 in Ri, and thus in R.
– For every message m ∈ I1 ∩ I2, and for every pair of transitions (t1, t2), such that
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t1 ∈ R1, t2 ∈ R2, where t1 has the form t1 , 〈l1,m, guard1, updates1, l ′1〉, and t2 is of
the form t2 , 〈l2,m, guard2, updates2, l ′2〉, we include a transition t which has the form
t , 〈(l1, l2),m, guard1 ∧ guard2, updates1; updates2, (l ′1, l ′2)〉 in Ri and thus in R. Note
that the operator “;” denotes sequencing of updates.
– For every message m ∈ O1, if m /∈ I2, then for every transition t1 ∈ R1 which has the
form t1 , 〈l1,m, guard, updates, l ′1〉, and for every l2 ∈ L2, we include the transitions,
each of the form t , 〈(l1, l2),m, guard, updates, (l ′1, l2)〉 in Ro and thus in R. Further,
for each Fi ∈ Fs1, (Fw1) such that t1 ∈ Fi, for every l2 ∈ L2, we include the transition
t , 〈(l1, l2),m, guard, updates, (l ′1, l2)〉 in the set Fi1 ∈ Fs (respectively Fi1 ∈ Fw).
– Similarly, for every messagem ∈ O2, ifm /∈ I1, then for every transition t2 ∈ R2 which has
the form t2 , 〈l2,m, guard, updates, l ′2〉, and for every l1 ∈ L1, we include the transitions,
each of the form t , 〈(l1, l2),m, guard, updates, (l1, l ′2)〉 in Ro and thus in R. Further,
for each Fi ∈ Fs2, (Fw2) such that t2 ∈ Fi, for every l1 ∈ L1, we include the transition
t , 〈(l1, l2),m, guard, updates, (l1, l ′2)〉 in the set Fi2 ∈ Fs (respectively Fi2 ∈ Fw).
– For every messagem ∈ O1, ifm ∈ I2, then for every pair of transitions (t1, t2) such that
t1 ∈ R1 and t2 ∈ R2, where t1 and t2 have the form t1 , 〈l1,m, guard1, updates1, l ′1〉,
t2 , 〈l2,m, guard2, updates2, l ′2〉, we include a transition t which has the form t ,
〈(l1, l2),m, guard1 ∧ guard2, updates1; updates2, (l ′1, l ′2)〉 in Ro, and thus in R. Further,
for each Fi ∈ Fs1 (Fw1) such that t1 ∈ Fi, we include the transition t in Fi1 ∈ Fs
(respectively Fi1 ∈ Fw).
– Similarly, for every message m ∈ O2, if m ∈ I1, then for every pair of transitions
(t1, t2) ∈ R1 × R2, where t1 and t2 have the form t1 , 〈l1,m, guard1, updates1, l ′1〉,
t2 , 〈l2,m, guard2, updates2, l ′2〉, we include a transition t which has the form t ,
〈(l1, l2),m, guard1 ∧ guard2, updates2; updates1, (l ′1, l ′2)〉 in Ro, and thus in R. Further,
for each Fi ∈ Fs2 (Fw2) such that t1 ∈ Fi, we include the transition t in Fi2 ∈ Fs
(respectively Fi2 ∈ Fw).
– For every transition t1 ∈ R1 which is of the form t1 , 〈l1, , guard, updates, l ′1〉, and for
every l2 ∈ L2, we include in R and thus in R, every transition t which is of the form
t , 〈(l1, l2), , guard, updates, (l ′1, l2)〉. Further, for each Fi ∈ Fs1 (Fw1) such that t1 ∈
Fi, for every l2 ∈ L2, we include the transition t , 〈(l1, l2), , guard, updates, (l ′1, l2)〉 in
Fi1 ∈ Fs (respectively Fi1 ∈ Fw).
– Similarly, for every transition t2 ∈ R2 of the form t2 , 〈l2, , guard, updates, l ′2〉, and
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for every l1 ∈ L1, we include every transition t, each of which has the form t ,
〈(l1, l2), , guard, updates, (l1, l ′2)〉 in R and thus in R. Further, for each Fi ∈ Fs2
(Fw2) such that t2 ∈ Fi, for every l1 ∈ L1, we include the transition t of the form
t , 〈(l1, l2), , guard, updates, (l1, l ′2)〉 in Fi2 ∈ Fs (respectively Fi2 ∈ Fw).
Because the composition of two esms or esm-sks is again an esm or esm-sk, all the earlier
definitions regarding reachability, deadlocks, executions and fairness are still valid. Note that
the composition operator “|” is associative and commutative.
2.2.7 Symmetry and Symmetric Types
Distributed protocols often exhibit symmetric behavior, e.g., the behavior of the state machines
in Peterson’s mutual exclusion algorithm described in Section 1.2.3 exhibits symmetry. To
allow the programmer to express such symmetric behavior, we use symmetric types, which are
similar to the scalarset construct used in the Murϕ model checker [ID96].
A symmetric type T ∈ T is characterized by (1) its name, and (2) its cardinality, |T |, which
is a finite natural number. The only operations permitted on values of a symmetric type are
comparisons for equality and disequality between two values. Given a collection of state
machines parameterized by a set of symmetric types, e.g., the state machines P0 and P1 in
Peterson’s algorithm, the behavior of the system is required to be invariant under permutations
(i.e., renaming) of the parameter values.
Given a symmetric type T , let perm(T) be the set of all permutations piT : T → T , over the
symmetric type T . For ease of notation, we define piT (v) = v for values v /∈ T , i.e., values whose
type is not T , provided that the type of v is not an array or record type. If the type of v is a record
type, then piT (v) is defined as the record value obtained by applying piT on each field of v. If the
type of v is an array type, whose index type is not T , then piT (v) is defined as the array value
obtained by applying piT recursively to all the elements of v. If the type of v is an array type
whose index type is T , then piT (v) is defined as the value obtained by first recursively applying
piT to all the elements of v and then permuting the array elements themselves according to
piT , i.e., for all j ∈ T , piT (v)[piT (j)] ≡ piT (v[j]). Given the collection of symmetric types in the
system, T1, T2, . . . , Tn ∈ B, we define the set of system wide permutations, perm(TB), as the
composition of the permutations over the individual types, piT1 ◦ piT2 ◦ · · · ◦ piTn .
esms, esm-sks and messages may be parameterized by a list of parameter variables,
each of a symmetric type. The semantics of such parameterization is that there exists one
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instance of the object for every possible value that the parameter variables can take. Consider
a parameterized messagem 〈p1 : T1,p2 : T2, . . . ,pn : Tn〉. Here p1,p2, . . . ,pn are parameter
variables which can take values of types T1, T2, . . . , Tn respectively. Then for every possi-
ble list of values 〈v1, v2, . . . , vn〉, where vi ∈ Ti, and i ∈ [1,n], there exists an instance
m 〈p1 7→ v1,p2 7→ v2, . . . ,pn 7→ vn〉 of the parameterized message m. The semantics of a
parameterized esm or esm-sk are similar, except that the parameter variables pi are available
for use as read-only variables within the guards and updates of the esm or esm-sk.
Given the set of types TB an interpretation I is said to be symmetric with respect to TB if
and only if for all fu : d1,d2, . . . ,dn → r ∈ U, for all pi ∈ perm(TB), and for all e1 ∈ d1, e2 ∈
d2, . . . , en ∈ dn, we have that pi(fu(pi(e1),pi(e2), . . . ,pi(en))) ≡ fu(e1, e2, . . . , en). An esm
or esm-sk A is said to be symmetric with respect to TB, if and only if for any interpretation I
such that I is symmetric with respect to TB, and for all pi ∈ perm(TB), every execution of A
under I of the form:
e , (l0,σ0) ∗1−→ (l1,σ1) ∗2−→ · · · ∗n−→ (ln,σn) ∗n+1−−−→ · · ·
where ∗i is one ofmi?vmi ormi!vmi or , implies that the permuted execution of the form:
pi(e) , (pi(l1),pi(σ1)) pi(∗1)−−−→ (pi(l2),pi(σ2)) pi(∗2)−−−→ · · · pi(∗n)−−−−→ (pi(ln),pi(σn)) pi(∗n+1)−−−−−→ · · ·
is also admitted by A under the same interpretation I. Here pi(∗i)−−−→ represents a transition along
which the instances of messages parameterized by symmetric types and message payloads
are also permuted according to the permutation pi. Further, we also require that e is a weakly
(respectively, strongly) fair execution of A if and only if pi(e) is a weakly (respectively, strongly)
fair execution of A. In other words, we require the strong and weak fairness assumptions on A
to be symmetric as well.
Our framework allows the programmer to describe protocols which are symmetric according
to the notion of symmetry just described. We ensure that symmetry breaking constructs are
not used by enforcing syntactic restrictions on the description of esms and esm-sks. This is
done in a manner similar to the what has been described in earlier work [ID96]. Further, we
also ensure that any interpretations I that are generated during the process of synthesis are
such that they satisfy the symmetry assumptions made on the esm-sks that they are a part of,
as we shall describe in later sections.
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2.2.8 Requirements and Specifications
We now turn our attention to the way in which requirements — i.e., the properties that we
expect from a correct protocol — are specified. The techniques proposed in this dissertation
support requirements expressed either as Linear Temporal Logic (ltl) formulas, or directly as
Büchi monitors.3 To make the presentation self-contained, we now briefly describe the syntax
and semantics of ltl and describe how we use monitors (possibly constructed from the ltl
formulas) to characterize the correctness of protocols.
Linear Temporal Logic
Given a set of atomic propositions AP, the syntax of Linear Temporal Logic (ltl) formulas over
these atomic propositions is given by the following rules:
• If p ∈ AP, then p is an ltl formula
• If ϕ1 and ϕ2 are ltl formulas, then so are ¬ϕ1, ϕ1 ∧ϕ2, Xϕ1, and ϕ1 Uϕ2.
Other commonly used operators and connectives can be defined in terms of these basic operators
using the standard equivalences. We list a few of them here:
• ϕ1 ∨ϕ2 ≡ ¬(¬ϕ1 ∧ ¬ϕ2)
• Fϕ1 ≡ trueUϕ1
• Gϕ1 ≡ ¬F¬ϕ1
• ϕ1 Rϕ2 ≡ ¬ (¬ϕ1 U¬ϕ2)
• ϕ1Wϕ2 ≡ (ϕ1 Uϕ2)∨ Gϕ1
We define the semantics of an ltl formula over executions of esms and esm-sks. Given the set
of types T, a set of function symbols F, an esm or esm-sk A = 〈L, l0, I,O,V ,σ0,R,Fs,Fw〉,
we let the set of atomic propositions AP be the set of all Boolean valued expressions over
V ∪ {loc} which do not involve Boolean connectives. Here, loc /∈ V is a distinguished variable
that tracks the location of A, whose values are allowed to range over L, and the only operation
allowed on this type is comparison of values of equality. Given a state s , (l,σ), where l ∈ L
and σ ∈ SV , an interpretation I, and an atomic predicate p ∈ AP, we say that s satisfies p under
the interpretation I, written as s
I
p if and only if p ′, which is obtained by substituting l for
every occurrence of loc in p and σ(v) for every occurrence of v in p, for each variable v ∈ V
is equivalent to true. We extend the notion of satisfiability to arbitrary Boolean expressions
3Every ltl formula can be translated into a (possibly non-deterministic) Büchi monitor, but there exist Büchi
monitors/automata which do not have an equivalent ltl formula.
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— which are just atomic propositions composed with Boolean connectives — in the natural
manner.
Given an infinite execution e , s0 → s1 → · · · of A, under an interpretation I, where
si , (li,σi) for i > 0, the satisfaction semantics of an ltl formula ϕ over e are inductively
defined as follows, where ϕ1 and ϕ2 are subformulas of ϕ, and p is an atomic proposition; i.e.,
p ∈ AP. Note that we use the notation e
I
ϕ to denote that the execution e (also under the
interpretation I) satisfies the ltl formula ϕ under the interpretation I.
• If ϕ ≡ p, then, e
I
p if and only if s0 I p.
• If ϕ ≡ ϕ1 ∧ϕ2, then e I ϕ if and only if e I ϕ1 and e I ϕ2.
• If ϕ ≡ ¬ϕ1, then e I ϕ if and only if it is not the case that e I ϕ1.
• If ϕ ≡ Xϕ1 then e I ϕ if and only if s1 I ϕ1.
• If ϕ ≡ ϕ1 Uϕ2, then e I ϕ if and only if ∃j > 0 (sj I ϕ2 ∧ ∀i < j (si I ϕ1)).
The semantics for the other operators such as F, G, R and W, can be deduced by using the
equivalences mentioned earlier to express ltl formulas involving these operators in terms of
the basic operators X and U.
We can now define the satisfaction semantics of an esm or esm-sk A with respect to an
ltl formula ϕ as follows: A satisfies ϕ, under an interpretation I, written A
I
ϕ if and only
if for every execution e of A (also under the interpretation I), we have that e
I
ϕ.
Algorithmically, this check is usually performed by translating the negation of the ltl
formula, i.e., ¬ϕ, into a Büchi monitor with accepting states and checking if the synchronous
product of the Büchi monitor andA admits a fair accepting cycle. We defer a detailed description
of this model-checking algorithm until Section 8.3, but we now provide a brief description of
the (Büchi and safety) monitors used in this process.
Monitors
Every ltl formulaϕ can be translated into a (possibly non-deterministic) Büchi automaton (BA)
or Büchi monitor which can then be used to algorithmically check if a given transition system
satisfies the ltl formula ϕ. The translation from ltl to BA takes time exponential in the size of
the ltl formula, and has been studied extensively in literature [WVS83, LP85, VW94, DGV99,
EH00, SB00, GO01, BKRS12, Dur14], and will not be covered in detail in this dissertation.
We will assume that the requirements which are specified using ltl formulas have already
been translated into Büchi monitors, whose form we describe in this section. This translation
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can be accomplished using widely available tools like ltl2ba [GO01], ltl3ba [BKRS12], or
spot [Dur14] for instance.
Consider an esm or esm-sk A , 〈L, l0, I,O,V ,σ0,R,Fs,Fw〉. Recall that SV is the set of
all valuations of the set of variables V. We denote the set of all states of A as S , L× SV . A
monitor over A is an automatonM , 〈Q,q0,∆〉. HereQ is the set of automaton states, q0 ∈ Q
is the initial state and ∆ ⊆ Q × S × Q is a transition relation. We denote the synchronous
composition of A withM as A ‖ M. The semantics of such a synchronous composition are
standard: Each time A makes a transition,M makes a transition as well. Suppose the current
state ofM is q, and the state of A is s ∈ S, thenM can (non-deterministically) transition to
any state q ′ such that (q, s,q ′) ∈ ∆. The notion of an execution is extended in the natural
manner to the product A ‖M, by augmenting the state with a component denoting the state
q ∈ Q of the monitorM, and we write (l,σ,q) −→ (l ′,σ ′,q ′), where the locations l, l ′ ∈ L,
the valuations σ,σ ′ ∈ SV and q,q ′ ∈ Q if and only if (l,σ) −→ (l ′,σ ′), and (q, (l,σ),q ′) ∈ ∆.
The notion of reachability also follows naturally from the extended notion of an execution.
The composition A ‖M inherits the the fairness assumptions from A, and an execution e of
A ‖M under an interpretation I is fair if and only if the projection of e onto A is fair, under
the interpretation I.4
A safety monitor is a monitor augmented with a set of error states. In other words, a safety
monitorMs , 〈Q,q0,∆,Qerr〉, where Qerr ⊆ Q is a set of error states. An finite execution e
of A ‖Ms is called erroneous if the monitorMs is in a state q ∈ Qerr in the last state of the
execution e. Given an interpretation I, A satisfiesMs under the interpretation I, written as
A
I
Ms, if and only if A ‖Ms admits no erroneous executions under the interpretation I, i.e.,
a state where the monitor component of the state q ∈ Qerr is not reachable.
A liveness monitor is a monitor augmented with a set of accepting states. In other words,
a liveness monitor Ml , 〈Q,q0,∆,Qacc〉, where Qacc ⊆ Q is a set of accepting states. An
infinite execution e of A ‖ Ml is called an accepting execution if the monitor Ml visits an
accepting state infinitely many times in e. Given an interpretation I, we say that A satisfiesMl
under the interpretation I, written as A
I
Ml if and only if every fair execution of A ‖Ml,
under the interpretation I, is not an accepting execution.
Although we have made a distinction between liveness and safety monitors for ease of expo-
sition, especially in the later chapters of this dissertation, we note that both safety and liveness
4An execution e of A ‖M is projected onto A by simply dropping the component forM in each state and each
transition of e.
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monitors can be expressed as (possibly non-deterministic) Büchi monitors with accepting states.
This is immediately obvious in the case of liveness monitors of the form we have described
above: a liveness monitor is itself a Büchi monitor with Qacc as the set of accepting states of
the Büchi monitor. One can express a safety monitor as a Büchi monitor by setting Qacc = Qerr
and adding a self-loop from every state q ∈ Qerr, i.e., by adding (q, (l,σ),q) for every q ∈ Qerr
and for every (l,σ) ∈ S to ∆, thereby allowing it to accept infinite executions. Further, we
also allow monitors to be symmetric in the same manner as for esms and esm-sks. Finally, we
say that an esm or esm-sk A satisfies the ltl specification ϕ under an interpretation I, if and
only if A
I
M, whereM is the Büchi monitor corresponding to the ltl formula ¬ϕ.
2.3 Problem Statement
We are given A1,A2, . . . ,An, where each Ai is either an esm or an esm-sk, over a set of types
TB and a function vocabulary F. We are also given a set of safety monitorsMs1,Ms2, . . . ,Msm,
and a set of liveness monitorsMl1,Ml2, . . . ,Mlk. The objective is to find an interpretation I
such that (1) the product A , A1 | A2 | · · · | An is deadlock free under the interpretation I,
(2) each esm-sk A ∈ {Ai}, i ∈ [1,n] is deterministic under the interpretation I, (3) for each
Msi, i ∈ [1,m], A I Msi, (4) for eachMlj, j ∈ [1,k], A I Mlj, and (5) I is symmetric with
respect to TB.
Note that we require that the interpretation I is such that each esm-sk under I is deter-
ministic. This is based on our observation that typically, the esms which cooperate to achieve
the goals of a distributed protocol are deterministic individually. The non-determinism in such
protocols arises out of (1) non-determinism in the scheduler, and (2) non-determinism in the
environment esms. We assume that environment esms are completely specified, and we will
therefore never be required to complete environment esm-sks.
The next chapter presents an elegant symbolic algorithm to obtain all interpretations I
which satisfy the requirements set forth in the problem statement. Unfortunately, this algorithm
is not effective in practice. We describe the reasons why this is so, and also elaborate on the
insights obtained by implementing the algorithm and experimenting with a simple cache
coherence protocol. These insights also explain some of the choices made in the rest of the
work that this dissertation describes.
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A Symbolic Strategy via Parametrized Transitions
Given that the problem defined in Chapter 2 only involves finite types, thereby rendering the
space of solutions finite, one can immediately imagine an elegant symbolic solution to find all
interpretations which satisfy the requirements set forth in Section 2.3. Such a solution would
have the following high level outline:
1. Translate the descriptions of the esms and esm-sks into a parameterized symbolic transi-
tion system, which could be represented using Reduced Ordered Binary Decision Diagrams
(henceforth referred to as ROBDDs or BDDs) [Bry85, Bry86, BRB90]. The values of the
parameters determine the interpretation I which is chosen. The set of all interpretations is
finite, given that the domains and ranges of all the function symbols f ∈ F are finite, and
thus the introduced parameters can only take on a finite number of values, since every
value corresponds to a distinct interpretation. The values for these parameters are encoded
symbolically as well, and are initially left unconstrained, i.e., any interpretation is allowed.
2. Translate the requirements expressed in ltl into a tester transition system as described in
the work by Kesten et. al. [KPRS06]
3. Interleave the symbolic model-checking algorithm described in the work by Kesten et.
al. [KPRS06] with steps to (symbolically) prune parameter valuations which result in
incorrect interpretations being chosen, until the model-checking succeeds. At this point,
the parameter valuations that we are left with correspond to all interpretations that satisfy
the requirements set forth in Section 2.3.
This strategy only handles requirements expressible in ltl, whereas the problem statement
outlined in Section 2.3 handles requirements expressed as arbitrary Büchi monitors. Given that
there exist Büchi monitors which do not have an equivalent ltl formula, this strategy solves
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a restricted version of the problem defined in Section 2.3. The strategy can be extended to
handle arbitrary Büchi monitors in a relatively straightforward manner. However, the objective
of presenting this solution strategy here is to highlight the complexity of distributed protocol
completion and glean insights that lead to developing more effective algorithmic strategies. So,
we will focus only on ltl requirements and a slightly simplified version of the original problem
in this chapter enabling us to leverage the proofs of correctness from earlier work [KPRS06].
3.1 A Simplified, Finite Version of the Problem
Consider the following simplified version of the problem defined in Section 2.3: Each esm
or esm-sk has no state variables, i.e., V = ∅. Further, we assume that messages do not have
a payload, i.e., mtype(m) = unit for all messagesm ∈ Σ. Essentially, the state machines are
now simply finite-state machines or finite-state machine sketches, and we will refer to them
as fsms or fsm-sks respectively. Each transition t ∈ R of such an fsm or fsm-sk will have
the form t , 〈l,m, guard, l ′〉. With no state variables and message payloads, the updates
component of a transition is no longer relevant. The guard in this setting is always the Boolean
constant true in the case of an fsm, but is allowed to be a propositional variable in the case of
an fsm-sk, where setting the propositional variable to true indicates that t ∈ R and setting
to false indicates that t /∈ R. An interpretation I in this simplified setting is then simply
a valuation for these unknown guards. Note that even in this simplified setting, the rest of
the definitions regarding composition, symmetry, executions and fairness remain unchanged.
Thus an fsm or fsm-sk A is the tuple A , 〈LA, lA0, IA,OA, FAs, FAw〉. We assume that the
specification is provided as a single ltl formula ϕ,5 over the single distinguished variable loc,
which represents the location of the fsm-sk A.
We now briefly outline each of these steps of the symbolic solution strategy for this simplified
version of the problem. We then explain why this strategy is not satisfactory, even for this
simplified version of the problem, based on empirical observations.
3.2 The Parameterized Symbolic Transition System
Given an fsm or fsm-sk A, which has the form A , 〈L, l0, I,O,R, FAs, FAw〉, which itself
could possibly be the composition of two or more fsms or fsm-sks, we now outline how
5If A is required to satisfy multiple ltl formulas, then these can be expressed as a single ltl formula which is
the conjunction of the given formulas.
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to represent A as a symbolic transition system. We denote the symbolic transition system
corresponding to A as A˜ ,
〈
V˜ , l˜0, R˜, F˜As, F˜Aw
〉
, where:
• V˜ is the set of variables in the symbolic transition system and we use V˜ ′ to represent the
primed version of the variables in V˜ . The primed version of a variable denotes the value of
the variable in the next state. We require them to distinguish between the current and next
values of variables in a symbolic representation.
• l˜0 is the symbolic representation of the set of initial states of the symbolic transition system.
• R˜ is the symbolic transition relation that relates the values in the next state, represented by
the primed version of the variables, i.e., V˜ ′, to their values in the current state, represented
by the unprimed version of the variables, i.e., V˜ .
• F˜As is a set of pairs of predicates over V˜ , with one pair encoding each set F ∈ FAs.
• F˜Aw is a set of predicates over V˜ , with one predicate encoding each set F ∈ FAs.
We will use BDDs to represent l˜0, R˜, F˜As and F˜Aw in our presentation. It will be convenient
to partition R into the sets Rfixed and Rsynth, where Rfixed consists of the transitions with “fixed”
interpretations, i.e., where guard is the Boolean constant true, and Rsynth consists of the set of
transitions whose interpretations are to be synthesized, i.e., where guard is a Boolean valued
variable whose value needs to be determined. The usual determinism constraints outlined
in Chapter 2 are implicitly assumed in the rest of this chapter. We note that these can also
be specified using suitable constraints on Rsynth and fit well into the BDD based algorithms
described in this chapter.
We define the set of variables of A˜ as V˜ , {loc, lastt}∪ G˜, where loc and lastt, represent the
location of the fsm A, and the identity of the transition that was taken to arrive at the current
state, respectively. The set of variables G˜ = {g1,g2, . . . ,gk}, where k = |R|, consists of Boolean
valued variables, where gi represents the guard of the transition ti, for each ti ∈ R. The
lastt variables are necessary because symbolic model checking algorithms are more naturally
suited to handle handle state-based fairness requirements, rather than transition-based fairness
requirements. By adding the variable lastt, we are essentially enabling the translation of
transition-based fairness into state-based fairness.
We now describe how each of the symbolic representations for l˜0, R˜, F˜Aw, and F˜As are
constructed, starting from a definition of A. We present the predicates over the set of variables
V as well as the primed variables V ′ that correspond to the definition of each of these. It is
straightforward to use BDD operations, using a BDD library like CUDD [SB00], for example, to
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construct BDDs corresponding to these predicates. The set of initial states of A˜, can be encoded
as follows:
l˜0 ≡
(loc = l0) ∧ ∧
ti∈Rfixed
gi

Each transition ti ∈ R of the form ti ,
〈
li,mi, guardi, l ′i
〉
is encoded symbolically as:
(loc = li)∧ gi ∧
(
loc ′ = l ′i
)
∧
(
lastt ′ = ti
)
∧ g ′i = gi
The constraint g ′i = gi ensures that the interpretation remains constant across transitions. The
complete symbolic transition relation R˜ is then simply the disjunction of the above encoding
over all the transitions t ∈ R:
R˜ ≡
∨
ti∈R
(
(loc = li)∧ gi ∧
(
loc ′ = l ′i
)
∧
(
lastt ′ = ti
))
Consider a fairness assumption Fw ∈ Fw, where Fw = {t1, t2, . . . , tn}, we symbolically encode
Fw, denoted F˜w, using a single predicate of the form:
F˜w ≡ ¬enabled(Fw)∨ taken(Fw)
where enabled(Fw) ≡
∨
ti∈Fw (loc = li ∧ gi), with li and gi referring to the initial location
and the Boolean variable corresponding to the guard of the transition ti, and the predicate
taken(Fw) ≡
∨
ti∈Fw lastt = ti. The predicate enabled(Fw) encodes whether any transition
in Fw can be executed, and taken(Fw) encodes whether the current state has been reached by
executing any transition in the set Fw.
For strong fairness assumptions Fs ∈ Fs, where Fs = {t1, t2, . . . , tn}, we symbolically
encode Fs, denoted F˜s, using a pair of Boolean valued formulas p and q, where p , enabled(Fs)
and q , taken(Fs), where enabled and taken are as defined above. The predicate encodings
of fairness assumptions will be used to characterize if a non-empty terminal strongly connected
component is fair. We refer the reader to earlier work [KPRS06] for a more detailed explanation.
3.3 Construction of the ltl Tester
We now describe how to construct a tester — which is itself a transition system augmented
with a set of weak fairness assumptions — corresponding to an ltl formula ϕ. We denote the
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tester for the ltl formula ϕ as Tϕ. This description has been adapted from earlier work by
Kesten et. al. [KPRS06].
The symbolic transition relation of Tϕ refers to variables in V˜ and V˜ ′, but does not constrain
either. Tϕ also refers to variables in the set Xϕ ∪X ′ϕ, where Xϕ is a set of Boolean valued vari-
ables, and is defined as Xϕ , {xp |p is a principally temporal sub-formula of ϕ}. The primed
version of the variables in Xϕ is denoted by the set X ′ϕ. A (sub-)formula is principally temporal
if its top level operator is one of U or X. If ψ is a sub-formula of ϕ (note that we consider ϕ to
be a sub-formula of itself), then we denote it as ψ ∈ ϕ. To define the transition relation of Tϕ,
we define a mapping χ which maps each sub-formula ψ of ϕ to an assertion over V˜ , defined as
follows:
χ(ψ) =

ψ if ψ is an atomic proposition
¬χ(p) if ψ ≡ ¬p
χ(p1)∨ χ(p2) if ψ ≡ p1 ∨ p2
xψ if ψ is principally temporal
(3.1)
The transition relation for Tϕ is as shown below:
R˜ϕ ≡
∧
Xp∈ϕ
(
xXp ↔ χ ′(p)
)
∧
∧
pUq∈ϕ
(
xpUq ↔
(
χ(q)∨
(
χ(p)∧ x ′pUq
)))
(3.2)
where χ ′(p) refers to the assertion corresponding to the sub-formula p, but where all the
variables are substituted with their primed variants. Finally, for each pUq ∈ ϕ, we add the
following (symbolic) weak fairness assumption:
χ(q)∨ ¬xpUq (3.3)
to Tϕ and set the initial condition for Tϕ to be true.
To summarize, the symbolic transition system for the tester for the ltl formulaϕ is denoted
as Tϕ ,
〈
V˜ϕ, l˜ϕ0, R˜ϕ, F˜ϕs, F˜ϕw
〉
, where:
• V˜ϕ = V˜ ∪ Xϕ.
• l˜ϕ0 = true
• R˜ϕ is constructed as shown in (3.2).
• F˜ϕs = ∅, and
• The set F˜ϕw consists of the predicates shown in (3.3), one for each sub-formula ψ ∈ ϕ,
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such that the sub-formula ψ is an until sub-formula, i.e., it has the form pUq, where the
sub-formulas p and q are the ones referred to in the Formula (3.3).
3.4 The Symbolic Synthesis Algorithm
Given two symbolic transition systems A˜0 and A˜1, where A˜0 ,
〈
V˜0, l˜00, R˜0, F˜0s, F˜0w
〉
and
A˜1 ,
〈
V˜1, l˜10, R˜1, F˜1s, F˜1w
〉
, we define the synchronous product of A˜0 and A˜1 as the symbolic
transition system A˜0 || A˜1 ,
〈
V˜0 ∪ V˜1, l˜00 ∧ l˜10, R˜0 ∧ R˜1, F˜0s ∪ F˜1s, F˜0w ∪ F˜1w
〉
. We present
the symbolic synthesis algorithm in terms of manipulations on sets of states. A state in the
setting of a symbolic transition relation A˜ over a set of variables V˜ can be considered a valuation
of the variables in V˜ . Let S
V˜
be the set of all valuations given a set of variables V˜ , i.e., S
V˜
is
the set of all functions σ which maps each variable v ∈ V˜ to a value of the appropriate type. For
every predicate p over the variables V˜ , we denote by |p| ⊆ S
V˜
the set of valuations that satisfy
p. It follows that |true| = S
V˜
. A predicate like R˜ over the variables V˜ ∪ V˜ ′ can be viewed as a
binary relation over S
V˜
, with the primed variables representing the second components of the
pairs in the relation. Given a set S ⊆ S
V˜
and a binary relation R ⊆ S
V˜
×S
V˜
, we define R∩ S
as R ∩ S , R ∩ (S×S
V˜
)
Having established the correspondence between sets and relations with predicates, we
define the operator img(P,R) , {s | (s0, s) ∈ R∧ s0 ∈ P}, where P ⊆ SV˜ and R ⊆ SV˜ ×SV˜ .
If P and R are represented symbolically as P˜ and R˜ which are predicates over V˜ and V˜ ∪ V˜ ′
respectively, then the symbolic equivalent of the img operator is given by:
unprime
(
∃ v1, v2, . . . , vn
(
p∧ R˜
))
given that V˜ is the set {v1, v2, . . . , vn}, and the function unprime substitutes primed variables
with their unprimed versions. In a similar fashion, we define the pre-image operator pre(P,R) ,
{s | (s, s0) ∈ R∧ s0 ∈ P}, where P and R are as defined earlier in the case of the img operator.
If P and R are represented symbolically as the predicates P˜ and R˜ as mentioned in the case of
the img operator, then the symbolic equivalent of the pre operator is given by:
∃ v ′1, v ′2, . . . , v ′n
(
prime(p)∧ R˜
)
given that V˜ ′ is the set {v ′1, v
′
2, . . . , v
′
n} and the function prime substitutes each variable with its
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primed version. Thus the img and pre operators yield the set of states (or valuations) reachable
from a given set of states P within one forward or backward transition through R respectively.
We define the operator img∗ as:
img∗(P,R) , P ∪ img(P,R) ∪ img(img(P,R),R) ∪ · · ·
Given that S
V˜
is finite, the sequence of unions for img∗ must converge to a fix-point after a
finite number of unions. Thus img∗(P,R) represents the set of all states that are reachable
from a given set of states P by zero or more forward transitions through R. Similarly, we define
the set of all states that can reach a given set of states P by zero or more forward transitions
through R by the function pre∗ as:
pre∗(P,R) , P ∪ pre(P,R) ∪ pre(pre(P,R),R) ∪ · · ·
Again, this sequence must also converge to a fix-point within a finite number of unions.
Algorithm 3.1, GetSymbolicInterps, which has been adapted from the model checking
algorithm presented in the work by Kesten et. al. [KPRS06]6 then describes the synthesis
algorithm in terms of these definitions. Note that although the algorithm is described in terms
of manipulations on sets, all of the operations have efficient implementations in the form of
BDD manipulation routines, if we use BDDs as a symbolic representation for sets. For instance,
we were able to translate these operations in a straightforward manner onto the operations
provided by the BDD library CUDD [SB00], in the prototype that we developed.
3.4.1 Correctness
It has been shown in earlier work [KPRS06] that if the input A˜ is not parameterized as it is in our
case, then A˜ |= ϕ, and thusA |= ϕ if and only if the value of new13, i.e., the value of the variable
new after the execution of line 13 of Algorithm 3.1, is such that new13∩ |θ˜∧χ(¬ϕ)| = ∅. Given
that in our setting, the symbolic transition relation A˜ is parameterized by the set of variables
G˜, the set new13 ∩ |θ˜∧ χ(¬ϕ)| yields exactly the set of interpretations for G˜ which result in
A˜ 6|= ϕ. Therefore, by eliminating these interpretations from the set of all interpretations S
V˜
in line 14 of Algorithm 3.1, and by the bi-directional implication in the proof of correctness of
6In fact, in the presentation here, the algorithm is exactly the same as that presented in [KPRS06] up-to and
including line 13.
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Algorithm 3.1: GetSymbolicInterps: Synthesize all correct fsm-sk completions
Input : A symbolic transition system A˜ , 〈V˜A, l˜A, R˜A, F˜As, F˜Aw〉, with parameters G˜
An ltl property ϕ over V˜A.
Output : All interpretations I for parameters in G˜, such that A
I
ϕ.
Data : T¬ϕ , 〈V˜¬ϕ, l˜¬ϕ, R˜¬ϕ, F˜¬ϕs, F˜¬ϕw〉, the tester for the ltl formula ¬ϕ.
D , 〈V˜ , θ˜, R˜, F˜s, F˜w〉, where D = A || T¬ϕ.
new, old : subsets of S
V˜
ρ : subset of S
V˜
×S
V˜
1 construct T¬ϕ and D as defined
2 old← ∅
3 new← img∗(|θ˜|, |R˜|)
4 ρ← |R˜| ∩ new
5 while new 6= old do
6 old← new
7 while new 6= new ∩ pre(new, ρ) do
8 new← new ∩ pre(new, ρ)
9 foreach Fw ∈ F˜w do
10 new← pre∗((new ∩ Fw), (ρ ∩ new))
11 foreach (p,q) ∈ F˜s do
12 new← (new \ |p|) ∪ pre∗((new ∩ |q|), (ρ ∩ new))
13 new← pre∗(new, ρ)
14 bad← new ∩ |θ˜∧ χ(¬ϕ)|
15 return (S
V˜
\ bad)
the algorithm presented in the work by Kesten et. al [KPRS06], we immediately obtain the
correctness of Algorithm 3.1.7
3.5 Evaluating the Symbolic Algorithm
To study how the symbolic synthesis algorithm presented in Section 3.4 performs in practice,
we consider the cache coherence protocol called the Valid-Invalid (VI) protocol, which has
been described in Chapter 1. This is one of the simplest cache coherence protocols, and
is thus conveniently representable as a finite-state protocol. Nonetheless, it is qualitatively
representative of the kinds of distributed protocols that we wish to target in this dissertation.
We built a prototype tool in OCaml that implemented Algorithm 3.1, using the CUDD [Som15]
BDD manipulation library as a back-end.
7Strictly speaking, the algorithm returns a set of valuations over V˜ , which includes variables other than those in G˜,
but nonetheless, because we have V˜ ⊇ G˜ by construction, every valuation for V˜ is also a valuation for G˜.
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3.5.1 Applying the Symbolic Algorithm to Complete the VI Protocol
We constructed a finite version of the VI cache coherence protocol to evaluate the symbolic
synthesis algorithm shown in Algorithm 3.1. In the sequel, we assume that the Directory
fsm-sk is of the formD , 〈LD, lD0, ID,OD,RD,FDs,FDw〉, and each Cache fsm-sk Ci is of
the form Ci , 〈Li, li0, Ii,Oi,Ri,Fis,Fiw〉. We considered three instances of the completion
problem:
• In the first version, the set of tentative transitions that were added to the directory machine is
restricted to transitions of the form 〈 A , RSP, guard, l ′〉, for each l ′ ∈ LD, where guard repre-
sents a fresh propositional variable to be solved for. Similarly, the set of tentative transitions
added to each cache machine was restricted to transitions of the form 〈 B , INV, guard, l ′〉,
for each l ′ ∈ Li, where guard again represents a fresh propositional variable. In essence,
the only synthesis that needs to be performed in this version is to determine the final state
l ′ that each machine needs to transition to. In this case, symbolic algorithm was able to
obtain a correct solution within 30 seconds.
• In the second version, the set of tentative transitions for the directory machine is restricted
to transitions of the form 〈 A ,m, guard, l ′〉, for everym ∈ ID ∪OD, and for every l ′ ∈ LD.
Similarly, the set of tentative transitions for the cache machine is restricted to transitions of
the form 〈 B ,m, guard, l ′〉, for everym ∈ Ii ∪Oi and for every l ′ ∈ Li. This is tantamount
to determining what message to send or receive when at the locations labeled A and B , as
well as the next state to transition to after sending or receiving the message. In this case,
the symbolic algorithm was able to converge on a correct solution in about ten minutes.
• In the third and final version, the set of tentative transitions for the directory machine
includes all transitions of the form 〈l,m, guard, l ′〉, for everym ∈ ID ∪OD, and for every
l, l ′ ∈ LD. Similarly, the set of tentative transitions for the cache machine is restricted to
transitions of the form 〈l,m, guard, l ′〉, for everym ∈ Ii ∪Oi and for every l, l ′ ∈ Li. These
tentative transitions are added only if they do not result in non-determinism in the fsm-sks.
In this version, the completion algorithm does not have any knowledge about the starting
locations of the missing transitions are, what messages to send or receive in the starting
locations, as well as what the final locations of the transitions are. For this version of the
problem, the symbolic algorithm was unable to obtain a correct solution even after six hours
of computation time.
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To summarize, the three versions of the protocol completion problem for the VI coherence
protocol differ in the amount of programmer intuition conveyed to the algorithm. The observa-
tion here is that the symbolic algorithm performs better when the search space of solutions is
restricted by leveraging the intuitions that a programmer has. We now discuss the reasons for
why the algorithm does not scale in the hardest of cases, as well as elaborate on some of the
insights obtained from this experiment.
BDDs and the Scalability of the Symbolic Algorithm
In our experiments with Algorithm 3.1, we observed that the BDDs often consisted of tens to
hundreds of millions of nodes. The calls to BDD manipulation routines sometimes required tens
of minutes of computation. We experimented with enabling the dynamic reordering of BDDs
in CUDD. This helped keep the size of the BDDs manageable and enabled quick completion
of the BDD manipulation routines. However, the cost of this was that every time the dynamic
reordering was triggered, it often took tens of minutes to complete the reordering, based on
the internal heuristics implemented in the CUDD library. To summarize, enabling dynamic
reordering did not have a positive impact overall execution time of the algorithm. Given that
the BDDs were being used to represent constraints over a set containing about 600 variables
in the hardest versions of the VI completion problem, we could not exhaustively evaluate
all possible static variable orderings. We did however, experiment with a few static variable
orderings, that we believed were reasonable, but were unable to improve the execution times
of the algorithm.
Impact of Symbolically Retaining all Solutions
Figure 3.1 depicts the reachable state space of the protocol in terms of the interpretation that is
chosen (in this case, parameter valuations), at a conceptual level. We have empirically observed
that checking if a correct version of the VI protocol satisfies all the ltl specifications can be
performed rather efficiently,8 and requires only a few seconds of computation time, even with
a static BDD variable ordering. From this observation, we infer that the region G is amenable
to being represented compactly using BDDs. However, Algorithm 3.1, first computes the region
U, and then computes G, by removing all states (and the parameter valuations which led to
their conditional reachability) that can reach an erroneous state in one or more steps. We
8This can be accomplished by simply executing Algorithm 3.1 until (and including) line 13, and checking that
new ∩ |θ˜∧ χ(¬ϕ)| is empty.
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Figure 3.1: Depiction of the state space of the protocol in terms of all possible completions.
The region marked U, which includes all other regions is the state space of the protocol which
is reachable if the set of parameter valuations is left unconstrained, i.e., this is the region that
is the union of the reachable state space for every possible completion. The region marked
G, which includes the region marked init, consists of the set of states of the protocol that are
reachable if a good completion is chosen. The set U \ G denotes the set of states that are
reachable if a bad completion is chosen. These are states that can reach an error state in zero
or more steps, under a given bad completion.
have empirically observed that the BDDs representing G are compact. We thus conclude that
representing the large parts of the set U that are conditionally reachable, together with the
parameter valuations which ensure their reachability is difficult using BDDs.
To try and reduce the size of the BDDs representing these intermediate results, our imple-
mentation differs slightly from Algorithm 3.1, in the following ways:
• We separate ltl specifications that are safety specifications, i.e., of the form Gp, from true
liveness specifications, which could involve eventualities.
• We aggressively eliminate interpretations that are proven unsafe, as early as possible, during
the execution of the algorithm. Specifically, the computation in line 3 in Algorithm 3.1 is
interleaved with steps to eliminate incorrect interpretations. This is done by eliminating
parameter valuations that cause the currently computed under-approximation of the set of
reachable states to have a non-empty intersection with the set of states where the invariant
is violated.
Unfortunately, this optimization did not have much effect on the execution time of the algorithm,
owing to two reasons:
1. We only eliminate a parameter valuation when it has been proven to reach an unsafe state.
As can be seen from Figure 3.1, there is a large set of states marked U \ G, which will
inevitably lead to an unsafe state, but might need several steps to do so. This causes our
algorithm to retain large parts of the setU\G as a function of the parameter valuations in a
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symbolic form. And we have already discussed that this space is not compactly representable
using a static BDD ordering. The problems with enabling dynamic reordering have also
been discussed earlier.
2. The aggressive pruning only prunes parameter valuations which violate some safety specifi-
cation. A large part of the specifications for the VI protocol are liveness specifications. We
have empirically observed that even after pruning unsafe parameter valuations, the BDDs
that evolve during the execution of the loop on line 5 of Algorithm 3.1 are often huge.
Based on these observations, we concluded that this symbolic approach, while very elegant,
was unlikely to perform well in practice on larger, more complex protocols. We conclude
the discussion on this symbolic synthesis strategy by summarizing some key insights which
influenced the direction of the research described in the rest of this dissertation.
3.5.2 Insights from Experimenting with the Symbolic Algorithm
• Starting with the set of all possible solutions and paring it down to the set of correct solutions
is difficult, especially if the state space of the protocol is maintained symbolically as a function
of the current over-approximation of the set of correct solutions. More effective algorithms
are possible if we require the algorithms to find one correct solution, rather than all of them,
as we show in subsequent chapters of this dissertation.
• Symmetry in the state space cannot easily be exploited to reduce the size of BDDs. Although
there has been work along this direction [CJEF96, EW03, EW05, WBE08], most of these
techniques are geared towards checking ctl properties, and not ltl properties with fine-
grained fairness assumptions. The problem is that symbolically representing the orbit
relation between states which are equivalent modulo the symmetry assumptions requires
an exponentially sized BDD, which negates any savings obtained by eliminating symmetric
states.
• Explicit state model checking techniques seem more promising than symbolic techniques for
synthesis. Counterexample Guided Inductive Synthesis [SLRBE05, STB+06, SAT+07, Sol09]
can more readily be applied when using explicit state model checking techniques, as we show
in the rest of this dissertation. Further, symmetry in the state space of the protocol can also be
more effectively exploited, leading to exponential space savings [ID96, Dil96, ES97, SGE00].
• If a CEGIS technique is used, then a purely depth-first or breadth-first approach during the
verification (or model-checking) phase is sub-optimal. We have observed this empirically in
46
Description of the
incomplete protocol
1
Build esm-sks
4
Constraints ψ on
unknown functions
2
Generate I such
that I |= ψ∧ϕ
5
Instantiate
Protocol
6
Check
correctness
7
Liveness and
safety monitors
3
Correct
Protocol
Augment ϕ with
constraints from errors
8
Correct?
Incorrect?
Error traces
ϕ augmented with
additional constraints
Figure 3.2: Algorithmic scheme of all the solution strategies we discuss. The gray rectangles
represent inputs, the blue rounded rectangles represent computation, and the red rhombuses
represent decisions. Solid blue arrows represent control and data flow, while the dashed black
arrows represent data flow.
the case of the symbolic algorithm, which uses a symbolic, breadth-first search strategy. In
the later chapters of this dissertation, we explore heuristics for explicit state model checking
algorithms, which lead to quicker convergence of the CEGIS loop to find an interpretation
that satisfies the requirements described in Section 2.3.
We conclude this chapter with a brief discussion of the solution strategies described in the rest
of this dissertation.
3.6 Road-map for the Rest of the Dissertation
In our attempt to find a complete solution to the problem defined in Section 2.3, we solved
several simplified versions of the problem, each progressively less simplified. Each of these
techniques will be described in subsequent chapters, culminating in a complete solution for
the problem defined in Section 2.3 in Chapter 8. Each of these approaches tries to solve a
particular aspect of the problem and is interesting in its own right, in addition to bringing us a
step closer to a complete solution. Figure 3.2 describes the general scheme of the algorithm
used in our solution strategies. Every one of the solution strategies which we shall present
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in the rest of this manuscript may be viewed as an instantiation of the algorithmic scheme
shown in Figure 3.2. The block labeled 1 represents the description of the incomplete protocol
provided by the user. This can be an esm sketch itself or in some other form, for example,
flows or scenarios [TT08], or message sequence charts [ITU96] or live sequence charts [DH01],
from which the esm sketch is built by the block labeled 4 . The user can also specify a set
of constraints ψ representing domain knowledge, as shown in the block labeled 2 , which is
taken into consideration while generating a suitable interpretation in the block labeled 5 . The
set of constraints ϕ is initially empty. Once a suitable interpretation I has been generated,
the protocol is instantiated with this interpretation by the block labeled 6 , and checked for
correctness against the user specified safety and liveness monitors ( 3 ) by the block labeled 7 .
This check is performed using a model-checker. If the protocol is found to satisfy all the safety
and liveness requirements, then the algorithm terminates with a success. On the other hand, if
the model-checker discovers errors, these errors are used to generate additional constraints
( 8 ) which are then added to ϕ. These additional constraints rule out at least the current
interpretation I from being generated again. A new interpretation I ′ is now generated taking
into account the newly added constraints, and this process is repeated until a correct protocol
is found. The solution strategies which we describe in this manuscript differ primarily in how
the incomplete protocol is described ( 1 ), how errors are analyzed to obtain new constraints
to augment ϕ with ( 8 ), and in how new interpretations are generated ( 5 ).
Our first attempt, which resulted in a system called transit [URD+13], applied the
following restrictions on the problem statement: (1) Only safety monitors were used, (2) We
required the protocol designer to specify the behavior of functions in U using any combination of
input-output examples, and symbolic constraints, and finally, (3) we required the interpretations
synthesized to only be consistent with the constraints specified by the protocol designer, and not
necessarily result in a correct protocol. Upon encountering an erroneous trace, the programmer
could specify the correct behaviors of the relevant functions in U using purely concrete input-
output examples corresponding only to the erroneous trace in question. Essentially, the
approach required the programmer to be in the loop with the synthesizer, providing additional
information, whenever the synthesis step resulted in an incorrect protocol. The approach is an
instantiation of the algorithm described in Figure 3.2, where the block labeled 1 is in itself
an esm-sk, the block labeled 2 represents input-output examples or symbolic constraints,
each of which refers to only one function fu ∈ U. The block labeled 3 is restricted to only
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contain safety monitors, and finally, the task performed by the block labeled 8 is performed
by the user or programmer by adding the relevant input-output examples to ϕ. This work is
described in Chapter 4.
While we were building the tool transit, we realized that the synthesis problem of
synthesizing a function interpretation given symbolic constraints and input-output examples
could be generalized in a manner that encompasses most other custom-built synthesizers for
various domains. This observation resulted in the formalization of the SyGuS problem, and
a competition of the same name. We built a general-purpose solver for the SyGuS problem,
based on the ideas used in the solver built for transit, which won the SyGuS competition
in 2014 [AFSSL14]. Chapter 5 provides a detailed description of the SyGuS problem, and
Chapter 6 describes an enumerative solution strategy, and also builds more sophisticated and
scalable algorithms based on the simple enumerative solver.
Our second solution strategy allowed full use of safety and liveness monitors, but we
restricted the esms and the esm-sks to not have any state variables, as described earlier in this
Chapter. In essence this meant that all state had to be encoded through the locations of the state
machines, which were essentially finite state machines or finite state machine sketches — fsms
and fsm-sks, as described earlier. Further, we also did not allow messages to have payloads.
However, we relaxed the requirement that an fsm-sk be provided, and instead allowed the
user to specify the known behavior of the protocol using scenarios or flows [TT08], which were
then compiled into fsm-sks. The problem then is essentially to find a set of transitions to add
to the given finite-state sketches, such that the composition satisfies the provided monitors. We
were able to build a system which worked completely automatically, and the system produced
correct protocols, starting from a set of scenarios which described the protocol behavior in
the common cases. Relating this to Figure 3.2, 1 is now a set of scenarios or flows, and block
8 is an algorithm that analyzes counterexample traces and adds appropriate constraints on
the functions in U. Also, U contains functions, each of whose domain the set of locations Li of
the appropriate fsm-sk in the composition A, and whose range is simply a Boolean which
indicates whether the particular transition is allowed or not. We describe this approach in
detail in Chapter 7.
Our third strategy treats symmetry — as defined in Section 2.3 — as a first class citizen
and also allows esms and esm-sks to have typed state variables. We expect the programmer
to provide the description of the protocol directly as esm-sks, i.e., 1 is a set of esm-sks. We
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also support liveness requirements in the form of Büchi monitors, which are required to be
satisfied under fine-grained fairness assumptions set forth by the programmer. This approach
is fully automatic, and is thus a complete solution to the problem defined in Section 2.3. We
discuss this approach in detail in Chapter 8. Chapter 9 discusses closely related work, both
in the area of distributed protocol synthesis as well as general program synthesis. Finally, we
reflect on the research problems addressed in this dissertation, the limitations of the solution
strategies, avenues for further research and conclude with Chapter 10.
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transit: Specifying Protocols
with Concolic Snippets
This chapter describes a tool called transit, which we have built and evaluated as a solution
to a restricted version of the problem defined in Section 2.3, and uses concolic snippets to
describe the behavior of esm-sks. This chapter is based on the work originally published
in [URD+13].
4.1 Overview of transit
transit allows a programmer to specify the known behavior of the protocol, using concolic
snippets. These are sample transition fragments which describe the guards and updates of a
single transition of an esm-sk using constraints on the valuations of the variables of an esm.
The constraints can be (1) concrete — in which case they describe the behavior of the guard
and updates on exactly one valuation of the esm variables, (2) symbolic — in which case they
describe the behavior of the transition as the post-condition which must hold whenever the
specified precondition holds, or (3) they can be any combination of the concrete and symbolic
constraints.
The motivation for the use of concolic snippets is that during the initial design and devel-
opment phase, the programmer can use symbolic values to describe the part of the behavior
of the protocol that well understood. Once an initial — and possibly incomplete — version
of the protocol has been specified using symbolic snippets, it is then checked for correctness.
The programmer can then codify the fixes to any counterexamples obtained during this check
using concrete input-output examples that correspond to a local fix, which eliminates at least
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Figure 4.1: Overview of developing a protocol with transit. The algorithm is an instantiation
of the algorithm shown in Figure 3.2, with the programmer analyzing error traces. The arrow
labeled 9 denotes the concolic snippets that the programmer provides to eliminate at least
the current error trace in question. These concolic snippets are then used to augment the
constraints ψ on the unknown functions. This process is repeated until a correct protocol is
obtained.
the one counterexample. transit integrates the new (concrete) constraints with the rest
of the constraints to provide a new interpretation I which satisfies all the constraints. The
protocol is instantiated with the new interpretation, and the process is repeated until a correct
protocol is found. The programmer is thus freed from reasoning about the global properties of
the protocol when handling corner-case behavior, which were not handled in the initial version
of the protocol.
Figure 4.1 provides a high-level view of the working of the transit system. It is an
instantiation of the algorithmic scheme shown in Figure 3.2: the inputs are in the form of
concolic snippets, which we will define shortly. The relevant constraints ψ on the unknown
functions — functions fu ∈ U—are extracted from these snippets by transit; the box labeled
2 is thus not directly provided by the programmer. The task of analyzing counterexamples and
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inferring additional constraints on the unknown functions — represented by the block labeled
8 in Figure 3.2 — is not automatic, but it instead performed by the programmer in transit.
Also, transit only supports safety properties: this is not a methodological limitation, but
rather due to the limitations of the model checker that we use, Murϕ, which does not support
the checking of liveness properties.
The synthesis algorithm presented in this chapter, assumes a specific form for the constraints
ψ. We require that ψ be a conjunction of constraints ψ , c1 ∧ c2 ∧ · · · ∧ cn, where each
conjunct ci can be an arbitrary Boolean valued expression, but has the following properties:
• The expression, ci refers to exactly one unknown function fu ∈ U.
• The expression ci is assumed to refer only to the set of variables V ∪ {o}, where V is the set
of all state variables of the esm-sk which uses fu in its description.
• All applications of fu in ci are of the form fu(V), i.e., every occurrence of fu in ci has fu
applied to the same set of arguments, and these arguments comprise all the state variables
of the esm-sk which uses fu in its description, in the same order.
These restrictions essentially ensure that the constraint ψ is separable, a notion which will
be defined in Chapter 6. For the purpose of exposition in this chapter, we note that these
restrictions essentially have the following consequences:
• For each fu ∈ U, we can find the subset of conjuncts ψfu in ψ that refer to fu, and these
conjuncts now form the all the constraints that an interpretation for fu needs to satisfy. We
can therefore synthesize interpretations for each fu ∈ U independently.
• Within each ψfu corresponding to the constraints on fu ∈ U, we know that all occurrences
of fu have the form fu(V), where V is the set of all state variables of the esm-sk that refers
to fu. We can thus replace each of these occurrences with a single distinguished variable o,
which has the same type as the range of fu.
The syntax that we use for concolic snippets allow transit to easily translate the concolic
snippets into a constraint ψ that has the required form.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 explains what a concolic
snippet snippet is and describes, by means of examples, how they are used in programming
with transit. Section 4.3 describes an algorithm for synthesizing symbolic expressions
such that they are consistent with the concolic snippets provided by the programmer. Finally,
Section 4.4 presents and discusses the results of experimentally evaluating of transit to
specify a few cache coherence protocols as case studies, our experience with transit, as well
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Transition(CurrentState, InputEvent)
[optional guard] => (NextState, OutMsg)
Pre1 ==>
Post11;
Post12;
· · ·
Pre2 ==>
· · ·
...
Figure 4.2: A concolic snippet. CurrentState and NextState are the start and end control
states. The snippet specifies zero or more outbound messages. It also specifies a guard-action
block for each guard containing a set of conditional updates. The expression Prei specifies
the condition (on process variables and the fields of the received message) under which the
Boolean constraints Postij hold. Each Postij constrains the updated value of exactly one process
variable or output message field in terms of the old values of the process variables and the
fields of the received message.
as the limitations and shortcomings of this methodology.
4.2 Concolic Snippets and Programming with transit
Figure 4.2 shows the ingredients of a concolic snippet expressed in the transit lan-
guage. We compare the elements in Figure 4.2 with the notation for a transition t ,
〈l,m, guard, updates, l ′〉 which we set up in Section 2.2. For clarity, a “Transition” — note
the mono-spaced font — refers to the identically named construct in the transit language,
whereas a “transition” — note the serif-ed font — refers to the notion of a transition formalized
in Section 2.2. CurrentState represents the initial location for the transition, l in our notation.
A Transition in transit groups together all transitions which begin from a given initial
location CurrentLocation ∈ L, i.e., a Transition in the transit language represents all
transitions of the form t , 〈CurrentState,m, guard, updates, l ′〉, which begin at CurrentState.
Within each Transition, we have multiple guard blocks, one for each transition which begins
at location CurrentState. The InputEvent describes the input messagem (or ) which triggers
the transition. Within each guard block, the guard is optional. If left unspecified, it will be
synthesized by transit. Each guard block specifies a NextState, which is l ′ in our notation,
as well as an optional output message OutMsg. transit allows the programmer to fuse a
transition involving the receipt of a message with a transition involving transmitting an output
message, i.e., an input or internal transition, followed immediately by an output transition.
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Figure 4.3: An error trace generated by themodel checker in response to an incorrect completion
for the SGI-Origin protocol synthesized by transit. Here, “C1” and “C2” represent two cache
esms and “Dir” represents the directory esm. Time progresses downward along the dotted
arrows (lanes) and the state of each esm after each transition is annotated along the lanes.
Message exchanges and their contents are described using annotated arrows across lanes.
Within each guard block, transit allows multiple Pre-Post blocks. The semantics of each such
block of the form Prei ⇒ Posti1; Posti2; . . . Postim;, where Prei is a Boolean valued expression
on the state variables and incoming message fields, V ∪ {mp}, and Postij constrains the value
of exactly one state variable or a field of the output messagemp, are that if Prei holds at the
beginning of the transition, then Postij, j ∈ [1,m] must hold after the transition has executed.
4.2.1 Using Snippets in transit
To illustrate the use of snippets in transit, we use an anecdote from our case study of
implementing the SGI-Origin cache coherence protocol [LL97] from published informal textual
rules. A directory-based cache coherence protocol, such as the SGI-Origin protocol, ensures
that the copies of data maintained in the private caches of a multi-processor system are
kept consistent. The protocol has a distinguished “Directory” process, which maintains the
global view of the processors in the system which currently have a copy of the data in the
cache. The “Cache” processes coordinate with the Directory process via exchange of messages
whenever they need to perform read or write operations on a block of data. The cache and
the directory processes are typically modeled as esms, and we refer to them as processes or
esms interchangeably. In the SGI-Origin protocol, the directory esm has the variable Sharers,
whose type is a finite set of cache process (or esm) identifiers, and a variable Owner, whose
type is a cache process identifier. The Sharers variable maintains the set of caches which
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have a read-only copy of the data, whereas the value of the Owner variable, if defined, is the
identity of the sole cache esm in the system which has a read-write copy of the data. The
safety property that every cache coherence protocol needs to satisfy is the coherence property,
which states that the value read by an cache esm is the same as the value written by the most
recent write operation by any cache esm in the system.
One of the textual rules from the paper [LL97], describing the behavior of the directory
esm in the SGI-Origin protocol, on receiving a read request from a cache esm reads:
If directory state is Exclusive with another owner, transitions to Busy-shared with
requester as owner and send out an intervention shared request to the previous owner
and a speculative reply to the requester. Go to 5b.
Note that this description does not specify how the Sharers variable needs to be updated. The
programmer indicates that the new value of the Sharers variable needs to contain at least the
sender of the message received, in addition to the old contents of the Sharers variable. This is
codified in transit using the following concolic snippet:
Transition(EXCLUSIVE, ReqNet Msg) {
[] => (BUSY_SHARED, RepNet RepMsg, IntNet IntMsg) {
(Msg.Type = READ & Msg.Sender != Owner) ==> {
SubsetOf(SetUnion(Sharers, {Msg.Sender}), Sharers’);
. . .
}}}
Note that this snippet is active only when the current location of the directory esm is EXCLUSIVE
and a request message is received. It also specifies that the location to transition to is
BUSY_SHARED, and that the a reply message as well as an intervention message is to be trans-
mitted, as required by the textual rule. The ReqNet, RepNet and IntNet declarations indicate
the specific channels these messages are sent out over. This is a technicality required by the
transit language is not particularly relevant to the ideas we describe, so we ignore it in
the rest of the manuscript. To be consistent with this snippet, transit needs to generate
code for the update of the state variable Sharers such that the new value of the variable
(denoted by the primed variable Sharers’) is the super-set of union of the old value of the
variable and the sender of the message. Based on the snippet provided by the user, suppose
that transit generated the following code for the update of the Sharers variable for the
transition in question:
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Sharers := Sharers ∪ {Msg.Sender}
An attempt to verify the protocol instantiated with this update, results in a violation of the
coherence invariant. A visual representation of a simplified version of the error trace is shown
in Figure 4.3. Observe that the transition shown on the directory esm in Figure 4.3 is a
concrete instance of the concolic snippet that we have described, with the cache esm C2 being
Msg.Sender and the Owner variable of the directory esm Dir initially set to C1. Upon inspecting
the error trace, the programmer recognized that in this particular case, the new value of
the Sharers variable needed to include the previous value of the Owner variable as well. The
programmer codifies this using the following concrete snippet:
Transition(EXCLUSIVE, ReqNet Msg) {
[] => (BUSY_SHARED, RepNet RepMsg, IntNet IntMsg) {
(Msg.Type = READ & Msg.Sender = C2 & Owner = C1) ==> {
Sharers’ = {C1, C2};
. . .
}}}
Observe that this snippet is only applicable in the specific case when the directory receives
a READ request from cache C2, and the owner is cache C1. The programmer has not applied
any global reasoning to come up with this snippet. With this additional snippet, transit
generated a new implementation with the correct update for the Sharers variable as:
Sharers := Sharers ∪ {Msg.Sender, Owner}
To sum up, transit allows a snippet to be (1) completely symbolic, in which case the
constraints on each lvalue are simple equalities, and transit does not attempt to synthesize
code for such snippets, instead treating them as the implementation itself, or (2) concolic, in
which case, each of the constraints Postij has no restriction on its form, but only constrains one
lvalue, or (3) concrete, in which case, it still constrains one lvalue, but concrete values are used
in both the pre- and the post-conditions in the constraints.
4.3 Expression Inference
To construct a protocol from the concolic snippets provided by the programmer, transit
needs to synthesize expressions which are consistent with each of the snippets provided by the
programmer. Let us, for the moment, assume that constraints implied by the programmer in
the concolic snippets can be translated precisely into a constraint ψ, of the form described in
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Section 4.1. We will return to the question of how this translation is accomplished towards
the end of this section. For the purpose of the synthesis algorithm, we treat the constraints
obtained from both concrete and concolic snippets in the same way, i.e., as symbolic constraints
over the expressions to be synthesized. For each unknown function fu ∈ U, we can separate the
constraints on fu into a set of conjuncts ψfu , where each conjunct refers to the set of variables
V , of the esm-sk that refers to fu, and a distinguished output variable o /∈ V . The variable o,
which corresponds to the lvalue being updated. Consider the set of constraints ψfu for one
fu ∈ U. Let us call the conjunction of the constraints in ψfu as C. The expression inference
problem thus corresponds to the following computational problem: Given a quantifier free
formula C over a set of typed (esm) variables V ∪ {o}, find a symbolic expression e, which
refers only to variables in V , such that C[o 7→ e] is valid, i.e., ¬C[o 7→ e] is not satisfiable. Here
the notation C[o 7→ e] denotes that every application of the function o in C is syntactically
replaced by the expression e. Note that we can synthesize expressions for each unknown
guard or update function independently because each post-condition in a snippet is required
to constrain the value of exactly one lvalue, which corresponds to the distinguished output
variable o, described earlier.
We assume a fixed vocabulary of function symbols Fv ⊆ F (with fixed, known interpreta-
tions) using which the expression e is to be constructed, i.e., e is a well-typed composition of
function symbols in Fv, applied to the variables in V . The instantiation of the set of types T in
the context of transit is the finite set of types which includes the types of all the variables
in the system. This includes (1) The type Int representing integers, (2) The type Bool, which
represents the Boolean type, (3) The type PID, which represents the set process identifier,
one for each state machine in a protocol, and (4) The type Set, values of which represent
sets of process identifiers, i.e., sets of values of type PID. The type PID is implemented as a
bit-vector. Table 4.1 shows the signatures and semantics of the function symbols used in the
instantiation of Fv in the implementation of transit. Thus the search space for an expression
e is simply the set of all well-typed function compositions using functions symbols in Fv applied
to variables in V. Our algorithm for inferring expressions enumerates expressions from this
space, in increasing order of the syntactic size of the expressions.
Consider a valuation σ of the set of variables V. Recall that a candidate expression e to
be substituted for the output variable o, is built from function symbols whose interpretations
are fixed and known and from variables in V. So, given a valuation σ, we can evaluate the
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Function Description
add (Int, Int)→ Int Integer Addition
sub (Int, Int)→ Int Integer Subtraction
inc (Int)→ Int Add one to an Integer
dec (Int)→ Int Subtract one from an Integer
setadd (Set, PID)→ Set Add an entry into a Set
setsize (Set)→ Int Cardinality of a Set
setunion (Set, Set)→ Set Set Union
setinter (Set, Set)→ Set Set Intersection
setminus (Set, Set)→ Set Set Difference
setof (PID)→ Set Create a singleton Set
or (Bool,Bool)→ Bool Boolean Disjunction
and (Bool,Bool)→ Bool Boolean Conjunction
not (Bool)→ Bool Boolean Negation
setcontains (Set, PID)→ Bool Membership test on a Set
iszero (Int)→ Bool Test if an integer is Zero
∀t ∈ T equals (t, t)→ Bool Equality Test
ge (Int, Int)→ Bool Greater than or equal to
gt (Int, Int)→ Bool Greater than
∀t ∈ T, ite (Bool, t, t)→ t Conditional Expression
numcaches ()→ Int # of Caches (constant)
Table 4.1: Expression Vocabulary used in Coherence Protocols
expression e over σ. Given a set of variables V , we denote by SV the set of all valuations of V ,
as in Chapter 2. We denote the value of an expression e evaluated with the variable valuation
σ as e|σ. Given an ordered list of valuations P , 〈σ1,σ2, . . . ,σn〉, we define the signature
of an expression e with respect to P as signature(e,P) , 〈e|σ1 , e|σ2 , . . . , e|σn〉. Now, if two
expressions e and e ′ have the same signature on a list of valuations P, then (1) either they have
the same signature on all possible valuations σ ∈ SV , in which case, e and e ′ are equivalent,
or, (2) there must be some valuation σ ∈ SV which serves to distinguish e and e ′. We use this
observation to prune the search space of expressions.
Algorithms 4.1 and 4.2 describe the enumerative algorithm to infer an expression e con-
sistent with a Boolean valued constraint C. Algorithm 4.1, SynthForPoints, synthesizes an
expression e such that C[o 7→ e] satisfies the constraints at least for a given set of valuations P.
It accomplishes this by a dynamic programming strategy. It begins by enumerating expressions
of size zero — variables v ∈ V and functions of arity zero, i.e., constants in our setting. For
each expression e that the algorithm considers, it computes signature(e) and determines if an
59
Algorithm 4.1: SynthForPoints: Synthesize an expression consistent with a set of
inputs
Input :An ordered list of valuations P.
An expression vocabulary Fv over a set of types T.
A set of typed variables V ∪ {o}.
A constraint C over V ∪ o.
Output :An expression e such that for every valuation σ ∈ P, C[o 7→ e]∣∣
σ
= true.
Data :expst,j, t ∈ T, j ∈ N+, which are sets of expressions of type t and size j, initially empty.
A set sigs which contains the signatures of expressions over P, initially empty.
1 baseexps← {v ∈ V} ∪ {c ∈ Fv : arity(c) = 0}
2 foreach e ∈ baseexps do
3 s← signature(e,P)
4 if s ∈ sigs then
5 continue
6 if ∀σ ∈ P. (C[o 7→ e]∣∣
σ
)
then
7 return e
8 t← typeof(e)
9 sigs← sigs ∪ {s}
10 expst,1 ← expst,1 ∪ {e}
11 i← 2
12 while true do
13 foreach f ∈ Fv do
14 m← arity(f)
15 〈t1, t2, . . . , tm〉 ← dom(f)
16 foreach m-partition 〈r1, r2, . . . , rm〉 of i− 1 do
17 foreach (e1, e2, . . . , em) ∈ Πmj=1expstj,j do
18 e← f(e1, e2, . . . , em)
19 s← signature(e,P)
20 if s ∈ sigs then
21 continue
22 if ∀σ ∈ P. (C[o 7→ e]∣∣
σ
)
then
23 return e
24 t← range(f)
25 sigs← sigs ∪ {s}
26 expst,i ← expst,i ∪ {e}
expression e ′ with the same signature has already been considered (lines 3, 4, 19, 20). If so,
then it discards e from further consideration. Otherwise, it checks to see if C[o 7→ e] evaluates
to true at all valuations σ ∈ P, in which case, the algorithm returns the expression e. If neither
of these two cases hold, then the algorithm caches the expression in the appropriate set for
subsequent use as a sub-expression in larger expressions (line 10, 26). Note that the notation
typeof(e) is used to denote the type of the expression e, dom(f) is used to denote the ordered
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Algorithm 4.2: SynthForAll: Synthesize an expression that is consistent for all inputs
Input :An expression vocabulary Fv over a set of types T.
A set of typed variables V ∪ {o}.
A constraint C over V ∪ {o}.
Output :An expression e such that for every valuation σ ∈ SV , C[o 7→ e]
∣∣
σ
= true.
Data :An ordered list P of valuations σ ∈ SV , initially empty.
1 while true do
2 e← SynthForPoints(Fv,V ,C,P)
3 if ¬C[o 7→ e] is unsatisfiable then
4 return e;
5 else
6 σ← valuation such that ¬C[o 7→ e]∣∣
σ
is true
7 append σ to P
list of types which are the domain of the function f and range(f) is used to denote the range
of the function f in Algorithm 4.1.
Algorithm 4.2, SynthForAll, synthesizes an expression e such that C[o 7→ e] is valid. It
accomplishes this by repeatedly invoking Algorithm 4.1, SynthForPoints, with a monotoni-
cally increasing set of points in the list P. The check in line 3 of the algorithm is performed
using an SMT solver. We use the SMT solver Z3 [dMB08] in our implementation. Each time
that the SMT solver returns a witness for the invalidity of C[o 7→ e], we use that witness to
augment P, and re-invokes SynthForPoints with the augmented P.
Attempting to first find an expression that is correct for a set of valuations P which were
witnesses to failed verification attempts in the past, enables the pruning by means of signatures
in Algorithm 4.1. The two techniques together yields two advantages over a naïve enumeration
of expressions: (1) The number of expressions enumerated is much smaller. Note that when an
expression is discarded, it is also never considered to build larger expressions from as well, and
thus results in a decrease in the number of expressions enumerated at the next level. We have
empirically observed that this ripple effect can significantly reduce the number of expressions
enumerated, and thus allow our techniques to synthesize larger expressions than possible if
these optimizations were not applied. (2) The number of expensive calls to an SMT solver
are reduced, when compared to a naïve algorithm which invokes the SMT solver on every
expression that it considers.
Example 1. To illustrate the working of Algorithm 4.2, consider the problem of finding an
expression for the output variable o, which needs to be updated with the value max(a,b), where
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Expression returned Counterexample Valuation σ
by SynthForPoints which violates C added to P
— — 〈a : 0,b : −1〉
a 〈a : 0,b : 1,o : 0〉 〈a : 0,b : 1〉
ite(iszero(dec(b)),b,a) 〈a : 0,b : 2,o : 0〉 〈a : 0,b : 2〉
ite(gt(b,a),b,a) — —
Table 4.2: Illustration of the working of the expression inference algorithm
a,b ∈ V , and with the expression vocabulary in Table 4.1. We can specify this with the following
constraint C over the variables a, b and o:
(o > a)∧ (o > b)∧ ((o = a)∨ (o = b))
Table 4.2 shows the expressions that were returned by the calls that SynthForAll made to Synth-
ForPoints, as well as the valuation returned by the SMT solver as a result of attempting to verify
that this expression is correct, and the valuation σ that was a added to the set P maintained by
Algorithm 4.2. The first row of the table seeds the set of valuations P, by making an query to the
SMT solver. The subsequent rows indicate the expression that was attempted to be verified, and the
valuation at which the expression is incorrect. We observe that the expression corresponding to
max(a,b) was discovered after making only four calls to the SMT solver, although Algorithm 4.1,
SynthForPoints enumerated approximately five hundred expressions in this process.
4.3.1 Correctness of SynthForPoints
We now provide a proof that the optimizations in Algorithm 4.1 are sound, i.e., they do not
result in expressions being spuriously discarded.
Theorem 1. Given a set of valuations P and a constraint C, the algorithm SynthForPoints
always terminates with a smallest expression e which is a well-typed composition of functions in
F, and satisfies C[o 7→ e] for every valuation σ ∈ P, if such an expression e exists. If no such e
exists, then SynthForPoints may run forever.
Proof. To prove this claim, we need to establish: (1) SynthForPoints always returns an
expression that is a well-typed composition of function symbols in F, (2) the expression
returned by SynthForPoints satisfies C[fu 7→ e] for every valuation σ ∈ P, and (3) that
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SynthForPoints always returns an expression e that satisfies the first two criteria, whenever
such an expression exists.
It is easy to see that algorithm SynthForPoints only ever enumerates expressions that
are well-typed compositions of function symbols in U, so the proof for (1) is immediate. By
construction, the algorithm always returns an expression e such that C[fu 7→ e] = true for
every valuation σ ∈ P, so the proof of (2) is also immediate.
To prove that SynthForPoints always returns an expression e if one exists, we leverage
the correctness of a naïve version of Algorithm 4.1. The naïve version performs no pruning
based on signatures, i.e., lines 4, 5, 9, 20, 21 and 25 are deleted from Algorithm 4.1. The
rest of the algorithm remains the same. This naïve algorithm enumerates all expressions, and
thus it definitely satisfies the theorem. Let ≺ be the total order in which the naïve algorithm
enumerates expressions. We have as a consequence that if e1 ≺ e2 for some expressions e1
and e2, then the size of e1 is less than or equal to the size of e2. Further, it is also clear that
Algorithm 4.1 enumerates expressions in the same order, but it might skip some expressions.
Let es be the first expression in this sequence such that C[o 7→ es] is true at all points σ ∈ P,
i.e., for every other e in the sequence such that C[o 7→ e] is true at all points σ ∈ P, we have
that es ≺ e. We now need to prove that Algorithm 4.1 never discards es.
We proceed by induction on the shape of es. If es is a variable or a constant, i.e., es is an
expression of size one, then the proof is immediate: the algorithm enumerates all of these,
and if some expression e ′, such that e ′ ≺ es has the same signature as es over P, then e ′ is a
solution as well, which contradicts the assumption that es is the first solution.
Suppose es consists of a function symbol at the top level, and Algorithm 4.1 does not return
es. There are two possibilities why this might have happened:
• Algorithm 4.1 actually enumerated es, but it was found to have the same signature as some
other expression e which was enumerated earlier. In this case, C[o 7→ e] is true at all points
σ ∈ P as well, contradicting the assumption that es is the first solution.
• Algorithm 4.1 never enumerated es. This can happen if some sub-expression esub of es had
the same signature as e ′sub on P, and e
′
sub ≺ esub. In this case, the expression es[esub 7→ e ′sub],
which is es with its sub-expression esub replaced by e ′sub would have been enumerated before
es. Because esub and e ′sub have the same signatures, so do es and es[esub 7→ e ′sub], and thus
C[o 7→ es[esub 7→ e ′sub]] is true at all points σ ∈ P as well, contradicting the assumption that
es is the first solution.
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On the other hand if no such e exists, then Algorithm 4.1, being enumerative, can never
prove that no such e exists, if the space of expressions is infinite. It may thus run forever on
infinite expression spaces, if no solution exists in the space.
The rest of this section describes how the concolic snippets specified by the programmer
are translated into constraints in the form described towards the beginning of this section.
As mentioned earlier, we synthesize for each guard and update independently. So we only
describe how the constraints C— which are of the form required by Algorithm 4.2 — for each
lvalue to be updated and for each guard to be synthesized are generated. The same process is
repeated for every update and for every guard in the protocol.
4.3.2 Constraints for Update Expressions
transit assumes a parallel assignment model. This in addition to the requirement that each
post-condition in each concolic snippet constrain exactly one lvalue makes it straight-forward to
extract constraints for update expressions independently: For each lvalue, we group together
the pre- and post-conditions from a single guard block within a Transition. All of these pre-
and post-conditions must constrain the updated value of the same lvalue. We replace this
lvalue in the post-conditions by a fresh variable o of the appropriate type. Thus, for each pre-
and post-condition pair, we simply make an implication of the form Pre⇒ Post and let C be
the conjunction of these implications.
4.3.3 Constraints for Guard Expressions
A guard can be viewed as a Boolean-valued expression. The key difference between computing
guards and computing update expressions is that for a given control state and input event,
guards cannot be computed independently of each other. To ensure that the behavior of the
esm-sk implementations generated by transit are deterministic, the computed guards for
each control location and input event pair are required to be pairwise mutually exclusive. To
compute guards on transitions from a given control location, transit groups the concolic
snippets with the same starting state, input event and next state into one guard-action as
shown in Figure 4.2. Therefore, given a starting state and input event, each possible next state
has a corresponding guard-action associated with it.
Given a set of guard-actions B1, . . . ,Bn, the jth guard-action block is a set of concolic
snippets with preconditions Prej1, . . ., Prejkj . The algorithm for computing guards sequentially
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computes the guards for each of the blocks, starting with B1. Thus, before synthesizing the jth
guard, it has the expressions already synthesized for the guards g1, . . . ,gj−1 corresponding to
the guard-action blocks B1, . . . ,Bj−1 available to it. To compute a guard gj for the guard-action
block Bj, we observe that for the completion to be deterministic, gj must evaluate to false
whenever the guard gi evaluates to true, for any i < j. This property is expressed with the
following constraint:
C1 ≡
∧
i<j
(
gi ⇒ ¬gj
)
Next, gj must evaluate to true whenever any of the preconditions Prejl, l ∈ [1,kj] evaluate
to true. This is necessary to ensure that the guard is not too narrow. This property can be
expressed with the following constraint:
C2 ≡
 kj∨
l=1
Prejl
⇒ gj
Also, corresponding to each block Bi for which a guard has not yet been synthesized (i.e.,
i > j), gj must evaluate to false whenever any of preconditions in Bi evaluate to true. This is
necessary to ensure that the guard is not too overly broad. This property is expressed with the
following constraint:
C3 ≡
∧
i>j
((
ki∨
l=1
Preil
)
⇒ ¬gj
)
Finally the constraint C required for inferring gj is simply the conjunction of the above three
constraints, i.e., C , C1 ∧ C2 ∧ C3.
4.3.4 Evaluation of the Expression Inference Algorithms
To evaluate the performance of the expression inference algorithm, we focus on the size of the
expressions which the algorithm is able to compute successfully as a key metric. To benchmark
the impact of pruning based on signatures in the algorithm SynthForPoints, a large number of
random expressions of varying sizes were generated. For each expression, a set of ten concrete
valuations for the input variables was generated. For each randomly generated expression,
the Algorithm SynthForPoints was used to compute an expression that is consistent with
the corresponding set of valuations for the input variables. Figure 4.4 shows that the “Pruned”
variant — which prunes the search space using signatures, as described earlier — often explores
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Figure 4.4: Average number of expressions explored for various expression sizes by the Pruned
and Exhaustive variants of Algorithm SynthForPoints. We omit data for the Exhaustive
variant for sizes greater than 10 where it exceeds the memory limit of 3.5 GB.
two to three orders of magnitude fewer expressions than the “Exhaustive” variant — which
does not perform any pruning — for expression sizes larger than ten (note the logarithmic
scale on the Y-axis in Figure 4.4).
To evaluate the overall expression inference algorithm, i.e., the performance of Synth-
ForAll in conjunction with SynthForPoints on symbolic constraints, we used the benchmarks
shown in Table 4.3. The algorithm computes expressions of up to size 15 within a reasonable
amount of time as shown in Table 4.3. The algorithm exceeds our 30 minute time-out on only
one benchmark, whose solution has an expression size greater than 20. The right-most column
in Table 4.3 shows that the algorithm reaches the desired solution within a few iterations of
the CEGIS outer loop.
4.4 Experimental Evaluation of transit
We first validated the feasibility of using our approach by transcribing two simple, fully specified
protocols from the GEMS simulation toolkit [MSB+05] into concolic transit snippets. These
protocols are the Valid-Invalid (VI) protocol and a blocking version of the MSI protocol, which
allows for limited concurrency. With four cache processes and one directory, the entire synthesis
process took less than a second for each protocol. The key results are summarized in Table 4.4.
We then evaluated the approach on three larger case studies: A non-blocking version of the
MSI protocol, the MESI protocol and the industrial SGI-Origin protocol.
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# Description Expected Expression
Expr.
Constraint C
Time
# Iters
Size (s)
1 Max. of a, b ite(gt(a,b),a,b) 6
(a)
< 1 1((a > b)⇒ (o = a)) ∧
((b > a)⇒ (o = b))
(b)
< 1 2o > a∧ o > b ∧
(o = a∨ o = b)
2 Max. of a, b, c Similar to 1 15
Similar to 1(a) 536 7
Similar to 1(b) 762 16
3 Sym. Diff. of s1, s2
setunion(setminus(s1, s2), 7
o ⊆ (s1 ∪ s2) ∧
< 1 2
setminus(s2, s1))
o ∩ (s1 ∩ s2) = {} ∧
o ∪ (s1 ∪ s2) = s1 ∪ s2
4 Sym. Diff. of 3 sets Similar to 3 11 Similar to 3 < 1 6
5 Sym. Diff. of 4 sets Similar to 3 15 Similar to 3 132 14
6 Conditional Update ite(equals(e, c1),a,b) 6
((e = c1)⇒ (o = a)) ∧ < 1 4
((e 6= c1)⇒ (o = b))
7 Largest of 2 sets 8
(a)
< 1 1
ite(gt(setsize(s1),
(|s1| > |s2|⇒ o = s1) ∧
setsize(s2)),
(|s2| > |s2|⇒ o = s2)
s1, s2)
(b)
|o| > |s1| ∧ |o| > |s2| ∧ < 1 2
(o = s1 ∨ o = s2)
8 Largest of 3 sets Similar to 7 > 20 Similar to 7(b) TO –
Table 4.3: Benchmarks and evaluation of the expression inference algorithms
Synthesis
Protocol # Snippets Updates Guards State-
Num. Exps Time Num. Exps Time Space
synth. tried (secs) synth. tried (secs)
VI 19 49 449 < 1 17 525 < 1 140K
MSI 77 157 3330 < 1 45 3710 < 1 854K
Table 4.4: Performance of snippet-based design. The column labeled “Num. synth” represents
the number of guard and update expressions that needed to be synthesized. The “Exps tried”
column shows the number of expressions enumerated by the expression inference algorithm,
and the column labeled “State-Space” shows the number of states in the final protocol.
4.4.1 Case Study A: Non-blocking MSI
We specified the non-blocking MSI protocol described in the synthesis lectures [SHW11] using
concolic snippets in transit. Note that the MSI protocol referred to in Table 4.4 is a blocking
version of the MSI protocol. The non-blocking version of the MSI protocol considered in
this case study allows a greater number of concurrent requests to be in flight, requiring the
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programmer to consider a larger number of corner cases due to the increased concurrency
resulting from the larger number of in-flight requests.
The scenarios described in the text resulted in a sparse initial set of snippets, as most of
the tricky corner cases were either indirectly specified in the textual description or were left
unspecified. Hence, the programmer added 67 more snippets over 13 debugging iterations
before converging to a correct protocol. In each such iteration, the programmer either added
symbolic snippets, when the behavior of the protocol in some corner case was completely
unspecified, or concrete snippets, when a specification existed but was incomplete. Table 4.5
summarizes the effort and complexity in this experiment.
4.4.2 Case Study B: From MSI to MESI
The goal of our second case study was to augment the blocking MSI protocol with an “Exclusive”
or the E state to arrive at the MESI protocol. The E state is an optimization that grants
read-write permissions to the first reader of an unshared address (i.e., not present in any
cache) — as opposed to just read permission in MSI — thereby eliminating coherence traffic
on a subsequent write to the same address. The synthesis lectures [SHW11] describe this
protocol in terms of new scenarios and modifications to scenarios in the MSI protocol. Our
approach was to add the corresponding snippets to the existing set of snippets used to specify
the blocking version of the MSI protocol. Because the examples describe a MESI protocol with
a non-blocking directory, we modified our baseline MSI protocol correspondingly.
The extended protocol contained five new states (four for the cache, one for the directory),
and seven new message types. In the first iteration, we added 19 snippets to specify transitions
involving the E state and the non-blocking behavior of the directory. These snippets described
the behavior of the protocol in under-specified corner cases and scenarios involving transient
states and were added in response to the errors reported by the model checker. The programmer
was able to obtain a fully verified protocol by adding twelve additional snippets over eight
iterations. Additional metrics gathered during this case study are presented in Table 4.5.
4.4.3 Case Study C: The SGI-Origin Protocol
For our final case study, we chose the coherence protocol used in the SGI-Origin 2000
servers [LL97], which is highly cited in the cache coherence literature. The Origin proto-
col is a directory-based, MESI protocol, and it supports multiple concurrent requests to the
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Case Study A Case Study B
Snippets in the first/last version 19/86 96/108
Writing first set of snippets 2 hrs 6 hrs
Total manual effort 6 hrs 13 hrs
Number of iterations 13 8
Number of traces inspected 5 6
Number of updates/guards inferred 175/80 260/74
States in verified protocol 1.48M 1.5M
Table 4.5: Effectiveness Metrics for Snippet-based Protocol Design
same address. Processes communicate through messages that may be arbitrarily re-ordered in
the network. The consequent race conditions made it an interesting candidate for this case
study.
Laudon and Lenoski [LL97] describe the common case protocol behavior using request
flows. In this experiment, ignoring the “poisoned” directory state (used for page-migration),
we transcribed each of the read, read exclusive, upgrade, and write-back flows using symbolic
snippets in transit. Except for the obvious cases, which corresponded to the well-understood
parts of the protocol, we left most of the guards empty and specified all conditional attributes
on message fields and process variables with pre-conditions.
The protocol skeleton comprised of the cache process and directory processes, four request
types, twelve response types, the request and response networks, and an intervention network
used to buffer intervention requests. We initially specified 56 transitions in the cache machine
and 18 transitions in the directory machine. We also specified the guards in instances where
the incoming message type was found to be inconsequential; doing so prevented the tool from
exploring artificially large expressions involving the disjunction of these enumerated types.
The resulting protocol resulted in an error discovered by the model checker due to the cache
process receiving an unexpected message. We fixed this case by adding a concrete snippet
describing the desired behavior of the cache. Once again we left the guards unspecified, but
the pre-conditions and update constraints were predicated by identical values for the input
message fields and internal process variables, as seen in the violating trace.
Continuing in a similar manner, we added concrete snippets to fix error traces as we
encountered them. In some cases, the tool identified inconsistencies between the added trace
and a pre-existing constraint. We found it straightforward to reconcile these differences before
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converging to a protocol that model checked. The final synthesis step took a little over 30
minutes, exploring over four million states during model checking. The generated transit
specification had a total of 50 Transitions.
4.4.4 Discussion and Limitations
We found the primary convenience of using transit to be the manner in which the initial
specification phase and the iterative debugging phases could be expressed differently. Although
it was natural to transcribe the bulk of the protocol symbolically from the algorithmic description
of flows, this description was invariably incomplete. Several corner cases, for which the behavior
was not explicitly specified were discovered during model checking. Most of these errors
occurred due to unintended interactions between flows. The unexpected message condition
cited above resulted from a cache process that was participating in a read-write-back race
scenario. transit generalized the concrete fixes provided by the programmer in a manner
that was guaranteed not to contradict the constituent flows. Fixing this bug symbolically would
have required reasoning about the impact on both these flows. Similarly, another coherence
violation was the result of the sharer set in the directory being updated incorrectly when a
previous owner was downgraded. Again, the fix involved adding a snippet that concretely
specified the next contents of the sharer set with the pre-condition specifying only the erroneous
case.
One limitation of the transit approach is that the “shape” of the protocol is assumed
to be provided and complete. For instance, if a particular transition is not provided by the
programmer, then it results in a deadlock or liveness violation during the model checking run.
To fix the problem, the programmer needs to add additional Transition blocks or additional
guard-action blocks within a Transition block. This is a case where a purely concrete fix is
not sufficient, because the programmer has to specify the missing behavior, perhaps using
concolic snippets. If this part of the behavior is missing from the textual description, then the
programmer might indeed have to resort to reasoning about the entire protocol to deduce
the correct behavior. In summary, the transit approach does not infer missing transitions.
Further, as we have already mentioned, liveness requirements are not supported by transit, as
a consequence of the choice of model checking framework (Murϕ) that transit is integrated
with. We seek to address both of these limitations in the work described in subsequent sections.
70
5
SyGuS
After building transit, we realized that the synthesis problem which we solved with a domain
specific synthesizer in transit shared a lot of similarities with other synthesis problems
addressed in literature [JGST10, Gul11, GJTV11, BCG+13, SSA13]. Although the synthesis
problems solved by various approaches are similar in spirit, the disparate input formats accepted
by each tool, and the disparate assumptions made by each tool about the search space of
programs made it impossible to compare the relative merits of various synthesis techniques. A
similar problem experienced by the constraint solving community led to the creation of the
SMT-LIB standards [BST10a, BST10b]. The motivation behind the SMT-LIB standards was to
specify a common input language (the SMT-LIB language) and a set of background theories,
so that SMT solvers which accepted the SMT-LIB language could be compared in a uniform
manner, with the same inputs. Inspired by the SMT-LIB approach, we formulated an input
format to specify synthesis problems. This effort resulted in the creation of the Syntax-guided
Synthesis (SyGuS) language [RU14], and a competition [AFSSL14] along the lines of the
annual Satisfiability Modulo Theories Competition (SMT-COMP) [Org05].
To encourage adoption, we attempted to keep the SyGuS language as close to the SMT-LIB
language as possible. The SyGuS language extends the SMT-LIB language with constructs for
specifying synthesis problems, and inherits the set of background theories from SMT-LIB. We
briefly describe the components of a SyGuS problem here, by way of examples, and refer the
reader to the language reference [RU14] for details on the specific syntax of SyGuS.
At a high level, the functional synthesis problem consists of finding a function f such
that some logical formula ϕ, which captures the correctness of f is valid. In syntax-guided
synthesis, the synthesis problem is constrained in three ways: (1) the logical symbols and their
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interpretations are restricted to a background theory, (2) the specification ϕ is limited to a
first order formula in the background theory with all its variables universally quantified, and
(3) the universe of possible functions f is restricted to syntactic expressions described by a
grammar. We now elaborate on each of these points, and conclude this chapter by comparing
and contrasting SyGuS with other meta-synthesis frameworks proposed in literature.
5.1 Correctness Specification
For the function f to be synthesized, we are given the type (or sort, if one wishes to use SMT
parlance) of f and a formula of the form ∃ f ∀ x ϕ[f, x] as its correctness specification. The
formula ϕ[f, x] is a quantifier-free Boolean combination of predicates from the background
theory, symbols from the background theory, and the function symbol f, all used in a type-
consistent manner.
Example 2. Assuming the background theory is LIA (Linear Integer Arithmetic), consider the
specification for a function f of type int× int 7→ int:
ψ1 ≡ ∃ f ∀ x,y ϕ1[f, x,y], where,
ϕ1[f, x,y] ≡ f(x,y) = f(y, x)∧ f(x,y) > x.
Note that all the variables in the formula ψ1 are bound to the universal quantifier, and all the
unknown functions (in this case, just f) are existentially quantified. A given function f ′ satisfies
the above specification if the quantified formula ∀ x,y ϕ1[f 7→ f ′] holds, or equivalently, if the
formula ϕ1[f 7→ f ′] is valid. The notation ϕ[f 7→ f ′] indicates that all occurrences of f in ϕ[f, x]
are replaced by f ′.
5.2 Set of Candidate Expressions
To make the synthesis problem tractable, as well as to allow users to encode any domain-specific
knowledge about the search space of programs, the “syntax-guided” version allows the user
to impose structural (syntactic) constraints on the set of possible functions f. The structural
constraints are imposed by restricting f to the set L of functions defined by a given context-free
grammar GL. Each expression in L has the same type as that of the function f, and uses the
symbols in the background theory T , composed according to the rules of the grammar GL, and
the variables corresponding to the formal parameters of f.
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Example 3. Suppose the background theory is LIA, and the type of the function f is int× int 7→ int.
We can restrict the set of expressions f(x,y) to be linear expressions of the inputs by restricting the
body of the function to expressions in the set L1 described by the grammar below:
linterm := x | y | intconst | linterm+ linterm
Alternatively, we can restrict f(x,y) to conditional expressions with no addition by restricting the
body terms from the set L2 described by:
term := x | y | intconst | ITE(cond, term, term)
cond := term 6 term | cond∧ cond | ¬cond | (cond)
Grammars can be conveniently used to express a wide range of constraints, and in particular,
to bound the depth and/or the size of the desired expression.
5.3 The Problem Definition
Informally, given the correctness specification ψ of the form ψ , ∃ f∀ xϕ[f, x], with ϕ[f, x] as
its quantifier free part, and the set L of candidates, we want to find an expression e ∈ L such
that if we use e as an implementation of the function f, the formula ϕ is valid. Let us denote
the result of replacing each occurrence of the function symbol f in ϕ with the expression e by
ϕ[f 7→ e]. Note that we need to take care of binding of input values during such a substitution:
if f has two arguments and expressions in L refer to the formal parameter names of f as x
and y, then every occurrence of the form f(e1, e2) in the formula ϕ must be replaced with
the corresponding expression e[x 7→ e1,y 7→ e2] obtained by replacing x and y in e by the
expressions e1 and e2, respectively. We can now define the SyGuS problem:
Given (1) a background theory T , (2) a typed function symbol f, (3) a quantifier-
free formula ϕ[f, x] over the vocabulary of T along with f, and the set of variables
x, and (4) a set L of expressions over the vocabulary of T , the formal parameters
of f, and of the same type as f, find an expression e ∈ L such that the formula
ϕ[f 7→ e] is valid modulo T .
Example 4. For the specification ϕ1 presented earlier, if the set of allowed implementations is
L1 as shown before, there is no solution to the synthesis problem. On the other hand, if the set
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of allowed implementations is L2, a possible solution is the conditional if-then-else expression
ITE(x > y, x,y).
In some special cases, it is possible to reduce the decision problem for syntax guided
synthesis to the problem of deciding formulas in the background theory using additional
quantification. For example, every expression in the set L1 is equivalent to ax + by + c, for
integer constants a,b, c. If ϕ is the correctness specification, then deciding whether there
exists an implementation for f in the set L1 corresponds to checking whether the formula
∃a,b, c ∀ x ϕ[f 7→ ax + by + c] is true, where x is the set of all free variables in ϕ. This
reduction was possible for L1 because the set of all expressions in L1 can be represented by
a single parameterized expression in the original theory. However, the grammar may permit
expressions of arbitrary depth which may not be representable in this way, as in the case of L2.
5.4 Comparison with other Meta-synthesis Frameworks
Broadly speaking, SyGuS can be thought of as a meta-synthesis framework: it essentially allows
a concise description of any synthesis problem whose solution space can be described using a
context-free grammar and function symbols in some combination of background SMT theories,
and whose properties can be described using a universally quantified formula. We now compare
and contrast SyGuS with some other frameworks that have been proposed in recent literature,
which have similar goals.
5.4.1 sketch and Rosette
sketch [SLRBE05, STB+06, SAT+07, SLJB08, Sol09] and Rosette [TB13, TB14] are both
meta-synthesis frameworks that were designed to be embedded within a language: the sketch
language is C-like, whereas Rosette is embedded within the functional language, Racket. As
with SyGuS, the space of programs is described using a context-free grammar in Rosette, and
using generators — which use a combination of regular and context-free constructs to describe
the search space — in sketch.
Unlike SyGuS, these frameworks allow the specification for the program to be synthesized
to be written as a program. sketch uses a subset of the C programming language to describe
the behavior of the program to be synthesized. This C program could possibly be sub-optimal
or unoptimized, with the sketch for the program describing the shape of an optimized version.
Rosette, on the other hand, specifies the properties of the program to be synthesized using a
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SyGuS sketch Rosette FlashMeta
Specification language SMTLIB-like C-like Racket Inductive spec.
Program space CFG Generators CFG CFG
Full formal specifications Yes Yes Yes No
Inductive specifications Yes Yes Yes Yes
Solvers extensively use ranking? No No No Yes
Language and Platform agnostic? Yes No No Relatively
Intended audience
Synthesis
Programmers
Programmers, Domain
Researchers Students experts
Existence of multiple solvers Yes No No No
Table 5.1: Comparison of various meta-synthesis frameworks
combination of assertions, pre-conditions and post-conditions on the program. Needless to say,
these specification techniques can be much more expressive than the first order specifications
that SyGuS allows. As a consequence, these techniques sometimes require inputs from the
programmer — in the form of pragmas in the case of sketch— or restrict the language to a
safe, and decidable subset — as is the case with Rosette.
The differences between sketch and Rosette on the one hand and SyGuS on the other
stem from the design choices made with the intended audience in mind. sketch and Rosette
are both intended to enable programmers synthesize usable code, whereas SyGuS intends to
cleanly abstract the core synthesis problem in a language and platform agnostic manner, to
encourage adoption and spur research in program synthesis techniques. Indeed, the relatively
low entry barrier has led to a multitude of solvers competing in the 2015 SyGuS competition.
Lastly, we note that regardless of the exact logic used to specify properties of the program
to be synthesized, SyGuS, sketch and Rosette all support full and formal specifications, i.e.,
it is possible for specifications to unambiguously and formally describe the behavior of the
program to be synthesized for any input.
5.4.2 FlashMeta
FlashMeta [PG15] is another meta-synthesis framework which is geared towards synthesis
from inductive specifications [PG15]. An inductive specification is a quantifier free first-order
predicate, where each atom constrains the behavior of the desired program on a specific concrete
input. Various other techniques for program synthesis using inductive specifications [Gul11,
SG12, LG14, BGHZ15, KG15] can be expressed using the FlashMeta framework [PG15].
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Like SyGuS, FlashMeta uses a context-free grammar to describe the space of candidate
programs. However, unlike SyGuS, FlashMeta does not assume the existence of background
SMTLIB theories, and thus does not restrict the space of programs to consist only of function
symbols from some background theory. FlashMeta allows any function that can be expressed
as a pure C# function to be used in the context-free grammar that describes the search space
for candidate programs. For programs that operate on infinite domains, such as the domain of
strings and integers, inductive specifications can be viewed as an under-approximation of a
complete specification. It is possible that two behaviorally different programs both satisfy a
given inductive specification. FlashMeta uses domain specific ranking schemes to determine
which program is most likely to be the program desired by the user from among a set of
programs which all satisfy the inductive specification [PG15, SG15]. Ranking is especially
important when inductive specifications are used, as there always exists a trivial solution which
is a large case split over all the concrete inputs referred to in the inductive specification. Such a
solution is undesirable, because it does not generalize well to unseen inputs.
A novel feature of FlashMeta, that is not present in any of the other meta-synthesis frame-
works discussed in this dissertation, is the use of witness functions [PG15]. A witness function is
specified by a programmer, who, in this case is assumed to be an expert, with a deep knowledge
of the kinds of programs that are likely to be useful for an end user. Consider an inductive
specificationϕ, for a function fwhich is to be synthesized. Further, suppose that the synthesizer
is exploring the possibility that the top-level operator for f is F. The shape of the program is
thus hypothesized to be F(a1,a2, . . .an), where the arguments ai now need to be synthesized.
A witness function ωj(ϕ) deduces a specification ϕj on the jth argument to F. This essentially
allows FlashMeta to decompose the synthesis problems into multiple sub-goals, which in turn
leads to scalable synthesis algorithms.
We conclude the comparison with other meta-synthesis frameworks by noting that Table 5.1
compares and contrasts the various meta-synthesis frameworks along different dimensions and
summarizes the comparison that we have just presented.
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6
Enumerative Strategies for SyGuS Solvers
This chapter describes how enumerative strategies can be used to solve instances of the SyGuS
problem. The first strategy we describe is a straightforward extension of the algorithm used to
infer expressions in transit, presented in Section 4.3. We then discuss recent advances made
in the area of SyGuS solvers, and present an algorithm for a class of SyGuS instances variously
termed single invocation [RDK+15], separable [ACR15], or single-point definable [MNS16]
in recent literature. The algorithm is enumerative in spirit, but uses a divide-and-conquer
approach by synthesizing multiple expressions, each of which is correct for a subset of inputs,
and then attempts to unify [ACR15] these expressions using conditionals.
6.1 esolver: An Enumerative SyGuS Solver
Having defined the SyGuS problem, as well as the language to describe instances of the SyGuS
problem, we built a solver for such instances based on enumerating candidate expressions,
which we dub esolver. The core algorithms used in esolver are similar to the algorithms
for inferring expressions in transit, described in Algorithms 4.1 and 4.2. We use the notion
of a signature to prune the space of expressions to be searched. The key differences from the
algorithms presented in Algorithms 4.1 and 4.2 are that:
• esolver does not assume that all well-typed expressions are a part of the candidate space,
and instead enumerates expressions using the grammar provided as part of the problem
instance.
• The notion of a signature, which we use to prune the search space, now needs to take into
account the non-terminal in the grammar from which an expression was derived, to avoid
spurious pruning.
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• esolver handles several extensions to the SyGuS solver — such as the let construct in
constraints and grammars [RU14], which we have not described here.
We do not present the details about the implementation of esolver, as it is a rather
straightforward extension of the algorithms presented in Section 4.3. esolver won the 2014
SyGuS competition with four other solvers participating. The implementation of esolver—
along with two other implementations, one based on symbolic search [GJTV11, JGST10]
and the other based on a stochastic search [SSA13] — has been made available as a base-
line for other participants to compare against, and possibly build upon, and is continually
maintained [JRU13].
The 2015 SyGuS competition had several new solvers competing, the most notable of
general-purpose solver being the CVC4 solver [RDK+15]. The CVC4 solver was the overall
winner of the 2015 SyGuS competition, with esolver coming in second place overall. However,
despite CVC4 being the overall winner, there were a set of benchmarks which could not be
solved by the CVC4 solver, but which esolver could solve, as well as the other way around.
In addition, a solver based on a unification approach was also proposed by Radhakrishna et.
al. [ACR15], which did not participate in the 2015 SyGuS competition, but has an impressive
performance nonetheless. The next section provides a brief overview of these new algorithms
to solve the SyGuS problem, and discusses the capabilities and limitations of esolver (and
enumerative strategies in general) with respect to the newer algorithms.
6.2 Capabilities and Limitations of esolver
These advances in SyGuS solvers led us to look more closely at the capabilities and limitations
of enumerative solution strategies. We observed that the newer solvers performed extremely
well with a class of specifications that have been termed variously as single-invocation specifi-
cations [RDK+15], or separable specifications [ACR15]. We note that the specifications in a
large fraction of the SyGuS benchmark suite fall into this class. We also observed that both the
newer solvers made extensive use of the specification itself in the actual synthesis algorithms;
whereas esolver makes very minimal use of the specifications in driving the search.
6.2.1 Separable Specifications
We treat the notion of separability as a semantic notion in this dissertation. We shall only
consider SyGuS specifications which refer to only one unknown function to be synthesized in
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the rest of this chapter. The definitions can be extended to specifications which involve multiple
functions, but will not be very useful in the context of this dissertation. Also, we shall assume
that the background theory T , over which the SyGuS problem is defined, is decidable.
Intuitively, a specification, which describes the constraints on an unknown function f, is
separable, if and only if it admits a solution where, for any concrete input c1, the value of f(c1)
is independent of the value of f(c2), where c2 6= c1 is any other concrete input. This definition
corresponds very closely with the definition of a single-point definable specification, presented
in a concurrent work [MNS16].
There has been a lot of interest recently in separable specifications because the synthesis
problem for such specifications can be reduced to determining the truth of a first-order sentence.
This problem is decidable, provided that the background theory T is decidable.9 We will explain
this reduction in greater detail later in this chapter. Apart from this advantage, separable
specifications, by definition, allow for synthesis strategies that produce solution fragments
(or sub-expressions) which are correct on some subset of inputs. These sub-expressions may
then be combined using an if-then-else operator, or other techniques. We explore one such
algorithm in this chapter.
Although we have informally defined the semantic notion of separability, checking if a SyGuS
specification is separable using this semantic notion is challenging, and is an open problem. Most
recent approaches [ACR15, RDK+15, MNS16] instead check if a specification satisfies some
syntactic restrictions which are sufficient to prove separability [ACR15, RDK+15], or check that
the specification satisfies a stronger property, such as single-point refutability [MNS16], which
is easier to check for. In this dissertation, we adopt a syntactic check for separability, which
is performed after some amount of rewriting of the original specification. We now provide a
few examples of SyGuS specifications which are separable and otherwise, to give the reader an
intuitive feel for the notion of separability.
Example 5. Consider the following specification, which describes a binary function f which
computes the maximum of its arguments:
ψsep1 ≡ ∃ f ∀ x,y (f(x,y) > x∧ f(x,y) > y ∧ (f(x,y) = x∨ f(x,y) = y)) (6.1)
ψsep1 is separable, because all applications of f have the same arguments, and therefore never
9Ignoring any syntactic restrictions on the solution.
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correlates the values that f can evaluate to, for different inputs. Further, there exists a solution
f(x,y) ≡ max(x,y), whose output, for any given input, never depends on its output for some
other input.
This example seems to indicate that a purely syntactic definition suffices: A specification is
separable if and only if all occurrences of f, which is the function to be synthesized for, in the
specification involve applications of f to the same set of arguments. However, the next two
examples show that this is not the case.
Example 6. The following specifications are separable even though f is applied to different
arguments in each specification:
ψsep2 ≡ ∃ f (f(1) = 1∧ f(2) = 2)
ψsep3 ≡ ∃ f ∀ x,y ((x = 1⇒ f(x) = 1)∧ (y = 2⇒ f(y) = 2))
ψsep4 ≡ ∃f∀ x,y (x = y⇒ f(x) = f(y))
The specifications ψsep2 and ψsep3 are separable, because each clause in each of these specifications
constrains the value of f at exactly one point. Any solution h, such that h(1) = 1 and h(2) = 2
is a valid solution. The specification ψsep3 is semantically equivalent to ψsep2. The specification
ψsep4 is in fact a tautology — recall that f is a function, and cannot evaluate to different results
when applied to the same arguments — and therefore separable. Any function can be used as a
solution for ψsep4.
Thus, if all function applications are over the same arguments, then the specification is definitely
separable, but this is not a necessary condition.
Example 7. The following specifications, which state that f is a monotonic function, are not
separable, because they correlate the value of f applied to different arguments:
ψnonsep1 ≡ ∃ f ∀ x,y (x 6 y⇒ f(x) 6 f(y))
ψnonsep2 ≡ ∃ f ∀ x (f(x) 6 f(x+ 1))
To be a solution to ψnonsep1 and ψnonsep2, a function h needs to be such that h(x) 6 h(y) for all
x 6 y. Clearly, the output of any candidate solution h on a concrete input c1 cannot be chosen
independently of all other concrete inputs c, if monotonicity is to be maintained.
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The following example demonstrates the subtleties of the definition of separability, and
also that a purely syntactic definition of separability is likely to be insufficient.
Example 8. The following specification for the constant function f, which takes an integer as
input and returns an integer is separable.
ψsep5 ≡ ∃ f ∀ x (f(0) = 0∧ f(x+ 1) = f(x))
Although the specification ψsep5 correlates the output of f applied to distinct arguments, it is
equivalent to the specification ∃ f ∀ x f(x) = 0, which is obviously separable.
As Example 8 demonstrates, the semantic notion of separability, which could involve arbitrary
equivalences between formulas, is difficult to check for. Consequently, we define the notion of
plain separability, which is a syntactic notion that is easier to check for.
Plainly Separable Specifications
Consider a SyGuS specificationψ, over some background theory T . The specificationψ can refer
to functions defined in the theory T , the unknown function f, of arity n, as well as to variables
in the set x = {x1, x2, . . . , xm}. Further, ψ has the form ψ , ∃ f ∀ x1, x2, . . . xm ϕ[f, x]. Where
ϕ[f, x] is a quantifier-free formula over symbols in the background theory T , the unknown
function f as well as the variables in x.
We denote byϕcnf , a formula which is equivalent toϕ, and in conjunctive normal form (CNF).
A formula is said to be in CNF if it has the form c1 ∧ c2 ∧ · · ·∧ ck, where each ci, for i ∈ [1,k]
— called a clause— has the form ai1∨ai2∨ · · ·∨aimi , where each aij, i ∈ [1,k], j ∈ [1,mi] is
an atom, and does not involve conjunctions or disjunctions, but could possibly appear negated.
Thus, all negations are restricted to be applied only to atoms. Note that we require ϕcnf to be
equivalent to ϕ and not just equi-satisfiable with respect to ϕ. For simplicity of presentation, we
assume that the straightforward, exponential transformation to CNF is used to derive ϕcnf from
ϕ. This is not a problem in practice, because ϕ is typically not large. If desired, techniques
like Tseitin’s transform [Tse83] can also be used, provided appropriate care is exercised while
checking validity: checking that the negation of a equi-satisfiable formula produced by Tseitin’s
transform, which contains auxiliary variables introduced by the transform is unsatisfiable,
may no longer imply that the original formula is logically valid. Having set up the necessary
definitions and the form of the specification ψ, we can now define plain separability.
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Definition 1. The SyGuS specification ψ, of the form described above, with ϕ as its quantifier
free part, is called plainly separable if and only if for each clause c in ϕcnf , we have that c is either
a tautology, or every occurrence of f in c has f applied to the same arguments.
The notion of a single-point refutable specification, which has been proposed in concurrent
work [MNS16] is a more sophisticated definition for the concept of plain separability. But
it requires that the domains and ranges of all functions, including the ones defined by the
background theory T be extended by a distinguished undefined value. In principle, there exist
specifications that are not plainly separable by our definition, but are still single-point refutable.
Such specifications can indeed be solved for by the algorithm which we shall propose later in
this chapter, but would be rejected based on our definition of plain separability. Fortunately
however, all of the benchmarks in the classes that we have targeted in the SyGuS benchmark
suite have plainly separable specifications.
Both the unification based solver, and the CVC4 SyGuS solver exploit the (plain) separability
of specifications, when applicable, to apply an algorithm that leverages such specifications.
As mentioned earlier, a large fraction of the SyGuS benchmark suite consists of separable
specifications, so a better algorithm for such specifications has immediate practical value. We
shall focus only on separable specifications in the rest of this chapter.
6.2.2 Black Box and White Box Algorithms
All the three baseline SyGuS solvers can be broadly classified as being black box algorithms, and
can all be viewed as instantiations of the counterexample guided inductive synthesis (CEGIS)
paradigm [SLRBE05]. These solvers use the specification ϕ only to verify that a proposed
solution is correct, and possibly to obtain concrete values of the universally quantified variables
on which the proposed solution fails. These concrete values could then be possibly used by
the black box solvers to rule out the current solution from future solution proposals. The
specification is not directly used to guide the search in any way. The CVC4 and unification
based algorithms, on the other hand, can be considered white box algorithms. These algorithms
make extensive use of the specification to derive a solution, and perform very minimal, if any,
enumeration; instead preferring to use theory-specific synthesis algorithms. We briefly describe
both of these strategies, and compare and contrast their strengths and limitations with respect
to enumerative approaches. To describe the two algorithms, we consider a plainly separable
SyGuS specification ψ, over some background theory T , of the form ψ , ∃ f ∀ x ϕ[f, x], which
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refers to the single unknown function f, symbols of T , and the set of universally quantified
variables x. As usual, ϕ[f, x] is a quantifier-free formula over symbols of T , f and variables in x.
The CVC4 SyGuS Solver
The description of the CVC4 SyGuS solver presented here is a highly condensed version of the
presentation from the original paper describing the algorithm [RDK+15]. Let us denote by
x , {x1, x2, . . . , xn}, the set of quantified variables in the separable SyGuS specification ψ. The
type or sort of each variable xi is denoted by di. Given that ψ is separable, we can replace
every occurrence of an application of f in the quantifier-free part, ϕ, of ψ with a single fresh
variable o, whose type (or sort) is the same as the range of f to obtain the following logically
equivalent formula:
∀ x ∃o ϕ[o, x]
Instead of attempting to solve for this formula directly, the CVC4 SyGuS solver attempts to
establish the falsehood of the negation of this formula, which is:
∃ x ∀o ¬ϕ[o, x] (6.2)
To prove that this formula is false, consider the following game played in rounds between Eloise
and Abelard. At the beginning of round i Eloise proposes a region Ri ⊆ d1 × d2 × · · · × dn,
and Abelard proposes a term ti[x], such that ϕ[ti[x], x] is true in some region Si, such that
Si ∩ Ri 6= ∅. Further, we have that R0 ≡ d1 × d2 × · · · × dn, and that Ri+1 ⊆ (Ri \ Si) for all
i. Abelard wins if in some round j, Eloise is forced to propose Rj ≡ ∅. Eloise wins if in some
round j, Abelard is unable to come up with a term tj. It is easy to see that (6.2) is false if and
only if Abelard wins, and is satisfiable if and only if Eloise wins.
The game just described is the essence of the quantifier instantiation procedure performed
within SMT solvers to prove the falsehood of formulas such as those shown in (6.2). The CVC4
SyGuS solver, takes advantage of being closely integrated with the CVC4 SMT solver, and having
access to its internals. A proof of falsehood of (6.2) can then easily be used to construct an
expression which serves as the solution for the unknown function f. Continuing with the game
analogy, such a proof would consist of the terms ti and the regions Ri, proposed by Abelard and
Eloise respectively, for each round. Suppose that the regions Ri are represented symbolically as
predicates, then it is trivial to construct an if-then-else ladder with the predicates corresponding
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the regions as the conditions controlling which branch is chosen, and the appropriate terms ti
as the branches.
As an example of how this game may be played out on the specification shown in (6.1),
which is for a binary function that computes the maximum of its arguments, we first write the
formula whose falsehood is to be established from (6.1):
∃ x,y ∀o (o < x∨ o < y∨ (o 6= x∧ o 6= y)) (6.3)
0. In round 0, R0 ≡ true, and t0 ≡ x, which makes the formula (6.3) true in the region
x > y, which is a subset of R0
1. In round 1, R1 ≡ x < y, and t1 ≡ y, which makes the formula (6.3) true in the entire
region R1.
2. In round 2, Eloise is forced to set R2 ≡ false, thus proving the falsehood of (6.3).
The Unification based SyGuS Solver
As was the case with the description of the CVC4 solver, this description of the unification based
solver is also a highly condensed and simplified version of the presentation in the original paper
describing this algorithm [ACR15]. The algorithm is conceptually similar to the algorithm used
in the CVC4 SyGuS solver. However, the unification based algorithm uses an SMT solver as
a black box, and does not depend on having access to the internals of an SMT solver. Given
a separable SyGuS specification ϕ, whose form is as described earlier, the unification based
solver maintains a region R, for which a correct solution has not yet been discovered. It then
selects a term t[x] and plugs the term t[x] back into ϕ to determine a region R ′ where the term
t causes ϕ to be true. The algorithm then recurses on the region R \ R ′.
The working of the algorithm is perhaps best illustrated with an example. Consider the
specification shown in (6.1) again. At the beginning of the algorithm, R ≡ true.
1. Suppose the algorithm picks the term x. Plugging this back into (6.1) for the term f(x,y),
we obtain the region x > y. The algorithm updates R to x < y.
2. The algorithm then picks the term y. Plugging this term back into (6.1), we obtain
the region y > x. The algorithm updates R to be the empty region and terminates by
unifying the terms x and y using an if-then-else ladder predicated with the regions in
which substituting the respective term for f(x,y) in ψsep1 causes the formula to become
true.
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The key difference between the unification based algorithm and the CVC4 algorithm is
in how terms are picked. The CVC4 algorithm piggy-backs on the sophisticated quantifier
instantiation mechanisms within the SMT solver. The unification based algorithm on the other
hand implements domain-specific solution techniques to derive terms that are likely to result in
a solution with a smaller number of conditionals. The paper by Radhakrishna et. al. [ACR15]
describes two algorithms to solve for terms: one for the domain of linear integer arithmetic,
and another for the domain of fixed size bit vectors.
6.2.3 A Comparison of White Box and Black Box Algorithms
The white box algorithms described in this section have some advantages over black box
algorithms. In turn, the black box algorithms have their own advantages over the white box
algorithms. We specifically refer to the black box algorithm implemented in esolver for
the purposes of this comparison, although a lot of the points are applicable to the stochastic
solver [SSA13] and the symbolic solver [JGST10, GJTV11] as well.
Strengths of White Box Algorithms
• Enhanced Scalability: The size of the expression to be synthesized does not have a large
impact on the execution time of both the white box algorithms described in this section.
Indeed, both of the algorithms can easily synthesize expressions with tens or hundreds of
if-then-else branches. On the other hand, enumerative algorithms struggle to synthesize
large expressions. This is primarily because the number of expressions in the search space
typically grows exponentially with the size of allowed expressions. Because the enumerative
approach enumerates all expressions of a given size before trying a larger size, it severely
limits the scalability of a purely enumerative algorithm. The scalability of esolver, as it is
implemented, is also restricted by the fact that it caches every expression that it enumerates,
leading to a large memory footprint.
• Ability to use domain-specific techniques: The white box algorithms leverage the specifi-
cation itself in synthesizing a function that satisfies the specification. As a result, they can
leverage domain-specific insights and algorithms to efficiently solve the sub-problems they
construct. As already mentioned, the unification based solver implements a per-domain
algorithm to choose terms. Similarly, the CVC4 SyGuS solver, which is deeply embedded
within the CVC4 SMT solver, has a large portfolio of quantifier instantiation and domain
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specific solution techniques — implemented as part of the CVC4 SMT solver — at its disposal,
and can select the most efficient strategy on a domain-by-domain basis as required.
Strengths of the Enumerative Black Box Algorithm
• Genericity: esolver uses the exact same algorithm regardless of what the domain being
solved for is. Any improvements in the algorithm result in improvements across the board,
for all domains. On the other hand, the white box algorithms’ use of domain-specific solvers
requires re-implementing any new algorithmic advance in each of the domain-specific
algorithms.
• Ability to Generalize: Recall that the SyGuS language fully supports inductive specifications,
or specifications where the behavior of the desired function is expressed as a finite set of
concrete input-output examples. Such specifications can be useful when a formal specification
is difficult to write. The ICFP benchmarks which were derived from a programming contest
held in conjunction with ICFP 2013 [AII+13]. The specifications for these benchmarks are in
the form of a set of input-output examples which describe the output of the unknown function
on various inputs. Assuming that the enumerative algorithm scales, it would produce the
most concise expression in the search space that behaves correctly on all the input-output
examples. Further, the output of the expression would be well-defined on unseen inputs.
On the other hand, the white box solvers cannot do much better than generate a case-split
on the concrete inputs, rendering the output of the expression being undefined or arbitrary
on unseen inputs. It is thus not surprising that both of these solvers perform poorly on the
ICFP benchmarks [ACR15, RDK+15]. To be fair, esolver does not perform well on these
benchmarks either, but due to scalability constraints rather than algorithmic ones. In fact,
none of the solvers that competed in the 2015 SyGuS competition were effective at solving
these benchmarks.
• Ease of Searching through a Syntactically Restricted Space: Observe that the description
of the white box algorithms does not mention the “Syntax-Guided” nature of SyGuS at all.
The CVC4 algorithm either encodes the syntactic restriction using the theory of algebraic
data types built into CVC4, or applies a enumerative post-processing step to find a term
which is equivalent to the solution synthesized without syntactic restrictions. The former
results in large slowdowns [RDK+15], and the latter can sometimes result in failure. The
unification based solver does not concern itself with syntactic restrictions at all; however,
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the enumerative post-processing step used in the CVC4 algorithm can be used in this setting
as well. Another possibility is to use a syntax aware unification operator, however this has
not been explored. Syntactic restrictions are often useful when synthesizing programs for a
low-power instruction set architecture, with a restricted set of operations, and are thus not
an artificial constraint.
The comparison presented above naturally makes one desire an algorithm which can be
generic, has the ability to generalize as well as the ability to enforce syntactic restrictions,
alongside the scalability to be able to synthesize functions which require large expression sizes
to describe. We describe an algorithm that fulfills this desire, at least to some extent, in the
next section.
6.3 Combining Enumeration with Unification
To develop a more efficient algorithm to solve instances of the SyGuS problem, we make the
following assumptions throughout this section:
• The SyGuS specification ψ is separable, and has the form ψ , ∃ f ∀ x ϕ[f, x]. Here f is
the only function to be synthesized, and x is a set of universally quantified variables of
appropriate types or sorts, while ϕ[f, x] is a quantifier-free formula that only refers to
symbols from the background theory T , the unknown function f and the variables in the set
x.
• Given that ψ is separable, we can assume that all occurrences of f in all clauses of ϕcnf have
f applied to the same arguments. If this is not the case, then we can transform ϕcnf [f, x]
to a logically equivalent formula ϕcan[f, x, a], which is also in CNF by introducing a set of
additional placeholder variables a , {a1,a2, . . . ,ap}, where p = arity(f) and a∩ x ≡ ∅ and
constraining them appropriately. For example, consider the following specification for the
binary function f, whose output is required to be greater than equal to each of its arguments,
whose quantifier-free part is already in CNF:
∃ f ∀ x,y f(x,y) > x∧ f(y, x) > x
This formula can be transformed into the following semantically equivalent formula, by
introducing additional variables a0 and a1 which represent the arguments to f which are
used in all terms referring to f. Note that quantifier-free portion of the transformed formula
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is also is CNF, once the implications have been converted into disjunctions using standard
equivalences:
∃ f ∀ x,y,a0,a1 (((a0 = x∧ a1 = y)⇒ f(a0,a1) > x) ∧
((a0 = y∧ a1 = x)⇒ f(a0,a1) > y))
We will refer to the version of the specification ψ, canonicalized in this manner as ψcan, and
assume that it has the form ψcan , ∃ f ∀ x, a ϕcan[f, x, a].
• Lastly, we assume that the program space is described by two context-free grammars, rather
than just one unified grammar. The first grammar, which is a grammar for terms, denoted
GT comprises of the set of all terms, and does not include any conditional expressions. All
terms generated by GT have the same type as the range (or return type) of the unknown
function f. The second grammar called GP consists of the set of all Boolean valued atomic
predicates that can be combined using Boolean connectives — disjunctions, conjunctions and
negations — for use as the conditions in conditional expressions. Note that GP is assumed
not to contain disjunctions, conjunctions or negations of atomic predicates.10 Further, we
allow GP and GT to be mutually recursive, in that GP can refer to non-terminals in GT
and vice-versa. We note that most of the grammars in the SyGuS benchmark suite can be
transformed into this form relatively easily, using a conservative and lightweight analysis
on the context-free grammar describing the syntactic restrictions on expressions. In terms
of the assumptions on the original SyGuS grammar, we require that the original grammar
must allow a solution to the SyGuS problem, such that the solution is either a single term
drawn from GT , or a conditional expression of the form:
if (cond0) then term0
else if (cond1) then term1
...
else if (condn−1) then termn−1
else termn
Where each condi is a Boolean combinations of atoms, with each atom drawn from GP, and
each termi is a term drawn from GT .
10The algorithm described here would still be correct if GP contains Boolean combinations of atoms as well, but it
would not be as efficient.
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Algorithm 6.1: Learn-DT: An algorithm to learn a decision tree
Input :A set of samples S.
An attribute function attrib : S→ Bm.
A labeling function label : S→ L.
Output :A decision tree that uses the attributes of samples to predict its label.
1 if all samples in S have the same label l then
2 return a tree which predicts l
3 abest ← attribute ai, i ∈ [1,m] which best classifies S.
4 if abest is undefined then
5 return ⊥
6 S+ ← subset of S where each sample has abest = true
7 S+ ← subset of S where each sample has abest = false
8 positive← Learn-DT(S+, attrib, label)
9 negative← Learn-DT(S−, attrib, label)
10 return a decision tree labeled with attribute abest with positive and negative as its
positive and negative sub-trees
6.3.1 Decision Trees
Consider a set of samples S , {s1, s2, . . . , sn}— each sample is some object, whose nature is
not relevant. Each sample si is associated with a vector ofm Boolean valued attributes. Let
attrib : S → Bm be a function that maps each sample s ∈ S to its attribute vector attrib(s).
Further, we define L as a set of labels, with a labeling function label : S→ L which maps each
sample s ∈ S to its label label(s). Now, consider the problem of predicting label(s) for each
s ∈ S, given information only about attrib(s) for each s ∈ S. This is a well studied problem in
machine learning and is typically solved by using an algorithm, such as the ID3 algorithm or
the C4.5 algorithm, to learn a reasonably compact decision tree which makes decisions based
solely on the attributes [Qui86, Qui87, Qui96]. Algorithm 6.1 shows an algorithm to learn
such a decision tree, which is now considered folk knowledge.
An interesting aspect of Algorithm 6.1 is how the best attribute is chosen in line 3. It has
been shown that constructing the optimal (in terms of the size of the tree) decision tree is
np-complete [HR76, Mur98]. Because typical sample sets as well as the length of attribute
vectors can be large, most algorithms to learn decision trees use a heuristic to greedily pick
an attribute in line 3 of Algorithm 6.1. Greedy heuristics which maximize information gain at
each level of the learned decision tree have been shown to be particularly effective in machine
learning literature [Qui86, Qui87, Qui96].
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Entropy and Information Gain
The entropy of a sample set S, denoted H(S) is a measure of uncertainty in the set S. The
mathematical definition of entropy, adapted to our setting is as follows:
H(S) = −
∑
l∈L
Pr(l) log2(Pr(l)) (6.4)
where Pr(l) denotes the fraction of samples in S which are labeled l. Note that we refer to the
Shannon entropy, whenever we use the term “entropy” in an unqualified manner throughout
this dissertation. The concept of information gain is defined in terms of entropy. The information
gain obtained by splitting a sample set S on an attribute a is the measure of the difference in
entropy of S and the entropy of the resulting sets S+ and S−, which are formed by splitting on
the attribute a. Mathematically, the information gain G(S,a) obtained by splitting a sample
set S, based on an attribute a, into two partitions S+ and S− can be computed by using the
following equation:
G(S,a) = H(S) −
(
|S+|
|S|
H
(
S+
)
+
|S−|
|S|
H
(
S+
))
(6.5)
Having provided the reader with an overview of decision trees and algorithms to learn such
decision trees, we now present how they can be used, in conjunction with enumerative strategies,
to solve instances of the SyGuS problem.
6.3.2 Program Synthesis using Decision Trees
Recall the Algorithm 4.1 SynthForPoints, respectively, shown in Chapter 4. Algorithm 4.1
essentially synthesizes one expression such that the expression satisfies the given specification
for all the concrete inputs in a given set P. In essence, it enumerates all conditional expressions
implicitly as a part of its search.
The basic idea behind the algorithm which we now present is that we do not need to
synthesize an expression which satisfies the specification for all concrete inputs. We can learn a
set E of expressions, such that each expression satisfies the specifications for some subset P ′ of
the concrete inputs P, such that for every concrete input in p ∈ P, there exists some expression
in e ∈ E such that e satisfies the specification at p. Once we have gathered such a set E, we
can then enumerate a sufficient set of atomic predicates from GP. These atomic predicates can
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then be combined using Boolean connectives to form the conditions in a conditional expression
that combines the terms in E to produce an expression which is correct over all the concrete
inputs. The computational problem of generating this conditional expression, which is correct
over all the concrete inputs, can be reduced to one of learning an appropriate decision tree, as
we describe in this section.
Formally, we are given a canonicalized, separable SyGuS specification for one function f
of the form ψcan , ∃ f ∀ x, a ϕcan[f, x, a] defined earlier in this section. We are also given two
grammars GT and GP which are as described earlier. We abuse notation slightly, and also use
GT and GP to refer to the sets of terms and predicates generated by the grammars GT and
GP respectively, whenever the context creates no opportunity for ambiguity. Further, we have
a set of valuations P of the variables in x ∪ a, where each σ ∈ P maps a variable v ∈ x ∪ a
to a value σ(v) of the appropriate type. We define a function L : P → 2GT , such that a term
t ∈ L(p), for any point p ∈ P if and only if ϕcan[t[p], x ∪ a 7→ p] evaluates to true. Note that
the notation ϕcan[t[p], x ∪ a 7→ p] denotes that first every occurrence of all variables from a in
t has been replaced by its valuation according to p, which is denoted as t[p]. Following this,
every occurrence of f(.) in ϕcan is replaced by t[p], and lastly, all other occurrences of variables
from x ∪ a in ϕcan are also replaced by their valuations according to p, which is denoted by
x ∪ a 7→ p.
Now, we can view the set of valuations P as a sample set. The labeling function is now
essentially a multi-labeling function L, which maps each point p ∈ P to a set of labels drawn
from the set GT . Further, for each point p ∈ P, the results of evaluating each predicate g ∈ GP
at p forms a vector of Boolean attributes for p, which may be of infinite length. Given these
parallels, it is now clear how we can treat this as a decision tree learning problem, except
for one wrinkle: that each sample may be multiply labeled. The possibility that a point may
be labeled with multiple terms causes problems in the computation of entropy according to
Equation (6.4), which requires the fraction of samples labeled with a particular label. Applying
this equation naïvely will result in
∑
l∈L Pr(l) 6= 1 and thus the function Pr will no longer be a
probability mass function.
To deal with this wrinkle, given a sample set P, we define a conditional distribution on
the probabilities of labels, i.e., the probability of a point p being assigned a label l ∈ L(p),
conditioned on the fact that a particular point p ∈ P has been chosen. In the original single
label formulation of the problem, this probability is either zero or one — once we pick a point
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p ∈ P, we know that it can be assigned only one label: label(p). In the multi-label case, our
formulation takes the view that once a point p ∈ P has been picked, it can be assigned any
label l ∈ L(p) according to a probability distribution. This conditional probability distribution
is defined as follows:
Pr(label(p) = t | p) =

0 if t /∈ L(p)
cover(t)∑
t ′∈L(p)
cover(t ′)
if t ∈ L(p) (6.6)
where, given a sample set P, the function cover : GT → N denotes how many samples in P
can possibly be labeled with a given term t ∈ GT , and is a rough measure of how relevant a
particular term is. This function is defined as follows:
cover(t) ≡ | {p ∈ P : t ∈ L(p)} | (6.7)
Now, given the sample set P, we can determine the unconditional label probabilities by summing
the conditional probability shown in Equation 6.6 over all the points in P. Thus, we have, the
probability of a randomly chosen point from P being labeled with t ∈ GT is:
Pr(t) =
∑
p∈P
Pr(label(p) = t | p)× Pr(p)
Now, assuming that each point p ∈ P is equally likely to be chosen, i.e., we sample from P
uniformly at random, we obtain:
Pr(t) =
1
|P|
∑
p∈P
Pr(label(p) = t | p) (6.8)
We can now directly use Equation 6.8 to compute the entropy according to Equation 6.4, and
thus information gain according to Equation 6.5, which can then be used to learn a decision tree
based on the greedy information gain heuristic. Finally, we note that the conditional distribution
that we have defined in Equation 6.6 makes intuitive sense, and works well in practice, as we
will demonstrate shortly. However, we note that better choices for this probability distribution
might still be possible, and this conditional distribution must therefore be viewed as tunable
heuristic for the algorithm.
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Row # p ∈ P L(p) attrib(p)
1 〈x : 2,y : 1〉 {x} 〈x < y : F, x = 0 : F,y = 0 : F〉
2 〈x : 1,y : 0〉 {x, x+ y} 〈x < y : F, x = 0 : F,y = 0 : T〉
3 〈x : 0,y : 1〉 {y, x+ y} 〈x < y : T, x = 0 : T,y = 0 : F〉
4 〈x : 1,y : 2〉 {y} 〈x < y : T, x = 0 : F,y = 0 : F〉
Table 6.1: A multi-labelled sample set over which a decision tree is to be learned
An Illustrative Example
We now illustrate the techniques which we have just described, with an example. Consider the
following specification which describes a binary function f, over integers, which is expected to
return the maximum of its arguments:
∃ f ∀ x,y f(x,y) > x∧ f(x,y) > y∧ (f(x,y) = x∨ f(x,y) = y
Suppose that the set of terms that we’re working with is {x,y, x+ y} and the set of predicates
is {x < y, x = 0,y = 0}. Further, the set P for our example contains the four valuations shown
in the second column of Table 6.1, with the third column showing the set of labels (terms) that
satisfy the specification at each sample (or point), and the fourth column showing the attribute
vector, which consists of predicates, and their truth value for the corresponding point. For
instance, the row numbered one in the table considers the valuation where x is two and y is
one. We see that the term x is the only term from among the terms x, x+ y and y that satisfies
the specification this point. Lastly, for this valuation, all the predicates that we consider, i.e.,
the predicates x < y, y = 0 and x = 0, evaluate to false as shown in the last column.
To learn a decision tree over this sample set, we need to evaluate the entropies that result
from splitting the set of valuations on each of the atomic predicates. We then choose the
predicate, splitting on which results in the smallest entropy, and split the set of valuations
according to the predicate. To illustrate, let us first consider splitting this sample set according
to the predicate x < y. Splitting the set of valuations using this predicate yields two partitions
the set of valuations P. Let us refer to these partitions P1 and P2, where P1 contains the
rows numbered one and two — where x < y evaluates to false — and P2 contains the rows
numbered three and four — where x < y evaluates to true. We need to compute the entropy
for each of these partitions. The total entropy for the partitioned set of valuations is then
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Partition Points in Partition Label Probabilities Entropy
P1
〈x : 2,y : 1〉 Pr(label(p) = x) =
5
6
0.650022
〈x : 1,y : 0〉 Pr(label(p) = x+ y) =
1
6
Pr(label(p) = y) = 0
P2
〈x : 0,y : 1〉 Pr(label(p) = x) = 0
0.650022
〈x : 1,y : 2〉 Pr(label(p) = x+ y) =
1
6
Pr(label(p) = y) = 56
Table 6.2: Entropies that result by splitting the sample set shown in Table 6.1 using the predicate
x < y
Partition Points in Partition Label Probabilities Entropy
P1
〈x : 2,y : 1〉 Pr(label(p) = x) = 59
1.351644〈x : 1,y : 0〉 Pr(label(p) = x+ y) = 19
〈x : 1,y : 2〉 Pr(label(p) = y) = 13
P2 〈x : 0,y : 1〉
Pr(label(p) = x) = 0
0.5Pr(label(p) = x+ y) = 12
Pr(label(p) = y) = 52
Table 6.3: Entropies that result by splitting the sample set shown in Table 6.1 using the predicate
x = 0
the sum of entropies of each of these partitions, weighted by the fraction of valuations in the
respective partition.
Table 6.2 shows the partitions that result from splitting on the predicate x < y, as well as
the label probabilities computed according to Equation 6.8. Finally, the entropy corresponding
to each partition are computed according to Equation 6.4, using the set {x,y, x+ y} as the set
of all possible labels. Note that in this table, the partition named P1 corresponds to the rows
in Table 6.1 where the predicate x < y evaluates to false, and the partition P2 corresponds
to the rows where the predicate x < y evaluates to true. Also, for the purposes of entropy
calculations, we assume that 0× log2(0) = 0. The overall entropy that results from the split
using the predicate x < y is the weighted sum 12 × 0.650022+ 12 × 0.650022 = 0.650022.
Now, repeating the same procedure to determine the entropy obtained by splitting on the
predicate x = 0 yields the results shown in Table 6.3. The overall entropy from the split is the
weighted sum 34 × 1.351644 = 14 × 0.5 = 1.138733. The results of splitting on the predicate
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x < y
use the term x
N
use the term y
Y
Figure 6.1: The decision tree learned for the sample set shown in Table 6.1
Algorithm 6.2: ExpandTermSet: Expand the labeling function L to include more terms
Input :A canonicalized SyGuS specification ψcan , ∃ f ∀ a, x ϕcan[f, x, a].
A list of n valuations of variables in x ∪ a, called P.
A stateful enumerator enumerator(GT ) for terms.
A map L from P to subsets of terms from GT .
Output : An expanded map L ′, such that for all p ∈ P,L ′(p) ⊇ L(p).
1 new_terms← the next KT terms from enumerator(GT )
2 foreach t ∈ new_terms do
3 s← 〈ϕcan[t[p], x ∪ a 7→ p], for p in P〉
4 if there exists a term t ′ 6= t, such that for all i ∈ [1, length(P)], s[i] iff t ′ ∈ L(P[i]) then
5 continue
6 foreach i ∈ [1, length(p)] such that s[i] = true do
7 L[P[i]]← L[P[i]] ∪ {t}
8 return L
y = 0 will be similar, as the cases x = 0 and y = 0 are symmetric, and will hence result in
the exact same entropy and are not shown here. Thus, the entropy obtained by splitting on
the predicate x < y is the minimum among the choices, and will therefore yield the highest
information gain. So, the decision tree learning algorithm splits according to the predicate
x < y at the first level. Once this has been done, notice that the sample set P1 that results
from the split, can be labeled consistently by the label x, which results in the specification
being satisfied at all the valuations in the set. Similarly, the label y can be chosen for the set P2.
Thus, the decision tree learned for this example is as shown in Figure 6.1. From this tree, the
expression ite(x < y,y, x) can easily be deduced, which is a correct solution for this example.
6.3.3 Putting it all Together
Algorithm 6.3 describes how the solver that combines enumeration and unification, which we
dub eusolver, computes a set of terms that when taken together could form a complete
solution. The loop at line 1 of Algorithm 6.3, continues enumerating terms from the term
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Algorithm 6.3: TermSolve: Algorithm to find a set of expressions which together satisfy
the specification for a given set of points
Input :A canonicalized SyGuS specification ψcan , ∃ f ∀ a, x ϕcan[f, x, a].
A list of n valuations of variables in x ∪ a, called P.
A stateful enumerator enumerator(GT ) for terms.
Output : A map L from P to non-empty sets of terms from GT .
Data : The partially computed output, L, which initially maps everything to ∅.
1 while there exists p ∈ P, such that L(p) ≡ ∅ do
2 L← ExpandTermSet(ψcan, P, enumerator(GT ), L)
3 return L
grammar GT until it finds a set of terms such that for every valuation p ∈ P there exists some
term t in L such that the term t satisfies the specification ϕcan when evaluated at the point p.
Algorithm 6.2 expands the mapping L to include more terms. This is tantamount to expanding
the set of terms that are allowed to be a part of a solution. As an optimization, if two terms t1
and t2 satisfy the specification on the same subset of points in P, then we only retain one of
them in the map L, in Algorithm 6.2. The number KT referred to in Algorithm 6.2 is a tunable
parameter, which was set to eight in all our experiments. Finally, Algorithm 6.3 returns the
map it has built up once the stopping condition described earlier has been reached.
Given such a map L, the algorithm UnifyTerms, which is shown in Algorithm 6.4 is then
used to unify these terms using conditionals, where the predicates for the conditional are
Boolean combinations of atoms drawn from GP. The algorithm works by enumerating sets
of the KP atoms from GT in each iteration. Here KP is a parameter; in all our experiments,
this was set to a value of eight. Once this set of atoms has been enumerated, the algorithm
computes the points p ∈ P, where each atom in this set evaluates to true, and stores it in the
map attrmap. An optimization similar to the one described in TermSolve is applied here:
if two atoms evaluate identically on all the points in P, then only one of them is retained.
Once the map attrmap has been computed for the current batch of atoms, the algorithm then
attempts to learn a decision tree. If this step fails, there could be two reasons for the failure:
1. The current set of atoms are sufficient to learn a correct classifier, in which case the
algorithm would need to enumerate more atoms.
2. The current set of terms under consideration require that we learn a classifier to separate
two points p1 ∈ P and p2 ∈ P. This could happen because two distinct terms, say t1
and t2, satisfy the specification at p1 and p2, respectively, and no other terms satisfy the
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Algorithm 6.4: UnifyTerms: Attempt to combine sub-expressions
Input :A canonicalized SyGuS specification ψcan , ∃ f ∀ a, x ϕcan[f, x, a].
A list of n valuations of variables in x ∪ a, called P.
A map L from P to non-empty sets of terms from GT .
A stateful enumerator enumerator(GP) for atoms.
A stateful enumerator enumerator(GT ) for terms.
Output : Either a solution e for ψcan, or a valuation p of variables in x ∪ a.
Data : A map attrmap, from predicates in GP to a bit vector of length length(P).
1 do
2 aps← the next KP atomic predicates from enumerator(GP)
3 foreach ap ∈ aps do
4 sig← 〈ap[p] for p in P〉
5 if there exists ap ′ 6= ap, such that attrmap[ap ′] ≡ sig then
6 continue
7 attrmap[ap]← sig
8 dtree← Learn-DT(P, attrmap, L)
9 if dtree 6= ⊥ then
10 e← expression constructed from dtree
11 if verify(e, ψcan) then
12 return e
13 else
14 return a valuation σ of variables in x ∪ a which form a verification counterexample
15 else
16 L← ExpandTermSet(ψcan, P, enumerator(GT ), L)
17 while (dtree = ⊥)
specification at these two points. Now, it could be impossible to separate p1 and p2, based
on the predicates defined by GP. However, a solution might still be possible if there exists
a term t ′ ∈ GT , such that it satisfies the specification at both p1 and p2. In this situation,
the algorithm would need to enumerate more terms.
It is not obvious how one can accurately determine which of these two reasons caused the
attempt to learn a decision tree to fail. Given this difficulty, Algorithm 6.4 conservatively
expands the set of terms currently in consideration (at Line 16 in Algorithm 6.4), as well as the
set of atoms used to construct a decision tree (at Line 2, at the beginning of the next iteration
of the loop), whenever an attempt to learn a decision tree fails. Note that attrmap retains its
value across iterations of the outermost loop in Algorithm 6.4. On the other hand, if it was
possible to learn a decision tree, the algorithm extracts an expression from the learned decision
tree. This can be achieved in multiple ways; one possible way is to walk down every path
from the root to the leaves, gathering the atoms that internal nodes are labeled with, together
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Algorithm 6.5: eusolve: Solve for a SyGuS specification ψcan
Input :A canonicalized SyGuS specification ψcan , ∃ f ∀ a, x ϕcan[f, x, a].
A grammar for terms GT .
A grammar for atoms GP.
Output :A solution e for the SyGuS specification ψcan
Data :A list of valuations P of variables in x ∪ a, initially empty.
enumerator(GT ), a systematic, stateful enumerator which enumerates terms from GT .
enumerator(GP), a systematic, stateful enumerator which enumerates atoms from GP.
1 while true do
2 if length(P) = 0 then
3 e← the first term from enumerator(GT )
4 if verify(e, ψcan) then
5 return e
6 else
7 σ← a valuation of variables in x ∪ a which forms a verification counterexample
8 append σ to P
9 continue
10 L← TermSolve(ψcan, P, enumerator(GT ))
11 solorcex← UnifyTerms(ψcan, P, L, enumerator(GP), enumerator(GT ))
12 if solorcex is an expression then
13 return solorcex
14 else
15 append solorcex to P
16 continue
with their polarity. When a leaf node is reached, the label at the leaf node provides the term,
and the conjunction of the accumulated atoms forms the condition under which the term can
be used. Once such an expression e has been built, the algorithm attempts to verify that e
is a solution to the SyGuS specification ψcan. The verification step is performed by posing an
appropriate query to an SMT solver. We use the SMT solver Z3 [dMB08] in our implementation.
If this verification succeeds, it returns e. Otherwise, it returns a counterexample to verification,
which is a valuation of the variables in x ∪ a, such that the expression e does not satisfy the
specification on that valuation.
Finally, the algorithm eusolve, shown as Algorithm 6.5, shows how the TermSolve
and UnifyTerms algorithms are composed to form a complete SyGuS solver. The algorithm
maintains a list of valuations P, which are built up from counterexamples returned by the
algorithmUnifyTerms. It repeatedly calls the algorithm TermSolve, followed by the algorithm
UnifyTerms, augmenting the list of valuations P in each iteration, until UnifyTerms returns
a solution that has been verified to be a correct solution to the SyGuS specification ψcan.
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Correctness of the Algorithm eusolve
We now argue that Algorithm 6.5 is a semi-decision procedure, i.e., if there exists a solution in
the form of a conditional expression in the grammars defined by GT and GP, the algorithm
terminates with a correct solution. If the grammars GT and GP do not admit a solution in
the form of a conditional expression, then Algorithm 6.5 can run forever. We now formalize
and prove these guarantees, that are provided by Algorithm 6.5, eusolve, in the following
theorem.
Theorem 2. Given a plainly separable SyGuS specificationψ, a term grammarGT and a predicate
grammar GP, if there exists a solution of the following form:
if (c0) then t0
else if (c1) then t1
...
else if (cn−1) then tn−1
else termn
where c0, c1, . . . , cn−1 are Boolean combinations of atomic predicates drawn from GP and
t0, t1, . . . , tn are drawn from GP, then Algorithm 6.5, eusolve terminates and returns a
correct solution.
Proof. We first note that it is sufficient to consider conjunctions of literals, where a literal is
either an atomic predicate or its negation in the conditionals {ci}. Suppose that the grammars
admit a solution of the form:
if (l0 ∨ l1) then t0
else t1
then, by leveraging that an if-then-else construct is essentially disjunctive, it also admits the
following equivalent solution:
if (l0) then t0
else if (l1) then t0
else t1
So, without loss of generality, we will assume that a correct solution admitted by the grammars
GT and GP has the following form:
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if (l0,0 ∧ l0,1 ∧ · · ·∧ l0,k0) then t0
else if (l1,0 ∧ l1,1 ∧ · · ·∧ l1,k1) then t1
...
else if (ln−1,0 ∧ ln−1,1 ∧ · · ·∧ ln−1,kn−1) then tn−1
else tn
where each li,j is either an atomic predicate drawn from GP or its negation, and each ti
is a term drawn from GT . Let us define the set Terms ≡ {t0, t1, . . . , tn}, as well as the set
Lits ≡ {l0,0, . . . , l0,k0 , . . . , ln−1,0, . . . , ln−1,kn−1}. Note that both the sets Terms and Lits are
finite. We now make the following observations:
1. For any given set of terms and literals, there are only finitely many syntactically distinct
conditional expressions that can be formed using the available terms and literals.
2. The set of distinct decision trees over a finite set of terms and literals, and given a finite set
of samples, is also finite.
3. We can map every decision tree over a finite set of terms and literals, which classifies a finite
set of samples, to a syntactically unique conditional expression. The number of terms in
such a conditional expression is equal to the number of leaves in the decision tree, and the
condition on each branch is the conjunction of literals along the path to the corresponding
leaf (term).
4. Algorithm 6.5 makes progress: If the verification of a particular expression fails — either
in Algorithm 6.5 or in Algorithm 6.4 — then that particular expression will never be
presented to the SMT solver for verification at any subsequent point during the execution
of the algorithm. To see that this is true, observe that Algorithm 6.1 always returns a
decision tree which correctly classifies the sample set, or reports that no decision tree
exists. Further Algorithm 6.1 is sound and complete, i.e., it always returns a decision tree
which correctly classifies the sample set if one exists. A verification attempt only occurs
when a decision tree can be learned. Now, suppose that a particular verification attempt
resulted in the candidate expression being proved incorrect. A valuation that demonstrates
the incorrectness of the candidate must have been added to the list P maintained by
Algorithm 6.5. Now, if the same decision tree was ever returned by Algorithm 6.1, then
that decision tree will incorrectly classify this newly added point (valuation). This is in
contradiction with the fact that Algorithm 6.1 always returns a correct classifier for a given
sample set.
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Based on these observations, we now only need to prove that a sufficient set of terms
and atomic predicates will eventually be enumerated by the Algorithm 6.3 and Algorithm 6.4
respectively. This follows from the observations of finiteness and progress made above, and the
fact that the sets defined by the grammars GT and GP are recursively enumerable. Thus, at
some point it must be the case that:
⋃
p∈P
L(p) ⊇ Terms (6.9)
where L is the mapping returned by the Algorithm 6.3, TermSolve. In other words, a sufficient
set of terms will eventually be enumerated by the algorithm. We can use a similar argument
to prove that the algorithm also eventually enumerates a sufficient set of atomic predicates
corresponding to the set of literals Lits. Formally it must be the case that at some point during
the execution of Algorithm 6.4, it must be the case that:
⋃
ap∈aps
{ap,¬ap} ⊇ Lits (6.10)
where aps is the set of atomic predicates generated during the execution of Algorithm 6.4.
We now argue that once the conditions described by the formulas 6.9 and 6.10 are met, the
mapping L and the set aps in Algorithm 6.3 and Algorithm 6.4 respectively, remain unchanged
in all future invocations.
To see why this is true, recall that we made the assumption that there exists a solution
involving only the terms in the set Terms and the literals in the set Lits. This means that
for any set of concrete valuations P (maintained by Algorithm 6.5), there must be some
term t ∈ Terms that satisfies the specification for that valuation. So based on its termination
condition, Algorithm 6.3 will never enumerate a larger set of terms. Furthermore, for any set
of valuations P, there must also exist a decision tree that correctly classifies the valuations
using the predicates as splitting attributes and the terms as labels. So, Algorithm 6.4 will never
need to enumerate a larger set of predicates — because Algorithm 6.1 will always return some
decision tree.
Based on the observations of finiteness and progress that we have made earlier, we know
that there are only a finite number of expressions that can be formed using the set of terms in
the (now unchanging) map L, and the (again, now unchanging) set of atomic predicates aps.
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1 (set-logic BV)
2 (define-fun shr1 ((x (BitVec 64))) (BitVec 64) (bvlshr x #x0000000000000001))
3 (define-fun shr4 ((x (BitVec 64))) (BitVec 64) (bvlshr x #x0000000000000004))
4 (define-fun shr16 ((x (BitVec 64))) (BitVec 64) (bvlshr x #x0000000000000010))
5 (define-fun shl1 ((x (BitVec 64))) (BitVec 64) (bvshl x #x0000000000000001))
6 (define-fun if0 ((x (BitVec 64)) (y (BitVec 64)) (z (BitVec 64))) (BitVec 64)
7 (ite (= x #x0000000000000001) y z))
8 (synth-fun f ((x (BitVec 64))) (BitVec 64)
9 ((Start (BitVec 64)
10 (#x0000000000000000 #x0000000000000001 x
11 (bvnot Start) (shl1 Start) (shr1 Start)
12 (shr4 Start) (shr16 Start) (bvand Start Start)
13 (bvor Start Start) (bvxor Start Start)
14 (bvadd Start Start) (if0 Start Start Start)))))
15 (constraint (= (f #x85c12c65236e72be) #x85c1ade52f6f73fe))
16 (constraint (= (f #xe1207ed6c7320aa4) #x70903f6b63990553))
17 .
18 .
19 .WWW
20 (check-synth)
Figure 6.2: Anatomy of an ICFP Benchmark
The progress property ensures that the same expression is never submitted for a verification
attempt more than once. Thus, we can conclude that eventually, Algorithm 6.5 will attempt to
verify the correct solution and return it.
6.3.4 Evaluation of eusolver
We built a prototype version of eusolver using the Z3 SMT solver [dMB08] for verification.
The prototype implemented the expression enumeration parts and the high level algorithm in
Python, whereas the decision tree learning algorithms as well as some performance critical bit
vector manipulation routines were implemented in C++. Our experiments were conducted on
an Intel Core i7 processor running at 2GHz. All experiments were run with a time out 1800
seconds per benchmark. We evaluated eusolver on the following subset of the SyGuS main
track benchmarks:
• Integer Arithmetic: We evaluated eusolver on a set of benchmarks which compute
the maximum of a some number of arguments. The actual number of arguments can be
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parameterized. We were able to scale reasonably well on this set of benchmarks, as the
value for the parameter was increased.
• ICFP Benchmarks: As mentioned earlier, the specifications for these 50 benchmarks were
in the form of a number of input-output examples which describe the output of the function
to be synthesized for various inputs. No other solver has been able to solve more than a
handful of these benchmarks, to the best of our knowledge. eusolver was able to solve
more than 80% of the benchmarks (42 out of 50) with a 30 minute time limit for each
benchmark.
We did not evaluate eusolver on the other tracks, because the solutions to these tracks
did not consist of large if-then-else expressions. Also, the original esolver could solve most
of these benchmarks. For a more universal solver, one could imagine running a portfolio solver
with the original esolver algorithm running on one thread, with the eusolver algorithm
running on another thread. Such a solver would be able to solve a sizeable fraction of the SyGuS
benchmark suite as it stands today. Table 6.4 summarizes the results of running eusolver
on the ICFP benchmarks. In contrast, CVC4, the winner of 2015 SyGuS contest could only
solve one ICFP benchmarks when syntactic restrictions were applied, and 43, when syntactic
restrictions were not applied. We note that all our solutions are within the syntax specified by
the benchmarks. Lastly, we did not observe the solver memory usage using exceeding 100 MB
for any benchmark. As a final comparison eusolver was able to produce syntactically valid
solutions for 42 out of 50 ICFP benchmarks in a total of 7630 seconds, whereas, the CVC4
solver could solve 43 out of the 50 benchmarks in 3400 seconds [RDK+15], but the solutions
were not syntactically valid and used arbitrary function symbols form the SMTLIB theory of
fixed-size bit-vectors.
To provide some context to the reader, Figure 6.2 shows a typical ICFP benchmark. Note
that the benchmark has been reproduced almost verbatim from the actual benchmark used in
the SyGuS competition. The only changes we have made are to elide a large set of input-output
constraints from line 17 – 20, and some whitespace and adjustments, for better readability.
Further, we emphasize that the syntactic restrictions that we have discussed earlier are an
integral part of the benchmark. The first line declares that the logic of fixed-size bit-vectors
is to be used. Lines 2 – 5 declare the macros named shr1, shr4, shr16, shl1, each of which
takes a 64-bit bitvector as an argument and returns another 64-bit bitvector, shifted by right or
left by the appropriate constant. Lastly, lines 6 and 7 declare a macro named if0, which is a
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Benchmark Time (s) Exp. size |P|
icfp_103_10 38.9 55 9
icfp_104_10 1.0 24 3
icfp_105_100 2.3 23 4
icfp_105_1000 24.5 22 4
icfp_113_1000 114.9 11 2
icfp_114_100 665 26 3
icfp_118_10 10.1 54 6
icfp_118_100 51.4 49 4
icfp_125_10 19.7 28 7
icfp_134_1000 TO – –
icfp_135_100 158 13 2
icfp_139_10 3.3 10 2
icfp_143_1000 TO – –
icfp_144_100 1525 39 11
icfp_144_1000 TO – –
icfp_147_1000 TO – –
icfp_14_1000 TO – –
icfp_150_10 4.7 52 7
icfp_21_1000 1069 28 5
icfp_25_1000 125 29 5
icfp_28_10 0.17 2 1
icfp_30_10 40.4 14 4
icfp_32_10 25.9 14 2
icfp_38_10 13.1 27 5
icfp_39_100 40.7 12 2
Benchmark Time (s) Exp. size |P|
icfp_45_10 0.48 9 2
icfp_45_1000 32.2 9 2
icfp_51_10 4.62 11 2
icfp_54_1000 69.8 11 2
icfp_56_1000 TO – –
icfp_5_1000 60.5 32 4
icfp_64_10 46.1 33 4
icfp_68_1000 37.6 46 7
icfp_69_10 1.82 11 4
icfp_72_10 47.9 13 2
icfp_73_10 1.15 24 3
icfp_7_10 1.61 24 5
icfp_7_1000 66.2 30 9
icfp_81_1000 1318 37 7
icfp_82_10 17.1 32 7
icfp_82_100 31.7 30 10
icfp_87_10 13.1 31 5
icfp_93_1000 174 29 5
icfp_94_100 2.58 24 4
icfp_94_1000 30.1 24 4
icfp_95_100 829 47 35
icfp_96_10 35.1 48 8
icfp_96_1000 TO – –
icfp_99_100 876 25 4
icfp_9_1000 TO – –
Table 6.4: Experimental Results for eusolver on the ICFP benchmarks. The column labeled
“Time” indicates the time taken to arrive at a solution. The column labeled “Exp. size” indicates
the size of the computed expression, and the column labeled |P| indicates the number of
counterexamples that were considered by the algorithm before arriving at a correct solution.
TO indicates a timeout.
restricted form of conditional which takes three 64-bit bitvectors as arguments and returns
the second argument if the first argument is equal to the bitvector constant “1”, otherwise
returns the third argument. Line 8 declares a function f which is to be synthesized, which
takes in one 64-bit bitvector as an argument, which is referred to as x — this is the formal
parameter name — and returns a 64-bit bitvector. Lines 9 – 14 describe the grammar for the
interpretation of f. Line 9 declares a non-terminal named Start which expands to a 64-bit
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Benchmark eusolver eusolver eusolver CVC4 STUN
Time (s) Exp. Size |P| Time (s) Time (s)
max2 0.05 6 2 0.01 0.094
max3 0.16 30 15 0.02 0.087
max4 0.56 94 43 0.03 0.097
max5 3.18 254 160 0.05 0.179
max6 17.3 634 544 0.1 0.167
max7 131.7 1510 2080 0.3 0.230
max8 1296 3490 7734 1.6 0.267
max9 TO – – 8.9 0.277
max10 TO – – 81.5 0.333
max11 TO – – ND 0.371
max12 TO – – ND 0.441
max13 TO – – ND 0.554
max14 TO – – ND 0.597
max15 TO – – ND 0.675
Table 6.5: Experimental Results for eusolver on the max benchmarks. The first four columns
have the same meaning as in Table 6.4. The next two columns show the times taken by the
CVC4 solver [RDK+15] and the STUN solver [ACR15] on the same benchmarks. TO indicates
a time-out and ND indicates that the data was not available.
bitvector value. Line 10 lists three expansions: The constants “0”, “1”, or the formal parameter
x. Lines 11 – 14 describe other, recursive expansions, involving standard functions like bvnot,
bvadd, etc., from the SMTLIB theory of fixed-size bitvectors, as well as macros defined in lines
2 – 7. The constraints on the behavior of f are described from line 16 onwards. Each constraint
is an input-output example, which constrains the result of f applied to a constant value, to
another constant value.
All the 50 ICFP benchmarks are similar in structure to the one shown in Figure 6.2, i.e., they
all use the same set of macros and the same grammar. However, the constraints themselves
differ to describe different functions f. These constraints are obviously underspecified; they do
not completely describe the behavior of f on all inputs. To successfully solve such constraints, a
SyGuS solver would need to perform a non-trivial amount of generalization. As we demonstrate,
eusolver is able to generalize well from these constraints and successfully solve a large
fraction of the ICFP benchmarks within a reasonable amount of time.
Table 6.5 demonstrates the performance of eusolver on the parametric max benchmark
from the SyGuS suite. On this set of benchmarks, eusolver performs better than the original
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esolver, which times out on all benchmarks beyond max3. However, it is not as performant
as the CVC4 and the STUN solvers on these benchmarks. Our investigations reveal that a
majority of the time is spent in decision tree learning on the larger max benchmarks. Indeed,
the number of counterexamples points added shown in the column labeled |P| in Table 6.5
seems to grow very rapidly with larger instantiations of the max benchmarks. The reasons for
why such a large number of counterexamples are considered by the algorithm are unclear and
warrant a closer investigation. In contrast, the CVC4 and STUN solvers show a much smaller
slowdown on larger instances of the max benchmark.
A Note on Expression Sizes
The expression sizes reported in Tables 6.4 and 6.5 were for the expressions obtained by the
simplistic strategy to convert a decision tree into an expression, which we have described
earlier in Section 6.3.3. Such a strategy returns an expression with a flat conditional structure,
i.e., with only a top level case split and no nested conditionals. In some cases, it is possible
that by allowing nested conditionals and applying slightly more sophisticated simplification
steps as post-processing, a smaller sized expression can be obtained. We did not explore such
simplifications and post-processing steps.
To conclude this chapter, we have presented a generic enumeration based algorithm to
solve separable SyGuS instances, where the grammar can be easily separated into a grammar
for atomic predicates and a grammar for terms. We have demonstrated the efficacy of the new
algorithm in solving a large fraction of the ICFP benchmarks in the SyGuS benchmark suite,
while respecting all the syntactic restrictions. To the best of our knowledge, this is algorithm
is the first to be able to successfully solve such a large fraction of the ICFP benchmarks. This
chapter concludes the digression towards the SyGuS problem. We now turn our attention back
to the problem of distributed protocol synthesis in the subsequent chapters of this dissertation.
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7
Synthesis of Finite-state Protocols
from Scenarios and Specifications
We now turn our attention back to the protocol completion problem. As mentioned in Sec-
tion 4.4, the transit tool has some limitations: (1) transit cannot synthesize transitions
which are missing from the input, (2) transit does not handle liveness properties, and (3)
transit requires the programmer to be in the loop. We seek to at least partially address these
limitations with the work described in this section. We develop a fully automatic approach to
synthesize protocols which are described using scenarios over finite-state machines — i.e., no
state variables — given a set of safety and liveness requirements that the completed protocol is
expected to satisfy. This chapter is based on the work originally published in [AMR+14].
7.1 Overview of Finite-state Protocol Synthesis
Figure 7.1 provides a high-level overview of the process of synthesizing finite-state protocols
from scenarios as an instantiation of the algorithmic scheme shown in Figure 3.2. The program-
mer provides a set of scenarios — which are essentially execution traces of the protocol under
construction, and will be described in detail in subsequent sections — and the protocol skeleton.
The protocol skeleton lists the state machines and state machine sketches that comprise the
protocol, their input and output alphabets, and the set of locations L for each state machine
(in the case of uncontrollable environment state machines) or state machine sketch (in the
case of state machines that are required to be synthesized). Note that the state machines are
required to be finite state, i.e., they do not have any state variables and messages do not have
payloads, as defined in Chapter 3. As in Chapter 3, we will refer to finite state machines and
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Scenarios and
Protocol Skeleton
1
Build esm-sks
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Generate I such
that I |= ϕ
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7
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3
Analyze error trace
and augment ϕ with
additional constraints
8
Correct?
Incorrect?
Error Trace
ϕ augmented with
additional constraints
Figure 7.1: Algorithm for Synthesizing Finite-state Protocols from Scenarios
finite state machine sketches as fsms and fsm-sks respectively. The tool builds the fsm-sk
of the full protocol using these scenarios. Given that the state machines here are finite-state
and have no state variables, the interpretation I that is to be generated is thus a set of Boolean
valued functions of the form g : L× Σ ∪ {}× L→ B, which determines whether a transition
to a location l ′ ∈ L, emitting (receiving) a messagem ∈ Σ ∪ {} is allowed when the esm-sk
is in location l ∈ L, where L is the set of locations of the esm-sk under consideration. We use
an Integer Linear Program (ILP) solver to generate this interpretation. The set of constraints ϕ
can therefore be considered an integer linear program. The resulting protocol is then checked
for correctness against the safety and liveness properties specified by the programmer. If
the protocol is correct, then the algorithm terminates. Otherwise, the protocol automatically
analyzes an error trace and augments the ILP ϕ with additional constraints which rule out at
least this erroneous execution from future solutions.
We describe the two key parts of this algorithm in rest of this section. Section 7.2 introduces
the notion of a scenario and describes how a set of scenarios is translated into a set of fsm-sks
and sets up the synthesis problem as one of completing this set of fsm-sks. Section 7.3
describes a CEGIS based algorithm to solve the completion problem, and how error traces are
analyzed to augment the ILP ϕ with additional constraints. Finally, Section 7.4 presents our
experience on using this methodology to specify the alternating bit protocol [KR09], a cache
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Figure 7.2: The first two scenarios for the Alternating-bit Protocol. The arrows colored red
indicate the events involving the environment. The first scenario describes the normal operation
of the protocol without any timeouts or lost messages. The second scenario describes the
behavior when a packet loss occurs.
coherence protocol and a protocol for solving the distributed consensus problem using atomic
registers.
7.2 Scenarios to fsm-sks
A scenario is a sample execution trace of a protocol, which shows the exchange of messages that
occur in the execution among the state machines that make up the protocol, with the passage
of time. Abstractly, we can view a scenario as describing partial order on the events (sending
and receiving messages) that occur across state machines in an execution. We will illustrate
the use and semantics of scenarios using the example scenarios that describe the behavior of
the Alternating-bit Protocol (ABP), which is a fundamental protocol in computer networking,
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Figure 7.3: The two remaining scenarios for the Alternating-bit Protocol. Again, the arrows
colored red indicate events involving the environment. The event labeled tout indicates a
timeout event. The third scenario depicts the behavior when an acknowledgment is lost, and
the final scenario describes the behavior on a premature timeout or a packet duplication
and is used for the reliable transmission of data across a channel which is unreliable. In this
dissertation, we assume that an unreliable channel is capable of losing packets or messages, as
well as duplicating them.
The Alternating-bit protocol consists of the state machines named Sender and Receiver,
with a pair of ordered, duplicating and lossy channels between them: the Forward channel,
relaying data packets (labeled p0 and p1) from the Sender to the Receiver, and the Backward
channel, relaying acknowledgment packets (labeled a0 and a1 corresponding to the data
packets p0 and p1) from the Receiver to the Sender. The goal of the protocol is to ensure
reliable packet delivery despite the possibility that the channels may non-deterministically drop
packets or duplicate them. This requirement is expressed by the liveness monitors provided by
the programmer, which are not shown here.
110
We will use the scenarios shown in Figures 7.2 and 7.3 to describe the behavior of the
ABP protocol. They come from a textbook on computer networking [KR09]. The first scenario
describes the behavior of the protocol when no packets or acknowledgments are lost or
duplicated. The second and the third scenarios correspond to the expected behaviors of the
protocol in the event of the loss of a packet and in the event of the loss of an acknowledgment
respectively. Finally, the fourth scenario describes the behavior of ABP on premature timeouts
and/or packet duplication. Note that scenarios may be annotated with labels. This is shown in
Figure 7.2(a), where the labels “before sending 0” and “before recv. 0” are used to indicate that
the states of the Sender and the Receiver automata at two different points of the scenario are
the same. These are used in the construction of automata from the scenarios as we will describe
shortly. Labels can also be used to indicate that two states of an automaton are the same even
across different scenarios. Furthermore, labels are essential for specifying recurring behaviors
in scenarios and the structure of the incomplete state machine constructed depends on the
number and positions of labels used. Also, note that these scenarios omit the environment
state machines for simplicity. In particular the state machines corresponding to the channels
are omitted, however, we will use a primed version of a message when referencing it on the
state machine that receives it.
The idea for transforming scenarios into state machines is simple. First, for every “lane” in
a given scenario, we identify the corresponding (complete or incomplete) state machine in the
overall system. For example, in each scenario shown in Figures 7.2 and 7.3, the left-most lane
corresponds to ABP Sender and the right-most lane to ABP Receiver.
Second, for every state machine P in the protocol whose behavior needs to be synthesized,
we generate an incomplete state machine (or fsm-sk) AP as follows. For every message history
ρ (ρ is a finite sequence of messages received or sent by the state machine) specified in some
scenario in the lane for P, we create a location sρ in AP. If ρ ′ = ρ · x is an extension of history
ρ by one message x, then there is a transition sρ x−→ sρ ′ in AP. At this point, we check that the
inputs and outputs of AP are included in the interface of P in the protocol skeleton and that
AP is deterministic.
Third, we merge states which have the same label. Merging occurs for states of a single
scenario as well as across multiple ones if the same label is used in different scenarios. If
consistent labels are given to the initial and final positions in all lanes of the scenarios the
resulting incomplete automata could have cyclic behavior.
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Figure 7.4: fsm-sk for the ABP Sender from all scenarios of Figures 7.2 and 7.3 and their
symmetric versions after merging labeled states. (Only one half of the fsm-sk is shown, the
rest is the symmetric case for packet p1)
Finally, symmetric versions of scenarios are inferred from the given set of scenarios. For
example, all the ABP scenarios express valid behaviors if p0 and a0 messages are consistently
replaced with p1 and a1 messages respectively and vice-versa. Thus, the framework allows for
scenarios to be characterized as symmetric.
As an example, the resulting fsm-sk for ABP Sender after applying the steps described
above, given the scenarios shown in Figures 7.2 and 7.3 is shown in Figure 7.4. Note that the
primed messages correspond to the unprimed messages of the same name which have been
transmitted through a channel. Essentially, if a channel state machine receives a message p,
then it outputs a message p ′ on its other end-point. This is needed because the output alphabets
of the state machines in a protocol are required to be pairwise disjoint for the composition to
be defined, as explained in Section 2.2. Once we have transformed the input scenarios into
fsm-sks, the problem is now one of protocol completion, as formalized in Section 2.3. The
completion in this case, is to add appropriate transitions the fsm-sks, which we now describe.
7.3 Completion of fsm-sks
Given a set of incomplete finite-state automata or finite-state esm-sks, we associate a Boolean
variable with every candidate transition that can be added to the individual incomplete au-
tomata. In other words, For every incomplete automaton A, and for every triple 〈l,m, l ′〉,
where l, l ′ ∈ L, the set of locations ofA,m ∈ I∪O∪ {}, I andO are the input output alphabets
of A, we associate a Boolean variable tlml ′ , which indicates whether a transition from l to
l ′ is permitted while receiving (transmitting) the messagem. The completion task is to find
a valuation for these Boolean variables, such that the resulting protocol (which is formed by
composing the completed esm-sks with the environment automata) is (1) deterministic, (2)
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deadlock-free, and (3) satisfies the safety and liveness monitors specified by the programmer. In
the remainder of this section we will use the names ti to refer both to candidate transitions that
can be added to the automata as well as the Boolean variables corresponding to the transitions.
7.3.1 State Coverage
Note that the number of states in the incomplete automata are influenced by the scenarios
used to construct them as well as the labels used in the scenarios. We have just set up the
synthesis problem as a completion problem which only involves adding transitions to incomplete
automata. As such, for the synthesis step to be successful, it is necessary that there exist a
correct implementation of the protocol such that (1) It uses only the set of locations represented
in the scenarios, and (2) Every provided scenario is an actual execution of such a correct
implementation. If this is the case, then we say that the scenarios provide adequate state
coverage for the synthesis to succeed.
7.3.2 Analysis of Counterexample Traces
To solve the finite-state protocol completion problem, we maintain a set of constraints ϕ on the
transition variables ti defined in Section 7.2. ϕ is initialized with determinism and deadlock
constraints. The first enforce that the protocol automata are deterministic. For the second, we
explore the reachable state space of the product of the environment and incomplete automata;
for every deadlocked state, we add constraints that guarantee that at least one transition will
be enabled out of that state.
The algorithm then works iteratively as follows. At the beginning of every iteration, a
constraint solver — an ILP solver in our implementation — produces an assignment to the
transition variables such the assignment satisfies the constraints ϕ. If the constraints are
unsatisfiable, the algorithm concludes that no solution is possible and terminates. Otherwise,
we translate the assignment to a set of transitions T , such that for every transition variable that
the assignment sets to true, the corresponding transition is added to the appropriate incomplete
state machine. Let the current set of transitions added, across all incomplete state machines be
T = {t1, . . . , tn}. We instantiate the protocol with transitions from T added to the appropriate
incomplete state machines, form their product with the environment automata, and check for
the absence of deadlocks, safety, and liveness violations using a model checker. The following
cases are possible:
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1. No violations are found. In this case, T is a correct completion, and the algorithm terminates.
2. A safety violation is found. This case means that the candidate solution T is incorrect.
Moreover, any candidate T ′ obtained by adding extra transitions to T , i.e., T ′ ⊇ T , will
also be incorrect, because adding extra local transitions can only add, but not remove,
global transitions. This in turn implies that any reachable error state with T will also be a
reachable error state with T ′, so any safety violation with T will also be a safety violation
with T ′. To enforce that no super-set of T is included in any future candidate set, we add
the formula ¬(t1 ∧ t2 ∧ · · ·∧ tn) to the constraint set.
3. A liveness violation is found. This case also means that the candidate solution T is incorrect.
A liveness violation, corresponds to a fair infinite accepting run, represented by a reachable
cycle, such that the run causes a liveness monitor to reach an accepting state infinitely
often. Although adding more transitions cannot eliminate the cycle, it is possible that
additional transitions can render a fair run unfair: if a particular output o ∈ Of was not
enabled in the cycle, then adding local transitions can cause o to become enabled. Let
T ′ = {t ′1, . . . , t
′
m} be the set of transitions that, if added, would make the infinite run
unfair.11 We add as a constraint the formula ¬(t1 ∧ t2 ∧ · · ·∧ tn)∨ (t ′1 ∨ t ′2 ∨ · · ·∨ t ′m).
The constraint guarantees that in all future candidate sets, the cycle will be unreachable,
broken, or not fair.
4. A deadlock state is found. In this case as well, T is incorrect, but could potentially be made
correct by adding more transitions. Let T ′ = {t ′1, . . . , t
′
m} be the set of candidate transitions
such that, if any transition in T ′ is added, a transition is enabled out of the deadlock state.
We add the constraint (t1 ∧ · · ·∧ tn)→ (t ′1 ∨ · · ·∨ t ′m).
In every iteration, either a correct completion is found or the search space is pruned. We
use an ILP solver to generate candidate sets from the constraints with an objective function
that minimizes the size of the candidate set. In that way, in each iteration, we examine the
smallest set of transitions that satisfies the constraints. This keeps the size of the product of
the automata small and allows for faster checking of the properties.
We employ the following heuristic to prune the search space faster. Assume that a candidate
set T = {t1, . . . , tn} is tested in an iteration of the algorithm and a safety violation is discovered.
As described so far, the algorithm will remove all super-sets of T from the search space by
11 For simplicity, we assume that process automata only communicate with environment automata. The constraint
for the general case is more complicated but conceptually similar.
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adding the constraint ¬(t1 ∧ · · ·∧ tn). However, if the safety violation is reachable by using
only a subset of T , T ′′, then it is safe to also remove all super-sets of T ′′ from the search space.
Ideally, one would find all minimal subsets of T that alone can lead to a violation and remove
all super-sets of them. We approximate this by finding a minimal path to a safety violation
using breadth-first search. If the path contains a subset of the transitions in T , we remove all
super-sets of that subset from the search space.
7.3.3 Complexity of the fsm-sk Completion Problem
Theorem 3. The fsm-sk completion problem as defined at the beginning of Section 7.3 is
pspace-complete.
Proof. It is easy to see that the problem is in npspace. We can guess a completion; the space
of all possible completions for each fsm-sk is bounded by |L|2 × |Σ|, where L is the set of
locations and Σ is the message alphabet, and is thus polynomial in the size of the input.
Once a completion has been guess, checking for determinism can also be accomplished in
polynomial time. Finally, checking if the completion is correct is tantamount to ltl model
checking, which is known to be pspace-complete [SC85]. From Savitch’s theorem, we know
that npspace = pspace. Thus the fsm-sk completion problem is in pspace.
To prove hardness, we observe that in the special case where the fsm-sks in the protocol
have the following property: Adding any transition to any fsm-sk in the protocol results in the
fsm-sk being non-deterministic. In this case, there is only one possible “completion”: which
is to not add any additional transitions. Determining whether this sole completion is correct
is again tantamount to ltl model checking, which we know to be pspace-complete. This
completes the proof that the fsm-sk completion problem is pspace-complete.
7.4 Experimental Evaluation
In this section we evaluate the effectiveness of scenarios and our methodology for specifying
finite-state protocols. We use three benchmarks: the ABP protocol, a cache coherence protocol,
and a consensus protocol. We first check manually whether the corresponding scenarios
provide sufficient state coverage to be able to synthesize a correct implementation. We then
evaluate our synthesis algorithm on those benchmarks and investigate the effectiveness of
scenarios in reducing the empirical complexity of the automata completion problem. Lastly, we
discuss the interaction between the number of scenarios used to construct the initial incomplete
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Benchmark time (s) # iterations # candidate transitions
ABP1 2.8 44 84
ABP2 9.9 87 172
ABP1-4 11.5 59 240
ABPcolored1 63.8 197 260
ABPcolored2 168.9 273 652
ABPcolored1-4 409.4 293 1012
VI-no-data 28.6 208 1170
VI 183.7 215 4538
Consensus-fail 0.3 5 264
Consensus-success 13.8 162 112
Consensus-success+1 21.4 163 216
Consensus-no-test-and-set 11.2 156 88
Table 7.1: Summary of experimental results for finite-state protocol synthesis from scenarios.
automata and the number of requirements that are necessary to synthesize a correct protocol.
A quantitative summary of our experiments can be found in Table 7.1. Each row corresponds to
a combination of benchmark and set of input scenarios used for that benchmark, column “time”
shows the total time that the synthesis algorithm took to find a correct completion, column “#
iterations” shows the number of iterations of the algorithm, i.e., the number of candidate sets
of transitions tested, and “# candidate transitions” is the total number of candidate transitions
for all process automata. Note that this last number, n, represents individual local transitions
and not number of candidate completions. The size of the space of all possible completions is
the number of subsets of the set of candidate transitions, i.e., 2n.
7.4.1 Alternating-bit Protocol
We have already described the working of this protocol using scenarios in Section 7.2. We use
different sets of input scenarios to create three versions of this benchmark. ABP1 used only the
first scenario shown in Figure 7.2 to construct the incomplete automata, ABP2 used only the
second scenario, while ABP1-4 used all four scenarios. Although the text-book presentation
uses four scenarios to describe the protocol, each of the these subsets of scenarios provided the
state coverage necessary for our algorithm to synthesize a correct and complete protocol.
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Figure 7.5: Scenario for the consensus protocol.
We also constructed a variant of the Alternating-bit protocol that also models the ability
of the clients to send different payloads in the message packets. In the protocol described
in Section 7.2, the implicit assumption was that the payload was unique and irrelevant. In
the experiments ABPcolored1, ABPcolored2, and ABPcolored1-4, there are two “colors” of
messages that can be sent and received. The different “colors” essentially represent the distinct
values of data that the client of the sender automaton might wish to send to be delivered to
the corresponding client of the receiver automaton using the Alternating-bit protocol.
7.4.2 The VI Cache Coherence Protocol
We have briefly mentioned the VI cache coherence protocol in Section 4.4. Here, we consider
a finite-state version of the VI protocol, whose behavior is as described in Figure 1.3, in
Chapter 1. The finite-state version of the VI protocol considered here is very similar to the
version considered in Chapter 3.
We examine two variations of the VI protocol: one where there is a unique value for the
data, in which case the protocol reduces to a distributed locking protocol (VI-no-data), and one
where the data can take values 0 or 1, which captures the essence of the VI cache coherence
protocol (VI) and ensures that the resulting protocol actually satisfies the coherence invariant
as well, in addition to the liveness properties satisfied by the version of the protocol which
assumes a unique data value.
7.4.3 The Consensus Protocol
In this problem we specify a protocol that describes how two processes can reach consensus
on one value. Each process chooses initially a preferred value and then they coordinate using
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shared memory to decide which of the two values to choose. The properties that the protocol
has to satisfy are agreement (the two decisions must be the same), validity (the common
decision must equal one of the preferred values), and wait-freedom (at any point, if only one
process makes progress it will be able to make a decision). It has been shown that wait-freedom
can be achieved only if a test-and-set register is used. The test-and-set register allows a process
to write a value to it and read its previous value, with both steps occurring as an atomic
operation.
Figure 7.5 shows the single scenario used for the consensus protocol. Both processes begin
by non-deterministically choosing a value, messages “Prefer0” and “Prefer1”, then write their
choices in shared registers, “Register1” and “Register2”, and then compete on setting the
common test-and-set register which is initialized with 0. In this case, Process1 succeeds, the
return value of the test-and-set operation is 0, and Process1 decides on its preferred value with
message “decide0”. On the other hand, Process2 fails, the test-and-set register returns 1, and
Process2 reads the value chosen by Process1, and decides on that with messages “read0” and
“decide0”.
We first attempt to synthesize the protocol starting from the incomplete automata con-
structed from the “success path”, i.e., only the lane for Process 1 in the scenario, and the “fail
path”, i.e., only the lane for Process 2 in the scenario. These two experiments correspond
to rows “Consensus-success” and “Consensus-fail” of the Table 7.1. Finally, we implement a
consensus protocol that does not use a test-and-set register, row “Consensus-no-test-and-set”.
Note that the protocol synthesized when a test-and-set register is not used is not wait-free.
7.4.4 Discussion
State Coverage
We observe that in all our experiments, except for “Consensus-success” and “Consensus-no-
test-and-set”, the states of the incomplete automata constructed by the scenarios cover all
states of the protocols. In the “Consensus-success” experiment, the incomplete automaton is
constructed using only the successful path of the protocol. A large part of the protocol’s logic is
missing from the input scenario, leaving the automaton with not enough states. The synthesis
algorithm terminates and thus proves that no successful completion is possible. When we add
an extra state in the incomplete automata without any edges to or from the rest of the states,
the synthesis algorithm returns a completion that uses the extra state to implement the missing
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behavior. Row “Consensus-success+1” corresponds to that experiment. This seems to indicate
that apart from being a natural way to describe the behavior of distributed protocols, scenarios
also contain enough information to mechanically fill in any missing detail.
Generalization and inference of unspecified behaviors
In all cases where the given scenarios covered all the states of the desired implementation
the synthesis algorithm terminated with a correct completion. For the case of ABP with just
one scenario specified, the algorithm successfully performs the generalization required to
obtain a correct completion. The generalization performed is non-obvious: the correct protocol
behaviors on packet loss, loss of acknowledgments and message duplication are inferred, even
though the scenario does not describe what needs to happen in these situations. The incomplete
automata constructed from the scenario describe only the protocol behavior over loss-less
channels. The algorithms are guided solely by the liveness and safety specifications to infer the
correct behavior. In contrast, when all four scenarios are used, the scenarios already contain
information about the behavior of the protocol when a single packet loss or a single message
duplication occurs. The algorithm thus needs to only generalize this behavior to handle an
arbitrary number of losses and duplications.
The same is true about the generalizations made by the algorithm in the other benchmarks.
Specifically, in the case of VI, the synthesis algorithm correctly infers that in a complete protocol
write-back and invalidate messages should be treated in the same way both from the caches
and from the directory. Note that this behavior cannot be inferred by looking at caches and
directory independently: they both have to implement it for the result to be correct.
Interplay between scenarios and requirements
We observed that when fewer scenarios were used we needed to specify more properties
— some of which were non-obvious — so that the algorithms could converge to a correct
completion. For instance, when only one scenario was specified, we needed to include the
liveness property that every deliver message was eventually followed by a send message. Owing
to the structure of the incomplete automata, this property was not necessary to obtain a correct
completion when all four scenarios were specified. Another property which was necessary to
reject trivial completions when no scenarios were specified was that there has to be at least
one send message in every run. Therefore, in some cases, using scenarios can compensate for
the lack of detailed formal specifications.
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Limitations and shortcomings
One primary limitation of the techniques described in this section is that they require the
individual state machines to be finite-state, without any state variables. Although this is not a
restriction from a theoretical perspective, because most interesting distributed protocols are
indeed finite-state, it is often tedious to express a distributed protocol — even if it is indeed
finite-state — without using any state variables. The resulting representation is often extremely
low-level and unintuitive to human beings, who typically model such protocols as extended state
machines with state variables and describe the evolution of the system by symbolic updates to
these state variables, with the transitions themselves conditioned on symbolic guard expressions
over these state variables. The work described in the next section attempts to remedy this
shortcoming, and to solve the full protocol completion problem formulated in Section 2.3.
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8
Completion of Distributed Protocols with Symmetry
In this section, we describe a fully automated solution to solve an unrestricted version of
the problem formulated in Section 2.3, where the programmer provides the esm-sks for
the protocol, and each esm and esm-sk may have an arbitrary number of state variables.
Furthermore, no restrictions are applied on the kinds of payloads that messages can carry. This
chapter is based on the work originally published in [ARS+15].
8.1 Overview of Symmetric Protocol Completion
Figure 8.1 shows the algorithm for symmetric protocol completion as an instantiation of
the algorithmic scheme shown in Figure 3.2. The input here is a set of esms and esm-sks,
so the block labeled 4 — which compiles the input provided by the user into esm-sks—
in Figure 3.2 is no longer necessary here. Based on the esms and esm-sks our algorithm
generates the necessary determinism and symmetry constraints ϕ0, which we require every
interpretation to satisfy. The rest of the algorithm is conceptually similar to the algorithm
described in Chapter 7. We model the unknown functions used in the guards and updates
in the esm-sks as uninterpreted functions — rather than as Boolean variables as was the
case in the algorithm described in Chapter 7 — and ask the SMT solver for an interpretation
which satisfies the set of constraints maintained by the algorithm. The protocol is then
instantiated with this interpretation and checked for correctness using a custom-built model-
checker. Errors discovered during this check are automatically analyzed to obtain constraints on
the uninterpreted functions which make at least the particular error trace in question infeasible
in future iterations. This process is repeated until we obtain an interpretation that results in a
correct, completed protocol.
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Figure 8.1: Overview of our approach for symmetric protocol completion.
The rest of this section is organized as follows: Section 8.2 describes the algorithm we
have developed to solve the symmetric protocol completion problem in depth. Section 8.3
describes the model checking algorithms used check correctness of a proposed protocol, and
also includes a description of a general purpose model checking framework which was built as
a part of this effort. Section 8.4 describes the results of the using the techniques described in
this chapter to synthesize a mutual exclusion protocol, Dijkstra’s self stabilization protocol and
several variants of a moderately sized cache coherence protocol.
8.2 Solving the Symmetric Protocol Completion Problem
We first describe how the initial constraints ϕ0 shown in Figure 8.1 are generated. We then
describe how counterexamples obtained from a suitable model checker, which supports sym-
metry and fine-grained fairness assumptions, are automatically analyzed to augment ϕ with
additional constraints, which rule out at least the particular counterexample in question. We
conclude this section with a short discussion on optimizations and heuristics which play a
crucial role in getting the algorithm to scale to larger instances of the symmetric protocol
completion problem.
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8.2.1 Initial Constraints
The initial constraints ϕ0 can be thought of being comprised of two disjoint sets. One set
of constraints to ensure that any interpretation chosen renders the instantiation of the state
machines deterministic; and another set of constraints to ensure that any interpretations that
satisfies them will result in a protocol which satisfies the symmetry assumptions specified by
the programmer. We will refer to these two sets of constraints as determinism constraints and
symmetry constraints, respectively.
Determinism Constraints
Recall that an esm-sk is deterministic under an interpretation I if and only if for every
state (l,σ) if there are multiple transitions enabled at (l,σ), then they must be input
transitions on distinct input channels. We constrain the interpretation I chosen at ev-
ery step such that all ESM sketches in the protocol are deterministic under I. Consider
the esm-sk for Peterson’s algorithm shown in Figure 1.13(b). We have two transitions
from the location L3, with guards gcrit(Pm, Po,flag, turn) and gwait(Pm, Po,flag, turn). We
ensure that these expressions never evaluate to true simultaneously with the constraint
¬∃v1v2v3v4 (gcrit(v1, v2, v3, v4)∧ gwait(v1, v2, v3, v4)). Although this is a quantified expres-
sion, which can be difficult for SMT solvers to solve, note that we only support finite types,
whose domains are often quite small. So our tool unrolls the quantifiers and presents only
quantifier-free formulas to the SMT solver.
Symmetry Constraints
Consider the case where the interpretation chosen for the guard gcrit shown in Figure 1.13(b),
was such that gcrit(P0, P1, 〈⊥,>〉, P0) = true. Then, for the interpretation I to be symmetric
with respect to the appropriate set of types for Peterson’s algorithm, we require that I is
such that gcrit(P1, P0, 〈>,⊥〉, P1) = true as well, because the latter expression is obtained by
applying the permutation {P0 7→ P1, P1 7→ P0} on the former expression. Note that the elements
of the flag array in the preceding example were flipped, because flag is an array indexed by
the symmetric type processid. In general, given a function f ∈ Ui, we enforce the constraint
∀pi ∈ perm(T).∀d ∈ dom(f). (f(pi(d)) ≡ pi(f(d))), where T is the set of all types as described
in Section 2.2. As with determinism constraints, these quantified constraints are unrolled
before they are presented to the SMT solver.
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8.2.2 Analyzing Counterexample Traces
We now describe in detail how we perform the analysis of counterexamples returned by the
model checker. Our implementation first composes the ESM sketches to form a product esm-sk
Π. It then compiles down this product esm-sk Π into guarded commands. These guarded
commands operate over a set of variables which include the state variables of every esm and
esm-sk in the protocol, as well as a distinguished variable that tracks the location of each esm
or esm-sk. The guards and updates of each guarded command are as defined in Section 2.2,
and the updates include the update to the distinguished location variable for each esm and
esm-sk as well. The guards and updates of the guarded commands are also transformed by the
compiler to use select, store, project and update functions12 for reads and updates of arrays
and records respectively. Furthermore, repeated assignments to the same variable in a guarded
command are coalesced into a single assignment. In effect, each variable (be it of a scalar type,
an array type or a record type) has at most one assignment to it in the list of updates associated
with each guarded command. These transformations on the guarded commands make it easier
to compute the weakest preconditions of predicates with respect to the guarded commands, as
we shall now explain.
Let the set of guarded commands be G, given a guarded command cmd ∈ G, we define
guard(cmd) to be the guard of cmd and update(cmd) to be the list of coalesced updates of
cmd. The weakest precondition of a predicate ϕ with respect to an assignment statement
stmt , l := e is defined as wp(stmt,ϕ) ≡ ϕ[l 7→ e], where ϕ[l 7→ e] is the expression obtained
by replacing all instances of the sub-expression l in ϕ with the expression e. We extend the
definition of the weakest precondition of a predicate ϕ with respect to a sequence of statements
in the natural way. The weakest precondition of a predicate ϕ with respect to a guarded
command cmd is defined is defined aswpcmd(cmd,ϕ) ≡ guard(cmd)→ wp(update(cmd),ϕ).
In the rest of this section, we use the symbol > to refer to the Boolean constant true and the
symbol ⊥ to refer to false, respectively, for brevity and readability.
Analyzing Deadlocks
In Figure 1.13(b), consider the candidate interpretation where both gcrit, gwait are set to be uni-
versally false. Two deadlock states are then reachable: S1 = ((L3,L3), {flag 7→ 〈>,>〉, turn 7→
12These are functions defined in the theory of arrays and records by the SMTLIB2 standard. For details, see
http://smt-lib.org/.
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P1} and S2 = ((L3,L3), {flag 7→ 〈>,>〉, turn 7→ P0}. We strengthen ϕ by asserting that these
deadlocks do not occur in future interpretations: either S1 is unreachable, or the system can
make a transition from S1 (and similarly for S2). In this example, the reachability of both
deadlock states is not dependent on the interpretation, i.e., the execution that leads to the
states does not exercise any unknown function, hence, we need to make sure that the states
are not deadlocks. The possible transitions out of location (L3,L3) are the transitions from L3
to L3 (waiting transition) and from L3 to L4 (critical transition) for each of the two processes.
In each deadlock state, at least one of the four guards has to be true. So in the case of the
deadlock in state S1, we add the following disjunction to the set of constraints:
gwait(P0, P1, 〈>,>〉, P1)∨ gcrit(P0, P1, 〈>,>〉, P1) ∨
gwait(P1, P0, 〈>,>〉, P1)∨ gcrit(P1, P0, 〈>,>〉, P1)
Similarly for the case of the deadlock in state S2, we add the following disjunction to the set of
constraints:
gwait(P0, P1, 〈>,>〉, P0)∨ gcrit(P0, P1, 〈>,>〉, P0) ∨
gwait(P1, P0, 〈>,>〉, P0)∨ gcrit(P1, P0, 〈>,>〉, P0)
The two disjunctions are added to the set of constraints, since any candidate interpretation has
to satisfy them in order for the resulting product to be deadlock-free.
Analyzing Safety Violations
Consider now an erroneous interpretation where the critical transition guards are true for both
processes when turn is P0, that is: gcrit(P0, P1, 〈>,>〉, P0) and gcrit(P1, P0, 〈>,>〉, P0) are set to
true. Under this interpretation the product can reach the error location (L4,L4). We perform a
weakest precondition analysis on the corresponding execution to obtain a necessary condition
under which the safety violation is possible. In this case, the execution crosses both critical
transitions and the generated constraint is ¬gcrit(P0, P1, 〈>,>〉, P0)∨¬gcrit(P1, P0, 〈>,>〉, P0).
Note that the constraints obtained from this analysis are necessary: the protocol under any
interpretation that satisfies the negation of the constraints would exhibit the same safety
violation.
More formally, given an error trace that is a non-repeating execution (i.e., a witness for a
safety violation or a deadlock) which consists of an initial state valuation σ0, and a sequence
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of guarded commands from G, say, cmd1, cmd2, . . . , cmdn. Given a predicate Γ , we define
pre0(Γ) ≡ Γ , and recursively define prei(Γ) ≡ wpcmd(cmdn−i−1, prei-1(Γ)). Then, if the trace
is a witness for a safety violation, we add the constraint C , pren(Γ)[v 7→ σ0(v)], for every
variable v in the system, to our set of constraints ϕ, where Γ is the invariant which was violated.
We note that after simplifications, C will be a constraint that refers only to the unknown
functions fu ∈ U; also, all arguments to an unknown function fu will be concrete values in C.
In fact, C will not refer to any variable at all, once it has been appropriately simplified. Our
prototype employs extensive simplifications at each step during the computation of weakest
preconditions to ensure that the formulas do not grow to be unmanageably large.
On the other hand if the trace is a witness for a deadlock, we add the constraint C ,
pren
(∨
cmd∈G guard(cmd)
)
[v 7→ σ0(v)], for every variable v in the system, to the set of con-
straints ϕ maintained by the algorithm. This constraint ensures that if this particular execution
is ever permitted under an interpretation for the unknown functions U chosen in the future,
then some guarded command is enabled at the end of the execution, under that interpretation,
therefore no longer rendering the final state of the execution a deadlock.
Analyzing Liveness Violations
An interpretation that satisfies the constraints gathered above is one that, when turn is P0,
enables both waiting transitions and disables the critical ones. Intuitively, under this interpreta-
tion, the two processes will not make progress if turn is P0 when they reach L3. The executions
in which the processes are at L3 and either P0 or P1 continuously take the waiting transition is
an accepting one. As with safety violations, we eliminate liveness violations by adding con-
straints generated through weakest precondition analysis of the accepting executions. In this
case, this results in two constraints: ¬gwait(P0, P1, 〈>,>〉, P0) and ¬gwait(P1, P0, 〈>,>〉, P0).
However, in the presence of fairness assumptions, these constraints are too strong. This is
because removing an execution that causes a fair liveness violation is not the only way to resolve
it: another way is to make it unfair. Given the weak fairness assumption on the transitions on
the criticalPi channels, the correct constraint generated for the liveness violation of Process P0
is: ¬gwait(P0, P1, 〈>,>〉, P0)∨ gcrit(P0, P1, 〈>,>〉, P0)∨ gcrit(P1, P0, true, true, P0), where the
last two disjuncts render the accepting execution unfair.
To describe the process of analyzing liveness counterexamplesmore formally, we assume that
infinite accepting executions are given as a pair of a finite stem execution of size n and a finite
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cycle execution of sizem. First, we describe the case where no fairness assumptions exist in the
system. The constraint computed from an accepting execution asserts either that the sequence
of transitions should not be enabled or that the state of the system at the beginning of the cycle
should be not be the same as the state at the end. If the set of variables of Π is {v1, . . . , vN} we
introduce symbolic constants v ′1, . . . , v
′
N and set Γ ≡ v1 6= v ′1 ∨ v2 6= v ′2 ∨ · · ·∨ vN 6= v ′N. We
first compute C = prem(Γ) on the cycle execution and then substitute v ′1, . . . , v
′
N for v1, . . . , vN
in C: C ′ = C[v1 7→ v ′1, . . . , vN 7→ v ′N]. We then get the final constraint by computing pren(C ′)
on the stem execution.
We now describe the case where strong fairness assumptions are present. Let Fs be the set
of strong fairness assumptions and G be the union of all sets F ∈ Fs such that every guarded
command in F is disabled everywhere in the cycle. We adapt the computation of prei in the
cycle execution as follows: pre ′i(Γ) ≡ wpcmd(cmdn−i−1, prei-1(Γ)∨
(∨
cmd∈G guard(cmd))
)
.
Enabling a command cmd in G at a step in the cycle execution has the effect of making the
accepting cycle unfair: since cmd is never executed in the cycle, enforcing guard(cmd) makes
cmd infinite often enabled but never taken.
The case where weak fairness requirements are present is similar: we set G to be the union
of all the sets F ∈ Fw, such that: (1) there exists at least one state in the cycle which has
the property that every guarded command in F is disabled at that state, and (2) no guarded
command in F is ever executed anywhere in the cycle, i.e., there do not exist states s1 and s2
in the cycle such that s2 can be reached from s1 by executing some command in F. The rest of
the process to obtain a constraint that ensures that the cycle is unfair is the same as for strong
fairness assumptions.
8.2.3 Heuristics and Optimizations
We describe a few key optimizations and heuristics that we have applied in the model checking
step, as well as in the constraints that we present to the SMT solver. We have empirically
observed that these techniques improve the scalability and predictability of our technique.
Not all counterexamples are created equal
The constraint we get from a single counter-example trace is weaker when it exercises a
large number of unknown functions. Consider, for example, a candidate interpretation
for the incomplete Peterson’s algorithm which, when turn = P0, sets both waiting transi-
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tion guards gwait to true, and both critical transition guards gcrit to false. We have already
seen that the product is not live under this interpretation. From the infinite execution lead-
ing up-to the location (L3,L3), and after which P0 loops in L3, we obtain the constraint13
¬gwait(P0, P1, 〈>,>〉, P0). On the other hand, if we had considered the longer self-loop at
(L3,L3), where P0 and P1 alternate in making waiting transitions, we would have obtained the
weaker constraint ¬gwait(P0, P1, 〈>,>〉, P0)∨ ¬gwait(P1, P0, 〈>,>〉, P0). In general, erroneous
traces which exercise fewer unknown functions have the potential to prune away a larger
fraction of the search space and are therefore preferable over traces exercising a larger number
of unknown functions.
In each iteration, the model checker discovers several erroneous states. In the event that
the candidate interpretation chosen is blatantly incorrect, it is infeasible to analyze paths to all
error states. A naïve solution would be to analyze paths to the first n errors states discovered
(where n is configurable). But depending on the strategy used to explore the state space, a
large fraction these errors could be similar14, and would only provide us with rather weak, or
even identical sets of constraints. On the other hand, exercising as many unknown functions
as possible, along different paths, has the potential to provide stronger constraints on future
interpretations. In summary, we bias the model checker to cover as many unknown functions
as possible along different paths, such that along any given path, the number of unknown
functions that are exercised is kept as small as possible.
Heuristics/Prioritization to guide the SMT solver
As mentioned earlier, we use an SMT solver to obtain interpretations for unknown functions,
given a set of constraints. When this set is small, as is the case at the beginning of the algorithm,
there exist many satisfying interpretations. At this point the interpretation chosen by the SMT
solver can either lead the rest of the search down a “good” path, or lead it down a futile path.
Therefore the run time of the synthesis algorithm can depend heavily on the interpretations
returned by the SMT solver, which we consider a non-deterministic black box in our approach.
To reduce the influence of non-determinism of the SMT solver on the run time of our
algorithm, we bias the solver towards specific forms of interpretations by asserting additional
constraints. These constraints associate a costwith interpretations and require an interpretation
with a given bound on the cost, which is relaxed whenever the SMT solver fails to find a solution.
13Ignoring fairness assumptions.
14We observed this phenomenon in our initial experiments.
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We briefly describe the most important of the heuristics/prioritization techniques: (1)
We minimize the number of points in the domain of an unknown guard function at which it
evaluates to true. This results in minimally permissive guards. (2) Based on the observation
that most variables are unchanged in a given transition, we prioritize interpretations where
update functions leave the value of the variable unchanged, as far as possible. (3) Another
possibility that we have explored is to try to minimize the number of arguments on which the
value of an unknown function depends.
8.3 Model Checking
To effectively and repeatedly generate constraints to drive the synthesis loop, a model checker
needs to: (a) support checking liveness properties, with algorithmic support for fine grained
notions of strong and weak fairness, (b) dynamically prioritize certain paths over others, as
explained in Section 8.2.3, and (c) exploit symmetries inherent in the model. The fine grained
notions of fairness over sets of transitions, rather than bulk process fairness are crucial. For
instance, in the case of unordered channel processes, we often require that no message be
delayed indefinitely, which cannot be captured by enforcing fairness at the level of the entire
process. The ability to prioritize certain paths over others is also crucial so that candidate
interpretations are exercised to the extent possible in one model checking run. Finally, support
for symmetry-based state space reductions can greatly speed up each model checking run.
Surprisingly, we found that none of the well-supported model checkers met all of our
requirements. spin [Hol97] only supports weak process fairness at an algorithmic level
and does not employ symmetry-based reductions. Our efforts to encode the necessary fine
grained strong fairness requirements as ltl formulas in spin resulted in the Büchi monitor
construction step either blowing up or generating extremely large monitor processes. Support
for symmetry-based reductions is present in Murϕ [ID96, Dil96], but it lacks support for
liveness checking.15 SMC [SGE00] is a model checker with support for symmetry reduction
and strong and weak process fairness. Unfortunately, it is no longer maintained, and has very
rudimentary counterexample generation capabilities. Finally, NuSMV [CCG+02] does not
support symmetry reductions, but supports strong and weak process level fairness. But, due to
bugs, we were unable to obtain counterexamples in some cases.
15There exists an unmaintained version of Murϕ which does support checking of some restricted forms of ltl
properties, but it only supports weak fairness.
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We therefore implemented a model checker based on the ideas used in Murϕ [Dil96] for
symmetry reduction, and an adaptation of the techniques presented in [ES97] for checking
liveness properties under fine grained fairness assumptions. At a high level, the model checking
algorithm consists of the following steps: (1) construct the symmetry-reduced state graph
of the model. (2) If the reachable state space does not contain a state where an invariant is
violated, then construct the symmetry-reduced product graph, obtained by composing the
model with the Büchi monitors representing the ltl requirements. (3) find accepting strongly
connected components (SCCs) in the symmetry-reduced product graph. (3) delete unfair states
from each SCC; repeat steps (3) and (4) until either a fair SCC is found or no more accepting
SCCs remain. We now provide a brief description of the architecture of our model checking
and synthesis framework, called kinara16 and of how each of these steps are implemented in
kinara.
8.3.1 Architecture of kinara
Figure 8.2 depicts the high level architecture of the kinara framework. kinara is implemented
as a C++ library, which can support multiple front-ends for describing models and requirements,
including the Murϕ language. The arrows in Figure 8.2 denote inter module dependencies. For
example, the arrow from the module labeled “Low-level Model Representation” to the module
labeled “Expression Representation” indicates that the model representation depends on the
functionality provided by the module responsible for expression representation.
At the heart of kinara is an extensible library for representing expressions. The expression
module deals with the syntax of expressions, and also provides APIs to create types. The module
also supports expressions involving array indexing, field references of a record. Expressions
can also be quantified over values of a type.
The low-level model representation APIs provide constructs for describing the model as a set
of guarded commands. The guard of each guarded command is a Boolean valued expression,
and the updates are a sequence of simple assignments to lvalues. Because kinara only supports
finite types, we assume that loops are unrolled in the low-level model description. The low-level
representation does not check that symmetry breaking constructs are not used. It assumes
that a higher-level front-end handles these aspects. In fact, in the low-level representation,
all objects that are parameterized by a set of symmetric types are assumed to have already
16kinara is not another recursive acronym, or kinara is not another reachability analyzer. kinara is open
source software and is publicly available at https://github.com/abhishekudupa/kinara
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Figure 8.2: Architecture of the kinara framework for model-checking and synthesis
been unrolled, with the exception of Büchi monitors. These are handled differently, as we
explain in Section 8.3.3. For example, the low-level representation of the Peterson’s mutual
exclusion algorithm shown in Figure 1.13 will have two processes, one for each instantiation
of the parameters. The values of the parameters Pm and Po in each of the machines will be
substituted with concrete values from the set {P0, P1} corresponding to the instantiation. The
definitions of symmetry in terms of executions from Chapter 2, imply the following constraints
on the low-level model representation:
• For every guarded command cmd, there must also exist the corresponding guarded command
pi(cmd), for every pi ∈ perm(T). Here pi(cmd) is obtained by syntactically permuting cmd
by the permutation pi.
• The transitions of every Büchi automaton must also be symmetric in the same manner. The
notion of symmetry for Büchi automata will be described in greater detail in Section 8.3.3.
• For every fairness set F ∈ Fw, (respectively Fs), of the form F , {cmd1, cmd2, . . . , cmdm},
it must be the case that for every permutation pi ∈ perm(T) the fairness set F ′ ∈ Fw
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(respectively F ′ ∈ Fs), where the fairness set F ′ is F permuted according to pi and has the
form F ′ , {pi(cmd1),pi(cmd2), . . . ,pi(cmdm)}.
Also, note that the low-level model representation represents the product of all the esms and
esm-sks that form the protocol, where the product construction is as described in Chapter 2.
The framework also provides APIs to construct Büchi monitors. These are restricted to
be state machines without state variables, but which can inspect the state of the model to
determine the next state to transition to. These may be symmetric as well, but we defer a
discussion on symmetric Büchi monitors to Section 8.3.3.
The module for state space generation provides mechanisms for efficiently representing the
state space, where each state is represented as a sequence of bytes which encodes the valuation
of variables in the state. Given a state which violates an invariant, or a fair, accepting strongly
connected component, the counterexample generation module presents a counterexample
as a simple path or a stem and a loop respectively. Given that the state space is represented
in a compressed or symmetry-reduced manner, generating a usable counterexample is non-
trivial, especially in the case of counterexamples which demonstrate the violation of a liveness
requirement. Owing to this complexity, we have chosen to implement the counterexample
generation as a separate module.
We note that the user is not restricted to specifying the model and requirements using
the low-level model description APIs. Front-ends that support higher levels of abstraction can
be implemented to translate models specified using these abstractions to the low-level model
description. In our instantiation, we have implemented a front-end library that allows the
specification of the model as communicating state machines and state machine sketches. This is
indicated using dashed lines in Figure 8.2. The front-end which we have implemented ensures
that symmetry breaking constructs are not used. This is done by enforcing the following rules at
a syntactic level: (1) no reference to a concrete value of a symmetric type is allowed anywhere,
and (2) the only operation defined on values of symmetric types is equality. In effect, this
requires that the only way that the values of a symmetric type can be referred to is in the
context of a for each construct, which is quantified over the values of the symmetric type. This
ensures that there exists one instance of the quantified object — which could be an assignment,
a transition, a message, a fairness assumption, or even an esm or esm-sk— for each value
in the symmetric type. In addition, invariants and safety properties can only refer to values
of a symmetric type using a universal or existential quantifier over the type. These syntactic
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restrictions are sufficient to prevent a user from specifying invariants that are not symmetric
over the symmetric model.
Recall that the kinara expression module deals only with the syntax of expressions. The
semantics of expressions are not a part of the core kinara library. Instead, kinara allows the
semantics to be specified using pluggable C++ modules. In our instantiation, we implemented
a module which described the semantics of the most commonly used operators in protocols,
namely basic arithmetic operators including multiplication, modulus and division as well
as conditional operators. The simplification routines are also implemented using pluggable
modules to the core kinara framework.
The synthesis engine uses the mechanisms provided by the state space representation
routines to drive the model checking along paths which lead to more fruitful constraints as
described in Section 8.2.3. It also leverages the counterexample generation routines to provide
it with a usable counterexample whenever the model checking phase discovers a safety or
liveness violation.
We now provide a brief description of the model checking algorithms, which are adaptations
of the algorithms presented in earlier work [ID96, Dil96, ES97], are implemented in kinara.
8.3.2 Construction of the Annotated Quotient Structure
Consider a model represented using the low-level representation of kinara. The model refers
to a set of variables V, each of which has a finite type drawn from the set of types T, some
of which may be symmetric types as defined in Chapter 2. The initial state of the model
is described using the valuation σ017 of the variables V. We denote by SV , the set of all
valuations over V . The evolution of the variables is described by a set of guarded commands
G , {cmd1, cmd2, . . . cmdn}. Given that all the variables range over finite domains, we can
represent each valuation σ ∈ SV using a finite-length array of bytes s ∈ S, where S represents
the set of all arrays of bytes of the given finite length. In the context of the description of the
model checking algorithms, we refer to both σ and s as a state of the model. Now, the reachable
state space of the model can be described using a graph M = (NM,EM), where NM ⊆ S
represents the vertices of the graph, and EM ⊆ NM×NM×N represents the edges, where an
edge (s1, s2, i) ∈ EM if and only if it is the case that the state executing the guarded command
cmdi in s1, results in the state s2. The initial state ofM is s0, the state corresponding to σ0.
17We assume a single initial state. If multiple initial states are required, it can be emulated by having a (dummy)
single initial state from which the system non-deterministically transitions to one of the actual initial states.
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ThusM represents the state space of the model. We can ensure that no safety violation or
deadlock is possible in the model, by merely inspecting the reachable subset ofM. For liveness,
we will need to construct the product ofM with a Büchi monitorMB and check for cycles in
the reachable product state space.
In case of a symmetric model, storing the reachable state space of the model using the
graph M is wasteful. Consider the set of system-wide permutations perm(T) over the set
of types T that the model is defined over. Given that the model is symmetric, then for any
edge e = (s1, s2, i) ∈ EM, and for any pi ∈ perm(T), we must also have that the edge
e ′ = (pi(s1),pi(s2), j) ∈ EM, where pi(s) denotes the state obtained by permuting s according
to the permutation pi ∈ perm(T), and j is the index of the guarded command obtained by
permuting the guarded command with index i according to pi. Note that the command cmdj
must belong to the set of guarded commands G, otherwise, the protocol is not symmetric.
The set of system-wide permutations perm(T) thus induces an equivalence relation ∼T over
S, where s1 ∼T s2 if and only if pi(s1) ≡ s2 for some pi ∈ perm(T). Because perm(T) forms a
group with respect of composition of permutations, we have that ∼T is reflexive, symmetric
and transitive, and thus ∼T is an equivalence relation. Furthermore, given that S is a set of
finite-length byte arrays, we can define a total, lexicographic ordering ≺ on the elements of S.
Let us denote by [s] the set of all states s ′ such that s ∼T s ′. For every state s ∈ S, we define
the state scan ∈ [s], such that there does not exist a state s ′ ∈ [s], such that s ′ 6= scan, and
s ′ ≺ scan. Thus scan is a representative for the set of states [s].
We can now represent M in a compressed form M = (NM,EM) as follows: The set of
vertices NM , {scan | s ∈ NM}, i.e., only the representatives from the equivalence classes
in NM are stored as vertices of M. The set of edges EM ⊆ NM × NM × N × perm(T) is
constructed such that (s1, s2, i,pi) ∈ EM if and only if executing the command cmdi in state
s1, results in a state pi−1(s2), where pi−1 denotes the inverse of the permutation pi. The initial
state ofM is s0can, i.e., the representative of s0 ∈ NM. The structureM is called an Annotated
Quotient Structure (AQS) [ID96, Dil96, ES97], and has the potential to be exponentially more
compact thatM, while retaining the same information.
WhileM has been described in terms ofM, in practice, the structureM is never constructed.
Instead, the AQSM is constructed on-the-fly by using a depth-first or breadth-first strategy,
where each new state s encountered is first canonicalized to get the state scan, and building the
AQS using only these canonical representatives. The implementation in kinara performs this
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canonicalization using an exhaustive search over all the permutations in perm(T). We did not
find the cost of this exhaustive canonicalization prohibitive for the protocols that we considered.
However, if this proves to be prohibitively expensive, we note that the the canonicalization is
implemented as a separate module in kinara. Thus, heuristic canonicalization techniques
which have been proposed earlier literature [ID96, Dil96, ES97] can be implemented in
a relatively straight-forward manner, as additional canonicalization modules which can be
plugged in as necessary.
Finally, we note that the construction of the AQSM is sufficient to verify safety proper-
ties. Assuming that the safety properties are symmetric as well, it has been shown in earlier
work [ID96, Dil96, ES97] thatM satisfies exactly the set of symmetric safety properties asM.
8.3.3 Construction of the Annotated Product Structure
The Annotated Product Structure (APS) is constructed for checking liveness properties under
fairness assumptions. The core kinara framework assumes that the representation of the Büchi
automata is symmetric as well, i.e., any given Büchi automaton is itself parameterized by zero
or more symmetric types, depending on the properties that they check. For example, consider
the Büchi automaton shown in Figure 1.13(c). This monitor is parameterized by a variable
called PID, which can take values of type processid. One can imagine this parameterized
Büchi automaton to be representing a set of symmetric automata, of size |processid|, with one
automaton for each value that the variable PID can take. Together, these automata check that
both processes satisfy their respective (and symmetric) liveness requirements. Furthermore,
the symmetric Büchi automata are assumed to correspond to the negation of the ltl property
that the protocol is expected to satisfy. In other words, an execution that is accepted by a Büchi
automaton is an execution that violates the corresponding liveness requirement.
The core kinara framework also assumes that the fairness assumptions are symmetric,
as described earlier in Section 8.3.1. The check that the Büchi automata as well as fairness
assumptions are symmetric are handled by the front-end in our case.
Consider a Büchi automaton B over the set of locations LB and whose transition relation
is RB ⊆ LB × LB × S, with a set of initial locations Q0 ⊆ LB, and a set of accepting locations
Qacc ⊆ LB. Suppose that B is parameterized by a set of symmetric types TB ⊆ T, where
TB ≡ {T1, T2, . . . Tk}, then this essentially represents that there are KB = |T1|× |T2|× · · · × |Tk|
symmetric instances of B, with one instance for each value in I , T1 × T2 × · · · × Tk.
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The APS M̂B is defined as a graph with the set of vertices N̂MB ⊆ NM × LB × I, and the
set of edges ÊMB ⊆ N̂MB× N̂MB×N×perm(T). An edge ((s1,q1, i), (s2,q2, j),k,pi) ∈ ÊMB
if and only if all of the following hold:
1. (s1, s2,k,pi) is an edge inM
2. (q1,q2, s1) ∈ RB
3. pi(i) ≡ j, recall that i and j are tuples from T1 × T2 × · · · Tk, and can thus be permuted.
The state (s0can,q0, i), for all q0 ∈ Q0 and for all i ∈ I is an initial state of M̂B. A vertex
(s,q, i) ∈ N̂MB is called green if q ∈ Qacc. Green vertices in M̂B will be used to characterize
cycles in M̂B that lead to the Büchi monitor B visiting an accepting state infinitely often.
In the actual implementation, each product state simply retains a pointer to the corre-
sponding AQS state. The state of the Büchi monitor is stored as a small width integer, and the
values from I are again encoded as integers. This helps keep the size of the product structure
manageable by not duplicating the states of the AQSM. The implementation builds M̂B by
considering only the reachable portion of M and executing an on-the-fly BFS construction
which builds the APS while simultaneously constructing the product ofM with B.
8.3.4 Checking for a Fair, Accepting Cycle
Consider the APS M̂B as described in Section 8.3.3. We denote an edge of the form (ŝ1, ŝ2,k,pi),
where ŝ1, ŝ2 ∈ N̂MB as ŝ1 k,pi−−→ ŝ2. A path x̂ in M̂B is a finite sequence states such that every two
adjacent states are related by an edge and is denoted as x̂ , ŝ0 k1,pi1−−−→ ŝ2 k2,pi2−−−→ · · · kn,pin−−−−→ ŝn.
Given such a path x̂, we denote the composition of permutations along that path by pix̂, i.e.,
pix̂ ≡ pin ◦ pin−1 ◦ · · · ◦ pi1. Then, we have from earlier work [ES97] that an APS M̂B has a fair
accepting cycle if and only if there exists a strongly connected sub-graph Ĉ in M̂B which has
the following properties:
1. Ĉ contains at least one green state, in which case, we call Ĉ itself as being green.
2. For every F ∈ Fw, of the form F , {cmd1, cmd2, . . . , cmdm} either (1) there exists a state
in Ĉ, such that every command in F is disabled, i.e., the guard of every command in F
evaluates to false on that state or (2) for every state ŝ where some cmdi ∈ F is enabled,
there exists a path x̂ lying entirely within Ĉ, beginning at ŝ and terminating at a state ŝ ′,
such that a ŝ ′ is reached on x̂ by executing the command pix̂(cmdi). In other words, the
path x̂ has the form x̂ , ŝ k1,pi1−−−→ · · · kj,pij−−−→ ŝ ′, where kj is the index of the pix̂(cmdi). We
will refer to this property as “Property(A)”
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Algorithm 8.1: Algorithm to find a fair, green strongly connected subgraph
1 compute the strongly connected components of M̂B
2 do
3 deleted← false
4 foreach strongly connected component Ĉ which is green do
5 if Ĉ satisfies Property(A) and Property(B) then
6 return Ĉ
7 if Ĉ does not satisfy Property(A), but satisfies Property(B) then
8 continue
9 if Ĉ does not satisfy Property(B) then
10 foreach F ∈ Fs such that Property(B) is violated for F do
11 delete from M̂B all states where some command cmd ∈ F is enabled
12 deleted← true
13 while deleted is true
14 return ⊥
3. For every F ∈ FS, of the form F , {cmd1, cmd2, . . . , cmdm} either (1) No command in F is
enabled in any state in Ĉ, or (2) for every state s such that some command cmdi ∈ F is
enabled, there exists a path x̂ lying entirely within Ĉ, beginning at ŝ and terminating at a
state ŝ ′ such that ŝ ′ is reached on x̂ by executing the command pix̂(cmdi). We will refer to
this property as “Property(B)”
Intuitively, these two requirements track the permutations that occur along a path and ensure
that the path satisfies all the fairness assumptions, despite the fact that the path involves
permuations and could possibly be compactly encoding a large number of un-permuted paths.
Algorithm 8.1 shows how the existence of such a strongly connected subgraph. It begins
by trying to find a maximal strongly connected subgraph which satisfied all the fairness
assumptions. This can be done efficiently using Tarjan’s algorithm for discovering strongly
connected components in a graph [Tar72]. Suppose that a maximal strongly connected
subgraph — which is the same as a strongly connected component — is not fair, due to some
strong fairness assumption not being satisfied, the algorithm then decomposes the strongly
connected subgraph by deleting some vertices, and restarts the process.
8.4 Experimental Evaluation
Having described the kinara model checking and synthesis framework in some detail, we
proceed to a description how well the framework performed on a few protocol synthesis tasks.
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We combine the description of the protocol synthesis task with an explanation of how the
kinara prototype fared in the subsequent parts of this section.
8.4.1 Peterson’s Mutual Exclusion Algorithm
We evaluated the proposed method to synthesize Peterson’s algorithm, which was described
in Section 1.2.3. In addition to the missing guards ggrit and gwait, we also replace the update
expressions of flag[Pm] in the (L1,L2) and (L4,L1) transitions with unknown functions that
depend on all state variables. In the initial constraints we require that gcrit(Pm, Po,flag, turn)∨
gwait(Pm, Po,flag, turn). The synthesis algorithm returns with an interpretation in less than a
second. Upon submitting the interpretation to a SyGuS solver, to obtain symbolic represen-
tations of the interpretations assigned to the unknown functions, the synthesized symbolic
expressions match the ones shown in Figure 1.13(b).
8.4.2 Self Stabilizing Systems
Our next case study is the synthesis of self-stabilizing systems [Dij74]. A distributed system
is self-stabilizing if, starting from an arbitrary initial state, in each execution, the system
eventually reaches a global legitimate state, and only legitimate states are ever visited after. We
also require that every legitimate state be reachable from every other legitimate state. Consider
N processes connected in a line. Each process maintains two Boolean state variables x and up.
The processes are described using guarded commands of the form, “if guard then update”.
Whether a command is enabled is a function of the variable values x and up of the process
itself, and those of its neighbors. We attempted to synthesize the guards and updates for the
middle two processes of a four process system P1,P2,P3,P4. Specifically, the esm-sk for P2
and P3 have two transitions, each with an unknown function as a guard and two unknown
functions for updating its state variables. The guard is a function of xi−1, xi, xi+1, upi−1, upi,
upi+1, and the updates of xi and upi are functions of xi and upi. We followed the definition
in [GT14] and defined a state as being legitimate if exactly one guarded command is enabled
globally. We also constrain the completions of P2 and P3 to be identical.
8.4.3 Cache Coherence Protocol
Recall that a cache coherence protocol ensures that the copies of shared data in the private
caches of a multiprocessor system are kept up-to-date with the most recent update to that
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shared data, by any other processor in the system. We describe the working of the German
cache coherence protocol, which has often been used as a case study in model checking
research [CMP04, TT08]. The protocol consists of a Directory process, n symmetric Cache
processes and n symmetric Environment processes, one for each cache process. Each cache
may be in the E,18 S or I state, indicating read-write, read, and no permissions on the data
respectively. All communication between the caches and the directory is non-blocking, and
occurs over buffered, unordered communication channels.
The environment issues read and write commands to its cache. In response to a read
command, the cache C sends a RequestS command to the directory. The directory sends C the
most up-to-date copy of the data, after coordinating with other caches, grants read access to
C, notes that C is a sharer of the data. In response to a write request from the environment,
the cache C sends a RequestE command to the directory. The directory coordinates with every
other cache C ′ that has read or write permissions to revoke their permissions, then grants C
exclusive access to the data, and notes that C is the owner of the data.
We consider a more complex variant of the German cache coherence protocol to evaluate the
techniques we have presented so far, which we refer to as German/MSI. The main differences
from the base German protocol are: (1) Direct communication between caches is possible in
18Not to be confused with the E state in the MESI protocol described in Section 4.4.
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some cases, (2) A cache in the S state can silently relinquish its permissions, which can cause
the directory to have out-of-date information about the caches which are in the S state. (3) A
cache in the E state can coordinate with the directory to relinquish its read/write permissions
over the block. The complete German/MSI protocol, modeled as communicating extended
state machines, is fairly complex, with a symmetry-reduced state space of about 20,000 states
when instantiated with two cache processes and about 450,000 states when instantiated with
three cache processes.
We now describe the working of the protocol used in the experimental evaluation using
scenarios which demonstrate the expected behavior of the caches and directory in response to
various stimuli from their environments.
Simple Cases for Read and Write Commands
We first consider the case where a cache process receives a read or (resp. write) command
from the environment, and no other cache in the system has exclusive permissions on data
(resp. any permissions on the data).
Figure 8.3a shows the actions performed by the various processes when a cache receives
a read command from its environment. It sends a RequestS message to the directory. In this
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particular scenario, the directory has recorded that all other caches are either in the I or S
state, and proceeds to send the most up-to-date copy of the data in a DataD2C message. The
cache then updates its local copy of the data, notifies its environment that the command has
been processed and transitions to the S state. Figure 8.3b shows how a cache processes a
write command from its environment which contains the new data value D to write. In this
particular case, the directory knows that all other caches are in the I state and thus proceeds
to acknowledge the RequestE message from the cache with a DataD2C message which also
contains the number of acknowledgments the cache needs to wait for before gaining write
permissions on the data. In this case, since all other caches are in the I state, the number of
acknowledgments to wait for is zero. The cache therefore, immediately updates its local copy
of the data with the new value D and notifies its environment that the command has been
processed and transitions to the E state. The case where all the other caches are not in the I
state will be described shortly, using another scenario.
Read and Write Commands which require Invalidations
On the other hand, Figure 8.4 depicts the scenario when a write command is received by a
cache and some other cache is in the S state. In this case, the directory sends invalidations
to all the caches in the S state, and sends a DataD2C message to the requesting cache with
the NumAcks field set to the number of sharers, notifying the cache that it needs to wait
for as many invalidate acknowledgments. The other caches directly communicate with the
requesting cache by sending acknowledgment of the invalidation from the directory. Note
that this is not part of the base German/MSI coherence protocol, where the directory collects
acknowledgments instead. With the extension, the cache-to-cache communication reduces the
amount of processing that needs to be done in the centralized directory, and also reduces the
latency (in terms of number of message hops needed to service a request from the enviroment)
for some requests.
Figure 8.5a describes the behavior of the protocol when a cache receives a write command
and some other cache in the system is in the E state. The actions are similar to the case where
some other cache is in the S state, except that the cache already in the E state directly sends
its data to the requesting cache, as well as to the directory. And the requesting cache does
not need to wait for any acknowledgments. Note that this is again an extension to the base
German/MSI protocol, where the data is sent to only the directory, and the directory forwards
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Figure 8.5: Commands in Exclusive State in the German/MSI Protocol
the data back to the requesting cache. Again, this extension reduces the amount of processing
that needs to be handled at the centralized directory.
The scenario when a cache receives a read command from the environment when some
other cache in the system is in the E state is shown in Figure 8.5b. As in the scenario shown
in Figure 8.5a, the directory sends an invalidation to the cache in the E state, which in turn
responds by sending the most up-to-date copy of the data to the directory as well as to the
requesting cache. It then downgrades its permissions to the S state. Both the cache and the
directory update their local copies of the data. The directory notes that the cache earlier in the
E state is now in the S state and also adds the requesting cache to set of sharers.
Relinquishing Permissions (Evictions)
Figure 8.6a and Figure 8.6b describe the behavior of the protocol in the case where a cache
wishes to relinquish its permissions. This is not a scenario that occurs in the base German/MSI
protocol, but is necessary in a real-world coherence protocol, where a block of data that has
been unused for some period of time may need to be evicted to make room for some other data.
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Figure 8.6: Evict Commands in the German/MSI protocol
This situation is depicted in Figure 8.6 by the receipt of an Ev command from the environment
by the cache. In the event that the cache in the S state, it silently evicts the line, without
notifying the directory. This can be done, only because the directory already has the most
up-to-date copy of the data — recall that the S state only grants read permissions to the cache,
hence it could not have modified the data. On the other hand if the cache is in the E state,
then it needs to send the most up-to-date copy of the data to the directory. Therefore it sends
a WriteBack message to the directory which contains the most up-to-date copy of the data. The
directory then updates its local copy of the data with this copy and notes that all caches in the
system are in the I state.
Corner-cases in the German/MSI Protocol
We now describe the corner-cases that could occur in the MSI/German protocol due to the
asynchronous interleaving of the scenarios presented so far. Consider the case where cache
C1 is in the I state. In contrast, the directory records that C1 is in state S and is a sharer, due
to C1 having silently relinquished its read permissions at some point in the past, according
the the scenario shown in Figure 8.6a. Now, both caches C1 and C2 receive write commands
from their respective environments. Cache C2 sends a RequestE message to the directory,
requesting exclusive write permissions. The directory, under the impression that C1 is in state
S, sends an Inv message to it, informing it that C2 has requested exclusive access and C1 needs
to acknowledge that it has relinquished permissions to C2. Concurrently, cache C1 sends a
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Figure 8.7: The racy scenario in the MSI/German Protocol
RequestE message to the directory requesting write permissions as well, which gets delayed.
Subsequently, the cache C1 receives an invalidation when it is in the state IM, the behavior
for which is not described by any of the scenarios provided by the programmer. The correct
behavior for the cache in this situation (shown by dashed arrows), is to send an InvAck message
to the cache C2. The guard, the state variable updates, as well as the location update is what
we have left unspecified in the case of this particular scenario.
The MSI/German protocol as described in this section has four other corner-cases. Two
of these are similar to the one shown in Figure 8.7, with the difference being that either the
RequestS message is sent by C1 in response to a Read command from the environment, or that
C1 begins in the S state, and sends a RequestE message in response to a Write command from
the environment.
We now describe the last two corner-cases. These are depicted in Figure 8.8. The scenarios
shown in Figures 8.6b and 8.5b interleave, to obtain the situation shown in Figure 8.8. The
cache C1 having sent a WriteBack message to the directory is not expecting an Inv message.
Similarly, the directory, having sent an Inv to cache C1 is not expecting a WriteBack message
from it. The correct way for the processes to behave in this situation is show by dashed arrows
in Figure 8.8. The cache behaves as if the Invmessage was aWritebackAckmessage and notifies
its environment of completion. The directory updates its local copy of the data with the one
from the WriteBack message, and then sends this data over to the cache C2, informing it that it
need not wait for any acknowledgment. After this point, both the cache and directory behaviors
know how to interact with each other as shown in Figure 8.3a. For completeness, the way the
scenario plays out is shown in Figure 8.8 as well, using dashed arrows.
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Figure 8.8: A Corner-case in the German/MSI Protocol
As part of the evaluation, we left all the five corner-case behaviors just described unspecified
in the incomplete protocol. Our tool was able to successfully synthesize the behavior for
the unspecified parts of the German/MSI protocol correspond to all of the five corner-cases
described in this section, within a reasonable amount of time.
8.5 Summary of Experimental Results
Table 8.1 summarizes our experimental findings. All experiments were performed on a Linux
desktop, with an Intel Core i7 CPU running at 3.4 GHz. with 8 GB of memory. The columns
show the name of the benchmark, the number of unknown functions that were synthesized
(# UF), the size of the search space for the unknown functions, the number of states in the
complete protocol (# States), “symm. red.” denotes symmetry reduced state space. The “#
Iters.” column shows the number of iterations required by the algorithm, where each iteration
corresponds to analyzing one or more counterexample traces to generate additional constraints
and querying the SMT solver for a new interpretation that also satisfies the newly added
constraints. The last two columns show the total amount of time spent in SMT solving and
the end-to-end synthesis time. We used the SMT solver Z3 [dMB08] in our implementation.
Further, Z3 was used in its incremental mode as constraints were added across iterations.
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Benchmark # UF
Search
# States # Iters.
SMT Total
Space
Time Time
(s) (s)
Peterson 3 236 60 14 0.1 0.13
Dijkstra 6 2192 ~2000 30 27 64
German/MSI-2 16 ~24700 ~20000 (symm. red.) 217 31 298
German/MSI-4 28 ~27614 ~20000 (symm. red.) 419 898 1545
German/MSI-5 34 ~29000 ~20000 (symm. red.) 525 2261 3410
Table 8.1: Experimental Results for Completion of Protocols with Symmetry
The “German/MSI-n” rows correspond to the synthesizing the unknown behavior for the
German/MSI protocol, with n out of the five unknown transitions left unspecified. In each case,
we applied the heuristic to obtain minimally permissive guards and biased the search towards
updates which leave the values of state variables unchanged as far as possible, except in the
case of the Dijkstra benchmark, as mentioned earlier. Also, note that we ran each benchmark
multiple times with different random seeds to the SMT solver to offset the variance due to
random restarts in the SMT solver. The run times reported in Table 8.1 are the worst of the
run times that we measured over these multiple runs.
8.5.1 Discussion
We now briefly discuss some qualitative aspects of our experiences with experimenting with
the prototype tool, and highlight on the aspects that were crucial in making the approach work
well.
Programmer Assistance
In all cases, the programmer specified the kinds of messages to handle in the states where the
behavior was unknown. For example, in the case of the German/MSI protocol, the programmer
indicated that in the IM state on the cache, it needs to handle an invalidation from the directory
(see Figure 8.7). In general, the programmer specified what needs to be handled, but not the
how. This was crucial to getting our approach to scale. Without this information, the algorithm
would be required to handle every possible event in every possible situation. We have observed
that sheer size of the constraints generated with this approach is too large for SMT solvers to
process efficiently.
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Synthesizing Symbolic Expressions
The interpretations returned by the SMT solver are in the form of tables, which specify the
output of the unknown function on specific inputs. We mentioned that if a symbolic expression
is required we can pass this output to a SyGuS solver, which will then return a symbolic
expression. We were able to synthesize compact expressions in all cases using the enumerative
SyGuS solver [ABJ+13].
Overhead of Decision Procedures
We observe from Table 8.1 that for the longer running benchmarks, the run time is dominated
by SMT solving. In all of these cases, a very large fraction of the constraints asserted into the
SMT solver are constraints to implement heuristics which are specifically aimed at guiding
the SMT solver, and reducing the impact of non-deterministic choices made by the solver.
Specialized decision procedures that handle these constraints at an algorithmic level [BP14]
can greatly speed up the synthesis procedure. Another possibility is to not rely on an SMT solver
to generate interpretations, but rather, use a SyGuS solver to generate symbolic expressions
which will serve as interpretations. From our empirical observations, for small expression
sizes (as is the case in most of the benchmarks we have evaluated), a SyGuS solver returns an
interpretation much faster than an SMT solver. Unfortunately, the available SyGuS solvers do
not handle the synthesis of multiple correlated functions well. So either (1) Existing SyGuS
solvers would need to algorithmically support the synthesis of multiple correlated functions, or
(2) The problem would need to be massaged into a form such that the SyGuS solver is only
ever called upon to generate an interpretation for a single function.
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9
Related Work
Synthesis of reactive systems has been studied extensively in literature. To describe, or even
list all past research in this area would be a Herculean endeavor in itself, which we shall
not attempt to undertake. Instead, we shall highlight a few key ideas that have shaped the
landscape of this research area. We begin with describing the classical approaches to reactive
synthesis purely from ltl, ctl, or ctl* specifications. We then briefly describe synthesis
approaches based on partial or incorrect system descriptions, and proceed to a discussion of
other approaches that share similarities, in spirit, with the approaches we propose in this
manuscript. We conclude the discussion of related work by describing recent work in the area
of straight-line and recursive program synthesis.
9.1 Classical Reactive Synthesis Techniques
Classical approaches to solve the synchronous (and non-distributed) version of reactive synthe-
sis, i.e., where the environment and the system make transitions synchronously in discrete steps,
can be broadly classified into linear-time and branching-time techniques, depending on whether
the specification is in ltl or a branching-time logic like ctl or ctl* respectively. In linear-
time synthesis, the overall strategy [PR89, Ros92] is to (1) construct a (non-deterministic)
Büchi automaton corresponding to the ltl specification ϕ, (2) Determinize the Büchi automa-
ton [Saf88] into a deterministic Rabin automaton, (3) Interpret the resulting Rabin automaton
as tree automaton on infinite trees over the Boolean predicates that are part of the specification
and (4) Check if the resulting tree automaton is empty. This approach has a complexity of
O(22
n
) (in fact, it is 2exptime-complete [Ros92]) where n represents the syntactic size of
the original ltl specification ϕ. Other approaches for ltl synthesis view the problem as a
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controller-synthesis problem [RW89, TW94a, TW94b, MPS95]. This view of reactive synthesis
as controller-synthesis has also been applied in the branching-time world for a subset of ctl
and is shown to be np-complete for full ctl [Ant95], when the controller is memory-less. It
has also been shown that ctl control with memory is exptime-complete, and ctl* control is
2exptime-complete [Kup95a, Kup95b, KV96]. Distributed reactive synthesis has been shown
to be undecidable [PR90, LT00, Tri04, FS05].
Classical ltl synthesis algorithms have found little practice, owing mostly to Safra’s de-
terminization procedure [Saf88] being notoriously difficult to implement [ATW06, THB95].
This has led to the development of “Safraless” approaches to synthesis [KPV06, KV05, EK14],
which eschew Safra’s determinization procedure and use alternative structures. Along the
other dimension, it has been shown that restricting the specification language to a reasonably
expressive subset of full ltl renders the reactive synthesis problem tractable, with polynomial
time complexity [BJP+12]. To deal with the undecidability of distributed protocol synthesis,
recent advances have proposed bounded techniques for synthesis [FS05, FS13], often com-
bined with symbolic reasoning [Ehl11, Ehl12]. Another interesting approach approximates the
eventuality properties of an ltl specification, successively refining the approximation until an
implementation can be synthesized [FJR11, FJR13]. Randomization, in the form of a genetic
programming based algorithm has also been used to skirt around the undecidability of the
problem [KP08, KP09].
One of the drawbacks of most classical synthesis techniques is that they operate over the
Boolean domain and often, the final output of such a synthesis algorithm is a transition relation
(or function) over propositional variables. This is typically not how a human views a reactive
system, and as a result such a representation can be rather opaque to a human being. Also,
while writing declarative specifications in a temporal logic does have theoretical elegance, it is
non-trivial for a human being to describe a protocol using only such specifications.
The work described in this manuscript differs from classical synthesis techniques in that we
allow a mix of specification languages: the high-level properties of the system are specified
using declarative constructs, while the common-case behavior of the protocol is described in
an operational manner and not required to be complete. Our techniques aim to fill in the tricky
details using the high-level temporal logic specifications. A pleasant consequence of this is that
the final artifact of our synthesis approaches is a human-readable, operational description of
the system.
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9.2 Synthesis from Partial or Incomplete Descriptions
The sketch system [SLRBE05, STB+06, SAT+07, SLJB08, Sol09] is a program synthesis
framework where the correctness requirement is expressed as a — possibly a sub-optimal, but
functionally correct — C program. The programmer then expresses the “shape” of the desired
program as another C-like program, called the sketch with certain details — called “holes”
in the sketch parlance — unspecified. The sketch system fills in the holes in the sketch
such that the completed version of the sketch is functionally equivalent to the sub-optimal C
program provided by the user. The sketch system has been successfully used to synthesize
bit-stream programs for encryption and decryption [SLRBE05], finite state programs [STB+06]
and stencil computations [SAT+07]. Perhaps the work that is most closely related to the work
described in this manuscript is the psketch system [SLJB08], which synthesizes concurrent
data structures. The ideas we present in this manuscript are inspired by sketch and share a
lot of methodological similarities with sketch. However, unlike sketch, we focus specifically
on distributed reactive synthesis problems.
The more recently proposed storyboard programming approach [SS11, SS12] by the
authors of sketch also shares several similarities with the techniques presented in this
manuscript. Our notion of a scenario is very similar to the notion of a storyboard as used by
Singh, et. al. A key difference is that storyboards seem to be more geared towards describing
representational transformations over linked data structures, where there is no notion of time,
whereas scenarios have an implicit notion of time associated with them.
Our work is also related to recent research on program repair [JGB05, vEJ13].The goal of
program repair is to repair a buggy program, such that some objective function is maximized.
To this end, techniques like modeling the problem as one of finding a memory-less strategy for
a Büchi game [JGB05] and finding a repair such that the repair deviates as little as possible
from the buggy program on non-buggy executions [vEJ13] have been proposed. However these
techniques are closer in spirit to classical synthesis approaches than to the ones we describe in
this manuscript and therefore suffer from many of the same shortcomings.
9.3 Synthesis from Sequence Charts
Specifying a reactive system using example scenarios — in the form of message sequence
charts, or live sequence charts — also has a long tradition. In particular, the problem of
150
deriving an implementation that exhibits at least the behaviors specified by a given set of
scenarios is well-studied [AEY03, UKM03, BBO12]. A particularly well-developed approach
is behavioral programming [HMW12, DH01, HM03] that builds on an extension of message
sequence charts, called live sequence charts [DH01], and has been shown to be effective for
specifying the behavior of a single controller reacting with its environment. It is not clear how
requirements in the form of temporal logic specifications can be supported in this framework.
The work in [BKKL10] generalizes Angluin’s learning algorithm [Ang87] to synthesize
automata from MSCs but does not allow for the specification of requirements and relies on the
programmer to answer classification and equivalence queries and is therefore not automatic.
The problem of inferring extended finite-state machines has been studied in the context of active
learning [CHJS14], but the techniques are again, not automatic, and do not accommodate
temporal logic specifications. Scenarios — in the form of “flows” — have also been used in the
modular verification of cache coherence protocols [TT08, OTT09].
9.4 Straight-line and Recursive Program Synthesis
The earliest work that we are aware of in the area of synthesizing straight-line program
fragments is the extensive work on what was then called “super-optimizations”. The original
problem was formulated by Massalin [Mas87], and the objective was to deduce the smallest
possible program that was behaviorally identical to another, possibly longer and less efficient,
program. The approach presented by Massalin [Mas87] could only scale to a programs with a
very few instructions. Since then, more scalable algorithms have emerged [JNR02, JNZ06] and
superoptimizers have also been applied in peephole optimizations and binary translation [BA06,
BA08, SSCA15]. More recently, stochastic approaches have been successfully applied to yield
scalable superoptimization algorithms [SSA13, SSA14]. Stochastic techniques techniques have
also been applied to synthesize loop invariants [SA14].
Significant inroads have been made in the last decade or so in the area of synthesizing small
program fragments to perform various tasks, starting from some form of formal specifications.
The research on the sketch framework [SLRBE05] perhaps reinvigorated research in the
area of program synthesis. The idea of using an unoptimized program as a specification
for a more optimized version which is to be synthesized was novel. Although the initial
system was for synthesis of bit-streaming programs [SLRBE05], the techniques were later
adapted to sketching finite programs [STB+06], stencils computations [SAT+07], concurrent
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data structures [SLJB08] as well as to synthesize code for data structure manipulations via
storyboards [SS11]. Synthesis of data structure manipulation routines has also been explored in
other recent work [FCD15, AGK13]. Other recent work has viewed the problem of synthesizing
straight-line code as that of component-based synthesis [GJTV11, JGST10]. Enumerative
approaches to synthesizing code fragments that are vectorized equivalents of unoptimized
code has also been explored in recent work [BCG+13].
More recently, the FlashFill algorithm [Gul11] was one of the first to leverage the notion
of an inductive specification, which has been described in Chapter 5. The original FlashFill
algorithm was designed for synthesizing string transformations in spreadsheets based on a few
input-output examples demonstrating the desired transformation [Gul11]. However, since then,
the techniques have been applied to a variety of different domains [KG15, BGHZ15, LG14,
GKT11, SG12, PGGP14, PGBG12]. A framework called FlashMeta [PG15], which unifies the
domain-specific inductive synthesis algorithms implemented in the rest of the Flash algorithms
using a common abstract algorithm has also been recently developed.
Program Synthesis techniques have also recently been used to synthesize loop invariants.
The ICE [GLMN14] and Alchemist [SGM15] are prime examples, along with algorithms that use
a stochastic search [SA14]. A tool based on the Alchemist [SGM15] algorithm participated in
the 2015 SyGuS competition in the invariant synthesis track. Decision trees based learners have
also been explored recently for SyGuS solvers [GNMR15], where they have been primarily used
to learn thresholds for affine classifiers. Type directed approaches to program synthesis from
input-output examples have also recently been a subject of study [OZ15, Ose15, FOWZ16].
152
10
Conclusions
This chapter concludes this dissertation by first providing a brief summary of the research that
has been described in this dissertation, followed by an orthogonal exploration of the themes
that have been prevalent throughout this dissertation. We then highlight some avenues along
which the work described in this dissertation can be improved and extended, and conclude
with the author’s opinions and outlook about research in the area of verification and program
synthesis.
10.1 Summary of the Dissertation
This dissertation approached the problem of synthesizing a distributed reactive synthesis from
the direction of completing an incomplete description of the protocol. Apart from the inherent
difficulty of developing such protocols, our primary motivation for this approach was that it
was not clear if describing the protocol purely using a temporal logic is necessarily easier than
describing it operationally. Furthermore, the complexity of distributed reactive synthesis from
temporal logic descriptions made it all the more appealing to view the synthesis problem as a
fruitful interaction between a synthesis tool and a programmer.
We formalized the problem of protocol completion, and described our experience with using
a theoretically elegant, but practically ineffective, symbolic algorithm to solve the protocol
completion problem.
We then described a tool called transit where the programmer would symbolically codify
the parts of the protocol that are well understood. The programmer would then describe
fixes to counterexamples presented by the tool transit using concolic snippets, which were a
mixture of symbolic constraints and constraints involving concrete values, the latter of which
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is intended to be derived from a concrete erroneous execution. The programmer is a part of
the synthesis loop in transit. Our prototype of transit was able to assist the programmer
in describing a complex industrial cache coherence protocol, demonstrating the scalability of
the proposed techniques.
We then made a brief digression to describe the SyGuS problem that came about as a
generalization of the core computational problem solved within transit. The SyGuS effort
was successful and annual SyGuS contests are conducted with participation growing each year.
We described an enumerative strategy to solve instances of the SyGuS problems, studied the
limitations of purely enumerative approaches, and proposed an improved algorithm that is
enumerative in spirit, but demonstrates enhanced scalability. We empirically evaluated a tool
based on this algorithm, called eusolver, and found it to be able to solve a set of benchmarks
that no existing SyGuS solver had been able to solve, to the best of our knowledge.
We then concluded our excursion into the world of syntax-guided synthesis and developed
algorithms for distributed protocol synthesis that eliminated the programmer from the synthesis
loop by automatically analyzing counterexamples and suitably constraining future solution
candidates. We evaluated these algorithms on a variety of benchmarks, and observed that
while they scaled to moderately complex protocols, their scalability was nonetheless lower than
that of transit. We also described a model checking and synthesis framework, called kinara,
that we developed as part of this effort, and which has now been released as an open-source
project.
10.2 Themes Explored in this Dissertation
Two themes have been pervasive throughout this dissertation. The first has been about the
interplay between the amount of programmer involvement and the scalability of the synthesis
algorithms. The second has been about the use of alternative and, hopefully more intuitive and
convenient techniques, to specify programmer intent. We now discuss, in some detail, how
each of these themes, has been explored in the research described in this dissertation.
10.2.1 Interplay between Programmer Involvement and Scalability
The transit system required the programmer to be a part of the synthesis loop. This resulted
in the tool being scalable enough to assist a programmer to develop a large industrial cache
coherence protocol. The implementation of transit described in this dissertation made
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use of an enumerative algorithm that is simplistic in comparison with the decision tree based
algorithm presented in Chapter 6. The scalability of transit is restricted only by the scalability
of the expression inference algorithm. So, we can expect that transit could scale to being
able to assist a programmer in designing even more complex protocols if coupled with better
algorithms for expression inference, such as the one described in Chapter 6.
In contrast to transit, the work described in Chapters 7 and 8 was aimed at being fully
automatic. While they could scale to reasonably complex protocols, we were unable to get
them to scale to the industrial SGI-Origin cache coherence protocol that transit proved to be
useful on. While, in general, more programmer inputs and involvement should imply an easier
synthesis problem that the algorithms are required to solve, our experience with the use of
scenarios in the work described in Chapter 7 was counter-intuitive: more programmer inputs,
in the form of providing more scenarios resulted in larger incomplete state machines, which
in turn led to poor scalability. However, an important point to note here is that in specifying
the scenarios the programmer made minimal use of the state labeling techniques described in
Section 7.2. A more extensive use of these techniques could have resulted in more compact
incomplete state machines, and thus enhanced the scalability of the algorithms. The fact
that the constraints were expressed as integer linear programs also contributed greatly to the
scalability of the techniques presented in Chapter 7. This was something that we could not
leverage when we allowed esms and esm-sks with state variables in Chapter 8, and we had to
replace a rather lean ILP solver with a relatively heavy-weight SMT solver as the constraint
solving engine.
The interplay between the amount of information provided by the programmer and scal-
ability is also apparent in the work described in Chapter 8. There, had the programmer not
specified a small set of transitions that were candidates for synthesis, the algorithm would not
have scaled. By narrowing the search space using an expert’s intuition, the programmer in
effect enables the synthesis algorithms to be useful in providing assistance.
10.2.2 Use of Alternative Techniques to Specify Intent
Traditionally, research on reactive synthesis has focused on synthesis starting from temporal
logic specifications or requirements. In addition to being computationally difficult, it is not
clear that writing formal temporal logic specifications is necessarily easier, simpler or better
than writing an operational description of the model, from a software engineering perspective.
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The work presented in this dissertation, on the other hand, uses other techniques to specify
the programmer intent. The transit system used concolic snippets added by the programmer
over the course of developing a protocol. Program synthesis techniques were then used to
obtain a candidate protocol which was consistent with the snippets provided by the programmer.
A point to note here is that the set of concolic snippets may be ambiguous. The expression
inference algorithm in transit uses the principle of Occam’s razor and deems the simplest or
the smallest expression to be most likely to explain the under-specified set of constraints.
Chapter 7 demonstrated how scenarios could be coupled with synthesis techniques in the
construction of distributed protocols. We believe that scenarios are a more intuitive form of
specification for distributed protocols, than specification of the protocol using a state machine-
like abstraction. Although the problem definition in Chapter 8 demanded an incomplete
protocol in the state machine abstraction, the incomplete protocol was in fact constructed from
a set of scenarios.
10.3 Avenues for Future Work
There are several directions in which the work described in this dissertation can be extended
and improved upon. We highlight what we consider to be the most fruitful directions in this
section.
Use of Inductive Specifications in Protocol Completion
The scalability of the algorithms described in Chapter 8 leaves something to be desired. It is
apparent from the summary of experimental results shown in Table 8.1 that the scalability is
limited by the performance of the SMT solver. But as we have mentioned earlier, the constraints
obtained on the uninterpreted functions are essentially inductive specifications. The only terms
appearing in such constraints are the uninterpreted functions applied to concrete constant
values, and concrete constant values. However, each constraint may involve disjunctions and
may also refer to multiple unknown functions. In other words, these specifications are not
separable, where separability is a concept we have defined in Section 6.2.1. Recent work [PG15]
has studied how such inductive specifications can be leveraged to develop scalable synthesis
algorithms. Although the work describes techniques for synthesis with disjunctive and non-
separable constraints, it is not clear how they perform: all the instantiations of the algorithms
seem to be for separable inductive specifications. Applying or adapting these techniques for use
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in the context of constraints obtained from the automatic protocol completion problem might
be an interesting area of future work. Efficient algorithms for solving constraints of this form
would have an immediate impact on the scalability of the algorithms presented in Chapter 8,
as it would obviate the need for the SMT solver
Synthesis Algorithms for Non-separable Specifications
The algorithm for solving the SyGuS problem described in Chapter 6 dealt only with separable
specifications. The original esolver however, could handle non-separable specifications and
even specifications involving multiple functions, albeit with reduced scalability. Investigating if
the techniques that make eusolver scalable on separable specifications can be adapted for
use on non-separable specifications would be a useful endeavor. Indeed, such specifications
do occur in practice as shown in Chapter 8; in addition the SyGuS benchmark suite also has a
small number of benchmarks with non-separable specifications.
10.4 Reflections on Verification and Program Synthesis
The problem of synthesizing a program or a circuit from a formal description of the behavior
of the program or circuit is often mentioned as (one of) the holy grail of computer science,
starting from Church’s problem, presented in 1957 [Chu57]. The number of scholarly articles
published on program synthesis in the past decade vindicates my19 opinion that synthesis is a
technology whose time has come. Someone who is even slightly less than optimistic might be
of the opinion that it is premature: After all, we haven’t been able to get verification techniques
to scale beyond programs with which have in the order of a hundred thousand lines. Mission
critical software systems like automotive control and avionics software are still largely without
formal proofs of correctness. Why then attack a new problem when there are already so many
unsolved problems?
I believe that research in program synthesis techniques could in fact prove beneficial to
research in program verification techniques, and most certainly the other way around as well.
My opinion is that the reason that program verification techniques have not seen the uptake that
can be considered desirable is simply the relatively high entry barrier, coupled with ineffective
19Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this section are solely those of the author, and are not endorsed
by the dissertation supervisor, the dissertation committee, or any of the author’s collaborators. Statements and
predictions in this section may also not be strongly backed by evidence, empirical or otherwise, and serve solely
to express the author’s point-of-view.
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feedback techniques when verification fails. The entry barrier is most commonly in the form of
having to write annotations in the form of loop-invariants and heap separability assumptions
— usually in some variant of formal first-order logic — for existing code bases, which are often
large to begin with. While there exists no silver bullet and programmers will eventually have to
bite the bullet and provide these annotations if they desire verified code, a lot can be done to
make it less unpleasant to write these annotations. For example, my personal experience with
the VCC framework [CDH+09] has been that the feedback provided when verification fails is
relatively unhelpful. I am simply presented with an execution that invalidates the annotations
that were provided, leaving me with little information about how to correct my annotations,
and what a correct loop invariant is.
I believe that program synthesis techniques could help in remedying this situation by either
(1) automatically trying to synthesize a loop invariant, or (2) providing me with suggestions
that differ from the existing, proposed loop invariant in minor ways and are more likely to
be correct. It delights me to see that program synthesis techniques are already being applied
to synthesize invariants [SGH+13, SA14]. The second possibility has also been explored in
the context of programs and reactive systems [vEJ13, vEJ15]. Such techniques would greatly
reduce the entry barrier to using program verification to prove real-world systems correct.
While program synthesis techniques can help adoption of formal methods, I also believe
that research in the area of human computer interaction has a large role to play in this arena in
the near future. While formal methods researchers are most comfortable working with abstract
objects in first order or other, more esoteric logics, the average programmer is unlikely to
appreciate the succinctness and the precision of such formalisms. Research in natural language
descriptions of such objects is likely to encourage adoption of formal methods far more than
anything else. There has been work in using natural language for program synthesis [RGM15]
and teaching and grading assignments for a course on automata theory [ADG+13, DKA+15],
but I predict that the future will see more of such work, which will ultimately make formal
methods more accessible.
Lastly, while research in the areasmentioned in this section can help in encouraging adoption
of formal methods as an integral part of software development, the most powerful motivator is
likely to be financial. So, the ultimate thrust must come from within an organization, making it
an organizational policy to use and apply verification and program synthesis techniques. This
is likely to happen only when researchers in this discipline actively collaborate with industrial
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partners to find out what problems matter to them, and attempt to solve the — possibly
un-fashionable and also difficult — problems that matter.
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